R v Haydon (No 7) - [2005] SASC 21

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal)
R v HAYDON (No 7)
Reasons for Ruling of The Honourable Justice Sulan
21 January 2005
CRIMINAL LAW - JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - COURSE OF EVIDENCE, STATEMENTS AND ADDRESSES - ADDRESSES - GENERALLY
MISTRIAL APPLICATION - CROWN OPENING
Accused charged with two counts of murder and six counts of assisting offenders - at conclusion of Crown opening accused sought order for mistrial - whether nature and content of Crown opening was such that accused cannot receive a fair trial - whether Crown invited the jury to reason in an impermissible way by propensity reasoning - whether Crown failed to identify what matters are being alleged as facts - discussion of contents of Crown opening - whether opening was fair to the accused - application refused.
R v Bunting & Wagner (No 3) (2003) 230 LSJS 410, discussed.
Deriz v R (1999) 109 A Crim R 329; R v Armstrong (1989) 53 SASR 25, considered.

R v HAYDON (No 7)
[2005] SASC 21

SULAN J Mark Ray Haydon (“Haydon”) is charged with two counts of murder and six counts of assisting offenders. The charges resulted from the discovery by police of eight bodies contained in six barrels in a bank vault at Snowtown on 20 May 1999.
Background
John Justin Bunting (“Bunting”), Robert Joe Wagner (“Wagner”), James Spyridon Vlassakis (“Vlassakis”) and Haydon were charged with a number of murders. It is not necessary to trace the history of events after the four men had been charged. When they were presented for trial, Martin J ordered that Bunting and Wagner be separately tried from Haydon. Vlassakis, by that time, had pleaded guilty to four counts of murder and was a key Crown witness in the case. Bunting was convicted by a jury of eleven counts of murder. Wagner, who had pleaded guilty to three counts of murder, was found guilty by a jury of a further seven counts of murder.
Haydon was presented on an Information charging him with two counts of murder and six counts of assisting offenders. After a lengthy voir dire, the trial commenced before a jury on 29 July 2004. Haydon pleaded not guilty to all counts.
The circumstances leading to the arrest of the four men were that police were investigating the disappearance of a number of persons, including Haydon’s wife, Elizabeth Haydon. During the course of the investigations, the police received information which caused them to look for a four-wheel drive Land Cruiser. That vehicle was located parked in a driveway at Snowtown. Further investigations led the police to a disused bank premises in Snowtown. In the vault of that bank they discovered six barrels containing eight bodies. Some of the bodies had been mutilated. There were body parts, a well as whole bodies in the barrels.
Post-mortem examinations established the identities of the bodies in the various barrels. During some of the time when it is alleged that murders occurred, Bunting was living at 3 Burdekin Avenue,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Haydon (No 7)

Details

AGLC: R v Haydon (No 7) [2005] SASC 21
Case: [2005] SASC 21
Decision Date: 21 January 2005

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Haydon (No 7), the accused was charged with two counts of murder and six counts of assisting offenders. Following the conclusion of the Crown's opening, the accused sought an order for a mistrial, arguing that the nature and content of the Crown's opening was such that they could not receive a fair trial. Specifically, the accused claimed that the Crown had invited the jury to reason in an impermissible way by propensity reasoning, and that the Crown had failed to identify what matters were being alleged as facts.

The court considered the specific complaints made by the accused's counsel and examined the contents of the Crown's opening. The court found that the Crown's opening was conducted without emotive language and without arguing the case for the Crown. The court concluded that there was nothing unfair about the manner in which the Crown opened the case, and that the Crown had not invited the jury to reason by way of propensity reasoning. The court found that the Crown opening was not unbalanced and did not seek to anticipate what might be the defence case. The court found that the Crown had simply set out the facts and inferences that they would be asking the jury to draw. The court concluded that the Crown opening was not unfair or improper and refused the application for a mistrial.

The court emphasised that it is not the function of an opening to deal with questions of admissibility of evidence and what evidence may be cross-admissible in respect of various counts. The court noted that if it transpired that there were matters upon which the Crown had opened on which there was no evidence, then the jury would be directed accordingly. The court also noted that at the conclusion of the evidence, the jury would be given detailed directions about how the evidence could be used and what evidence was admissible in respect of each count. The court held that the Crown opening was not unfair or improper and dismissed the application for a mistrial.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

SULAN J

She referred to other facts, including the storage and movement of barrels, and the inferences that the Crown ask the jury to draw from those facts. She referred to the movement of the Land Cruiser. She described the bank premises and the storage of the barrels at the bank. She referred to access to the bank, and the evidence that the Crown will call to establish that Haydon and Bunting were lessees of the bank. She dealt with the various items found at the bank.Conclusion The Crown case was opened without emotive language, and without the Crown arguing its case. Any summary of the allegations in this case would create feelings of revulsion in any jury. However, Ms Abraham kept to the facts. There was nothing unfair about the manner in which Ms Abraham opened the Crown case. In respect of the specific complaints made by Mrs Shaw, which had some justification, I invited Ms Abraham to correct them. Insofar as there was no objection from Mrs Shaw, those corrections were made. Having heard the opening and then read the transcript, I conclude that the opening was not unfair. The Crown opening was not unbalanced. It did not seek to anticipate what might be the defence case. It simply set out the facts and inferences that the Crown will be asking the jury to draw. It did not seek to go into the detail of how the jury should approach the evidence in respect of each count. The Crown was not required to do so. It is not the function of an opening to deal with questions of admissibility of evidence, and what evidence may be cross-admissible in respect of various counts. There was nothing in the opening from which it could be said that the jury were invited to reason by way of propensity reasoning. At the conclusion of the evidence it will be necessary for the jury to be given detailed directions about how the evidence can be used, and what evidence is admissible in respect of each count. If it transpires that there are matters upon which the Crown opened on which there is no evidence, then the jury will be directed accordingly. In my view, the Crown opening was not unfair or improper. I refuse the application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SULAN J

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