FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AXD15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 880
Appeal from: AXD15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1006 File number: NSD 749 of 2016 Judge: ROBERTSON J Date of judgment: 3 August 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing application for judicial review of a decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal – protection visa – cancellation – incorrect information provided in application form – sexual orientation of appellant – claim of jurisdictional error – whether primary judge erred by misinterpreting, misunderstanding or misapplying the applicable law, or by otherwise failing to ask the correct question Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 101, 107, 108, 109
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 2.41
Cases cited: Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71; 216 CLR 473
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNWC [2010] FCAFC 157; 190 FCR 23
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332
Date of hearing: 3 August 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 38 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J Williams Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr A Markus of Australian Government Solicitor Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 749 of 2016 BETWEEN: AXD15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 AUGUST 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ROBERTSON J:
INTRODUCTION
This appeal is from orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 29 April 2016, dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review of the decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) given on 27 April 2015. The Tribunal affirmed the decision to cancel the appellant’s Subclass 866 (Protection) visa.
The application before the Federal Circuit Court contained a number of grounds. The appeal concerns only ground 2. The primary judge said the “real gist” of that ground was that the Tribunal could not find that the appellant was not a homosexual because it accepted that he had had sex with men. This was confirmed by counsel for the appellant who put the submission before this Court that “if a man has sex with a man he is homosexual”.
The statutory setting
The statutory setting is provided by the following sections of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), so far as relevant:
101 Visa applications to be correct
A non-citizen must fill in or complete his or…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 880
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the law in assessing the appellant's sexual orientation and its relevance to their claim for protection. The primary judge had dismissed the appeal, finding no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The court held that the Tribunal's extensive analysis, which included the appellant's return to Egypt, their marriage, inconsistencies in their claims, and their sexual activities in Australia, provided a sound basis for concluding that the appellant was not a homosexual. The court also dismissed the appellant's argument that the Tribunal had misunderstood or misapplied the law, finding that the Tribunal had appropriately considered the cultural context of homosexuality in Egypt. The court further held that the Tribunal's reasoning did not exhibit a paradox as suggested by the appellant.
In conclusion, the court upheld the Federal Circuit Court's dismissal of the appeal, finding no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The appeal was dismissed with costs, which were to be paid by the appellant as agreed or taxed, in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. The court's decision affirmed the Tribunal's findings and the primary judge's interpretation of the law in this matter.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submitted that while the appellant’s submissions asserted that the reasoning exhibited a clear paradox, this was clearly not so for the reasons which the primary judge gave at [42] of his judgment. The issue was not whether sexuality and sexual activity correspond in most cases, but whether it necessarily corresponded in any and all circumstances.Consideration I do not accept the Minister’s submission that the entirety of the question was whether sexuality and sexual activity corresponded in any and all circumstances: that was the major premise, and the minor premise was whether sexuality and sexual activity corresponded in the appellant’s circumstances. The Tribunal assessed the material at some length and found on the basis of the following factors that the appellant was not, as he claimed, a homosexual. First, in terms of importance to the reasoning of the Tribunal, was the appellant’s return to Egypt in 2011 and his marriage to Ms F. The Tribunal said, at [34], that his return signified his lack of fear from anyone, including his family, which undermined the core aspects of his claims for protection and raised serious doubts about whether he feared returning to Egypt on the basis of his homosexuality. Second, was the appellant’s marriage ceremony in 2009. At [45], the Tribunal found that, at the time of lodgement of the application for a protection visa on 14 March 2011, the appellant was married, he was not in a homosexual relationship with Nour and he was not homosexual. Third, were the inconsistencies in what the appellant had claimed or had said, for example about the length of the relationship with Nour. Fourth, the Tribunal disbelieved the appellant about his sexuality. Fifth, the Tribunal found, at [52], that the appellant engaged in sexual activities with other males in Australia for the purpose of strengthening his claims for protection and not because he was a genuine homosexual. I refer to these matters because there is extensive reasoning on the part of the Tribunal. Also, the Tribunal expressly accepted, at [31], that in certain cultures, homosexuality is not accepted and homosexuals can be ill-treated in various countries, including in Egypt. I reject the appellant’s submission that the authority on point can be found in SZFZN v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2006] FMCA 1153. In that case the Tribunal accepted the applicant’s history of being “caught in flagrante” with his friend in his village, and that “his family suffered humiliation and his father’s crops were later burned by locals”. It also accepted that, when he returned to his village in 1996, “his friend’s father stirred up local animosity because he wanted the applicant to go away”. It also accepted the applicant’s account of what happened in New Delhi. It appeared to have accepted, or assumed, that this revealed the applicant being publicly identified as a member of a “particular social group” of homosexuals within that term in the Convention definition. However, the Tribunal declined to find that the events in New Delhi revealed harm had been inflicted upon the applicant “for reasons of” that membership. The jurisdictional error found by M Smith FM was, as submitted by counsel in that case at [15], that the Tribunal must have overlooked or misunderstood that, on the proper understanding of the Convention definition, an underlying reason for an incident of persecution could provide the Convention characterisation of its “reason”. The Tribunal must have thought that it was enough to characterise the immediate objective of the person who initiated the persecution, without taking into consideration the cause of his conduct. M Smith FM said, at [17], that the Tribunal’s reasoning exhibited a clear paradox between, on the one hand, appearing to accept that the friend’s father was impelled by his society’s hostility to homosexuality when procuring persecution of the applicant, and, on the other hand, finding that the father’s motivation was not “by reason of” the applicant’s “membership of a particular social group”. The Tribunal in that case provided no reasoning which addressed and explained how it could arrive at these paradoxical findings consistently with the test of causation required to be applied. M Smith FM considered that he should infer that the Tribunal made a significant legal error in its understanding of that test.