Baird v Smee

Case [2000] NSWCA 253


NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:     Baird & Anor v Smee [2000]  NSWCA 253

FILE NUMBER(S):
40635/99

HEARING DATE(S):           13 March 2000

JUDGMENT DATE:            11/09/2000

PARTIES:
Lorraine Noeline BAIRD - First Appellant
James Robert McDONNELL - Second Appellant
Dolores SMEE - Respondent

JUDGMENT OF:      Mason P Handley JA Giles JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Supreme Court - Equity Division

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):        EQ  2954/98

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Master Macready

COUNSEL:
C J Bevan & A Iuliano - Appellants
P H Blackburn-Hart - Respondent

SOLICITORS:
Turner Freeman, Sydney - Appellants
Warren McKeon Dickson, Engadine - Respondent

CATCHWORDS:
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION - mutual wills made - one testator died - other testator changed will - other testator died - whether trust for beneficiaries under original will - must find agreement not to revoke original wills, intended to have legal effect - fact made mutual wills does not of itself establish requisite agreement - agreement not to be lightly inferred - insufficient evidence from which requisite agreement can be inferred.  D

LEGISLATION CITED:

DECISION:
(1)  Extend time to apply for leave to appeal and grant leave to appeal;  (2)  Appeal dismissed with costs.

JUDGMENT:

THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA  40635/99

EQ  2954/98

MASON P

HANDLEY JA

GILES JA

Monday 11 September 2000

BAIRD & ANOR v SMEE

JUDGMENT

1     MASON P:  I have had the benefit of reading the judgment of Giles JA.  I agree with the orders proposed and with his Honour's reasons.

2     Mr Derek McDonnell and Mrs Gwendoline McDonnell made separate mutual wills on 12 March 1986.  Each testator appointed the Public Trustee as executor and trustee and disposed of the entire estate in favour of the other “absolutely” if he or she survived by 30 days.  If this did not happen residue was to be divided equally between the children of Derek and Gwendoline's former marriages and their respective families.  The wills were not expressed to be mutual wills, nor do they contain any express provision relevant to non-revocation.

3     There is no evidence as to the age of Derek or Gwendoline in 1986 beyond what can be inferred from the fact that Derek's first marriage was dissolved in 1963 at a time when there were two children of that marriage and the fact that Derek and Gwendoline married each other in 1967.

4     Derek died in 1992.  Neither of the 1986 wills had been revoked by that time.  Upon Derek’s death his share in a jointly owned home unit at Eastlakes passed to his widow.  Upon her surviving him by 30 days, approximately $20,000 also passed to her under the 1986 will.  Almost a year after Derek’s death, Gwendoline made a new will revoking her 1986 will and leaving her entire estate to the two children of her first marriage (ie to the exclusion of her two stepchildren, the appellants).  Gwendoline died in 1996.

5     To succeed in their claim, the appellants must establish that Derek and Gwendoline had agreed not…

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Details
AGLC
Baird v Smee [2000] NSWCA 253
Case
[2000] NSWCA 253
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales regarding the existence of a mutual wills trust. The appellants were the children of Derek McDonnell from a previous marriage, and the respondent was a child of Gwendoline McDonnell from a previous marriage. Derek and Gwendoline, who were married to each other, executed wills on 12 March 1986, prepared by the Public Trustee. Derek's will provided for his estate to go to Gwendoline if she survived him by 30 days, with a further provision that if she predeceased him or died within that period, his estate was to be divided equally between his children (the appellants) and Gwendoline's children (including the respondent). Gwendoline's will contained similar provisions. Derek died on 15 March 1986. Subsequently, Gwendoline changed her will, and upon her death, the appellants sought to establish that the original wills were mutual and that a trust arose in their favour.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the original wills executed by Derek and Gwendoline McDonnell on 12 March 1986 were mutual wills, and if so, whether a trust was imposed on Gwendoline's estate for the benefit of the appellants. This required the court to determine if there was a binding agreement between Derek and Gwendoline not to revoke their original wills, and if such an agreement was intended to have legal effect.

