Babic v The Queen

Case [2010] VSCA 198


SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

No 713 of 2008

FRANK BABIC

v

THE QUEEN

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JUDGES ASHLEY, NEAVE and HARPER JJA
WHERE HELD MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING 25 May and 3 June 2010
DATE OF JUDGMENT 17 August 2010
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION [2010] VSCA 198
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM [2008] VSC 218 (King J)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Conviction – Application for leave to appeal – Murder – Self defence – Defensive homicide –Whether common law self defence abolished – Effect of amendments introduced by Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 – Whether jury directions as to defensive homicide incorrect and deprived applicant of conviction of defensive homicide – Interpretation of Crimes Act 1958, ss 9AC, 9AD – Whether judge failed to relate applicant’s intoxication to issue of intent – Whether judge erred in referring to ‘imminent threat’ – Application refused.

CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Murder – Whether judge gave insufficient weight to applicant’s age in setting non-parole period – Application refused.

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Appearances: Counsel Solicitors
For the Applicant Mr D A Dann Balmer and Associates Pty
For the Crown Mr D A Trapnell SC Mr C Hyland, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

ASHLEY JA:

  1. Neave and Harper JJA, whose reasons for judgment I have had the advantage of reading in draft, have set out the general circumstances of this proceeding, the main arguments of counsel, relevant passages from the judge’s charge, and the grounds of appeal.  I need not, in the circumstances, revisit those matters.

  1. I agree with their Honours, for the reasons which follow, that the applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence should be refused. 

  1. Concerning grounds 4 and 8 on the conviction application, and the application for leave to appeal against sentence, I respectfully agree with what their Honours have said and have nothing to add.

Conviction application;  Grounds 1 and 3

  1. Grounds 1 and 3 are interrelated. But each of them requires discrete consideration. Ground 1 contends that the judge erred by not leaving common law self-defence to the jury, but only the defence in s 9AC of the Crimes Act1958.  Ground 3 asserts that the judge misdirected the jury by directing it, in effect, that the starting point for consideration of ‘defensive homicide’ was a belief held by the applicant. 

Ground 1

  1. The main argument for the applicant upon ground 1 was that the defence created by s 9AC is more restrictive than common law self-defence. For that reason, the section should not be read to exclude common law self-defence except if there were plain words; and here there were none.Counsel acknowledged that there would be ambiguities whichever way s 9AC was read.

  1. In my opinion s 9AC does operate to exclude common law self-defence in the case of murder. That is so for these reasons, which focus upon the words of the statute.

  1. First, it is too simplistic to say that the statutory defence is more restrictive than the common law defence.  In some ways, it is more restrictive.…

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Babic v The Queen [2010] VSCA 198
Case
[2010] VSCA 198
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

Babic v The Queen involved the applicant, Babic, appealing against his conviction and sentence for murder. The key legal issues in this case were whether the common law defence of self-defence had been abolished by the amendments introduced by the Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005, and if the jury directions concerning defensive homicide were incorrect, thereby depriving Babic of a conviction for defensive homicide. Additionally, the court considered whether the trial judge failed to adequately address Babic's intoxication in relation to the issue of intent and whether the judge erred in referring to an "imminent threat." The applicant also argued that insufficient weight was given to his age in setting the non-parole period of his sentence.

The court held that the purpose of Subdivision 1AA of the Crimes Act 1958 was to replace existing common law defences to homicide, including self-defence, with statutory defences. The headings of the Division and sections within Subdivision 1AA supported this view, indicating that common law defences no longer applied. The court further found that there was no ambiguity as to the purpose of the legislation, and the presumption that Parliament could not have intended to disadvantage an accused was rebutted. The court concluded that self-defence had indeed been codified in sections 9AB to 9AH and 9AJ, rather than abolished. The jury directions were found to be correct, and the trial judge did not err in his references to an "imminent threat" or in addressing the issue of intoxication.

In light of the above, the court dismissed the application for leave to appeal against both the conviction and the sentence. The reasoning provided by the court was that the statutory framework introduced by the Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 had effectively replaced the common law defences, and there was no error in the trial judge's handling of the case. Therefore, Babic's conviction and sentence for murder were upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In response to the argument that provocation was abolished by s 3B and that there was no similar provision abolishing common law self-defence, counsel for the Crown submitted that this was explicable by the fact that self-defence was codified in ss 9AB to 9AH and 9AJ, rather than being abolished. Conclusion on ground 1 In our opinion the purpose of Subdivision 1AA of the Act was to replace existing common law defences to homicide, including self-defence, with statutory defences and in the case of excessive self-defence, with a new offence. We turn first to the words of ss 9AC and 9AD, read in the context of Subdivision 1AA, which is headed ‘Exceptions to Homicide Offences’. Other provisions in the Subdivision include s 9AG, which abolishes the common law rule that the defence of duress does not apply to homicide offences, and s 9AI which applies the doctrine of necessity to homicide offences. Sections 9AC to 9AE are headed respectively ‘Murder–“Self Defence”’, ‘Defensive Homicide’ and ‘Manslaughter–“Self Defence”’. Both the Division heading and the section headings are part of the Act.[27] These headings support the view that the legislation was intended to codify defences to homicide, so that common law defences no longer apply. [27]Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984, s 36. In Gould[28] Coghlan J relied on the principle that statutes creating criminal offences are to be construed strictly,[29] in support of his decision that the common law defence of self-defence to murder or manslaughter had not been abolished. In Parr,[30] Whelan J pointed out that this principle was no longer applied as strictly as had been the case in the past. He said that: We agree with his Honour’s view that there is no ambiguity as to the purpose of the legislation. Some provisions in Subdivision 1AA advantage the accused. For example sections 9AG (duress) and 9AI (sudden and extraordinary emergency) give an accused the opportunity to rely on defences to homicide which did not exist at common law. Similarly s 9AH allows an accused who kills a person who has previously subjected the accused to family violence, to rely on self-defence, even if the threatened harm is not immediate and the response involves the use of excessive force. The abolition of provocation may disadvantage some accused; whilst other provisions may make it less difficult for the Crown to disprove a particular defence. For example s 9AE, which precludes a person charged with murder or manslaughter from relying on self-defence in response to lawful force, and s 9AJ, which deals with intoxication, may prevent an accused from relying on self-defence in some circumstances. Having regard to the legislative context of s 9AC, any presumption that Parliament could not have intended to disadvantage an accused is rebutted. In Parr,[35] Whelan J also relied on the fact that ss 9AC and 9AD applied only where the person’s conduct ‘would otherwise constitute murder’ in support of the conclusion that common law self-defence had been abolished. In relation to s 9AC his reasoning was as follows:

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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