Beard v Perpetual Trustee Company Limited - [1918] HCA 31

25 CLR 1

[ ] BEARD.

THE PERPETUAL TRUSTEE COMPANY

RESPONDENTS. LIMITED

DEFENDANTS,

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF Practice-High Court-Appeal from Supreme Court of State- ppealable amount-

Judgment involving claim to property of the value of £300-Measure of Claim to property subject to payment of compensation-Judiciary Act 1903-1915 (No. 6 of 1903-No. - 4 of 1915), sec. 35 (1).

In order that a judgment may fall within sub-clause 2 of clause (a) of sec. 35 (1) of the Judiciary Act 1903-1915, it must involve directly or indirectly a determination which SO prejudicially affects the litigant wishing to appeal MELBOURNE, from it as to make him worse off by at least £300 than he would be if he appealed and were wholly successful in his appeal.

The plaintiff, while an infant, had insured his life for £3,000, and shortly after attaining the age of twenty-one years assigned the policy to his grandmother,

25 CLR 2

who stood in loco parentis to him and who from the time when the insurance was effected up to the date of her death paid the premiums. By her will the grandmother directed that the premiums should be paid by her trustees, and that the policy moneys when paid should fall into the residue of her estate, and she gave a life estate in the residue to the plaintiff with remainders over. Ten years after his grandmother's death the plaintiff instituted a suit in the Supreme Court of New South Wales against the trustees of her estate, he alleging that she took the policy as trustee for him and claiming a right to elect whether he would allow the policy to be dealt with as part of his grandmother's estate or would take it against her will subject to payment of compensation to the trustees.

A decree was made declaring that the plaintiff was entitled to SO elect, but an appeal by the trustees was allowed by the Full Court, and the suit was

Held, by Gavan Duffy, Powers and Rich JJ., that as the amount of the compensation payable was the value of the interest in the policy which would have been taken by the beneficiaries under the will and as that value could not be less than the value of the interest which the plaintiff would have in such policy if he were under no obligation to make compensation, the judgment of the Full Court was not within clause (a) of sec. 35 (1) of the Judiciary Act 1903-1915, and therefore that the plaintiff was not entitled as of right to appeal to the High Court.

Appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales dis- missed as incompetent.

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

A suit was, in the year 1917, brought in the Supreme Court by Samuel John Bryce Beard against the Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd. as trustees of the will of Harriett Beard, deceased, in which the state- ment of claim set out…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Beard v Perpetual Trustee Company Limited

Details

AGLC: Beard v Perpetual Trustee Company Limited [1918] HCA 31
Case: [1918] HCA 31
Decision Date: 13 June 1918

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant, Samuel John Bryce Beard, had instituted proceedings against the Perpetual Trustee Company Limited, as trustees of his late grandmother's will. Beard sought to assert his beneficial interest in a life insurance policy he had assigned to his grandmother, who had paid the premiums and directed in her will that the policy proceeds form part of her residuary estate, from which Beard was to receive a life interest. Beard claimed he was entitled to elect whether to take the policy as his own, subject to compensating beneficiaries under the will, or to allow it to be dealt with according to the will.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the judgment of the Full Court of New South Wales involved a matter of sufficient pecuniary value to grant the appellant a right of appeal under section 35(1)(a) of the Judiciary Act 1903-1915. Specifically, the court had to determine if the value of the claim, directly or indirectly, was at least £300, making the appellant pecuniarily worse off by that amount if the Full Court's decision stood.

The High Court, comprising Gavan Duffy, Powers, and Rich JJ., held that the appeal was incompetent. Their reasoning focused on the value of the appellant's actual claim, which was not an unconditional claim to the policy but rather a claim to the policy subject to the payment of compensation to the beneficiaries whose interests would be affected by his election. The court determined that the value of the matter at issue for appeal purposes was the difference between the appellant's position if the original judgment stood and his position under the Full Court's decree. Since the compensation payable was the value of the interest the beneficiaries would have received, and this value could not be less than the value of the plaintiff's interest if he were not obligated to compensate them, the appellant could not demonstrate that he would be pecuniarily benefited by at least £300 if his appeal were successful.

Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal as incompetent, finding that the judgment did not meet the threshold required for an appeal as of right under the Judiciary Act.

Orders