The court reasoned that the mere fact that two persons have made wills that are identical or reciprocal in their provisions does not, of itself, establish the requisite agreement for mutual wills. The court emphasised that an agreement not to revoke wills must be clearly established and should not be lightly inferred. In this instance, the court found that the evidence presented, including the wills instruction sheet and the wills themselves, was insufficient to infer the existence of such an agreement. The instruction sheet contained no mention of mutuality or an agreement to make mutual wills, and the dispositive provisions, while reciprocal, did not inherently demonstrate a concluded agreement to be legally bound not to alter them.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Extend time to apply for leave to appeal and grant leave to appeal; (2) Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The submission may be doubted, see Beard v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1912) 25 CLR 1; Webb v Hanlon (1939) 61 CLR 313 at 321 (Latham CJ), 322 (Rich J), 327 (Starke J); and Oertel v Crocker (1947) 75 CLR 261 at 267-8 (Latham CJ), 269-70 (Starke J) and 272-3 (Dixon J), in particular the comments on Tipper v Moore (1911) 13 CLR 348. Whatever the position be, however, the substance of the appeal has been fully argued and I consider that in this case it is appropriate to grant leave to appeal if leave be necessary. Facts Derek James McDonnell and Gwendoline McDonnell married on 13 May 1967. Without intending any disrespect, I will refer to them as Derek and Gwendoline. Derek had been previously married, the marriage ending in divorce on 31 May 1963. The appellants were the two children of that marriage. Gwendoline had also been previously married and divorced. There had been two children of that marriage, the respondent being one of the children. There were no children of the marriage between Derek and Gwendoline. There was no evidence of wills made by Derek or Gwendoline prior to the wills next mentioned. On 10 March 1986 Derek and Gwendoline attended the office of the Public Trustee and gave instructions for wills. The officer whom they saw did not give evidence, but there was tendered and admitted a wills instruction sheet recording the instructions. So far as immediately relevant, on the one page noting the names of and information concerning both Derek and Gwendoline there was recorded against the heading “next of kin” -“Yes - both have children of a 1st marriage - have [?] not decided how to divide”.After details of the children, under the heading ”instructions” was -“Whole estate to spouses. 30 days - if predecease - not survive then into 2 PARTS(1)1 PART to Mr McD’s children James & Lorraine + sub issue(2)Remaining parts to Mrs McD’s children Dolores & Donald + sub issueFailure to vest.” The wills instruction sheet said nothing about mutuality of wills or about an agreement to make mutual wills. On 12 March 1986 Derek and Gwendoline executed wills prepared by the Public Trustee. Derek’s will revoked any previous testamentary dispositions (cl 1), appointed the Public Trustee as his executor and trustee (cl 2), gave his trustee certain powers in relation to converting his estate into money and advancing a beneficiary’s interest (cll 3 and 4), and by its dispositive provision provided (cl 5) -“I GIVE DEVISE AND BEQUEATH the whole of my estate both real and personal to my Trustee UPON TRUST to pay thereout all my just debts funeral and testamentary expenses Probate Estate Death or other Duties AND THEREAFTER for my wife GWENDOLINE McDONNELL absolutely if she be living at the expiration of a period of thirty (3) days from the date of my death OR should my said wife predecease me or survive me and die before the expiration of a such period of thirty (30) days THEN to divide the residue thereof into Two (2) equal parts and to hold such parts upon the following terms and conditions namely:-(A)As to One (1) of such parts for such of them my children JAMES ROBERT McDONNELL and LORRAINE NOELENE BAIRD who shall be living at my death and if both in equal shares absolutely PROVIDED HOWEVER should my said children or either of them predecease me leaving a child or children living at my death who shall attain or have attained the age of eighteen (18) years such child or children shall take and if more than one in equal shares absolutely the share or interest his her or their parent would have taken under this clause of this my ill (sic) had such parent been living at my death.(B)As to the remaining One (1) of such parts for such of them my said wife’s children DOLORES SMEE and DONALD WILLIAM STRANEY who will be living at my death and if both in equal shares absolutely PROVIDED HOWEVER should my said wife’s children or either of them predecease me leaving a child or children living at my death who shall attain or have attained the age of eighteen (18) years such child or children shall take and if more than one in equal shares absolutely the share or interest his her or their parent would have taken under this clause of this my Will had such parent been living at my death.PROVIDED HOWEVER that should any of the abovementioned parts fail to vest then the total number of parts into which residue shall be divided shall be reduced by the number of parts failing to vest and the parts failing to vest shall be construed as nil parts.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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