SUSAN AXARLIS and FIONA MILLER v PETS PARADISE FRANCHISING (SA) PTY LTD (ACN 069 620 391)
File number(s):
VID 001 of 2010
Judges:
DODDS-STREETON J
Date of judgment:
1 April 2010
Catchwords:
BANKRUPTCY – Bankruptcy notice – Whether debtors’ cross claim constitutes prima facie case equal to or exceeding judgment debt – whether cross claim could have been set up in proceeding which judgment obtained – whether Re Ling; Ex parte Ling v Commonwealth (1995) 58 FCR 129 should be followed – Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s40(1)(g).
2.The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
3.The time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice number VN789/2009 be extended until 4pm on 22 April 2010.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules. The…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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In the case of Axarlis v Pets Paradise Franchising (SA) Pty Ltd, the appellants, Susan Axarlis and Fiona Miller, appealed against the decision of Riley FM, who dismissed their application to set aside or extend the time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice issued by Pets Paradise Franchising (SA) Pty Ltd. The bankruptcy notice was based on a judgment debt of $151,110.92 obtained by Pets Paradise in the County Court of Victoria. The appellants, as directors of Krescendo Pty Ltd, guaranteed the obligations of Krescendo under a franchise agreement with Pets Paradise. Following Krescendo's default and liquidation, Pets Paradise issued the bankruptcy notice against the appellants. The appellants sought to set aside the bankruptcy notice on the basis of a counterclaim under s 47(6) of the Trade Practices Act 1974, alleging that the franchise agreement was contrary to law and void ab initio.
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the appellants had a bona fide claim under s 47(6) of the Trade Practices Act that equalled or exceeded the judgment debt and could not have been set up in the proceeding in which the judgment was obtained. Riley FM rejected the appellants' submission, finding that their claim did not meet the required standard. The court considered the principles established in Ebert v The Union Trustee Co of Australia Limited, which held that a debtor must show that they have a genuine demand with a reasonable probability of success. The court also noted that the appellants needed to demonstrate a prima facie case for their counterclaim.
The appeal was heard as a rehearing, and the court found that the appellants had not satisfied the necessary legal standard to set aside the bankruptcy notice. The court held that the appellants' claim was not bona fide or had a reasonable probability of success. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the bankruptcy notice remained in effect. The court did not order any specific relief beyond the dismissal of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Section 41(7) of the Act states:Where, before the expiration of the time fixed for compliance with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice, the debtor has applied to the Court for an order setting aside the bankruptcy notice on the ground that the debtor has such a counter‑claim, set‑off or cross demand as is referred to in paragraph 40(1)(g), and the Court has not, before the expiration of that time, determined whether it is satisfied that the debtor has such a counter‑claim, set‑off or cross demand, that time shall be deemed to have been extended, immediately before its expiration, until and including the day on which the Court determines whether it is so satisfied.Background and Evidence By a notice of appeal dated 4 January 2010, the appellants, Susan Axarlis and Fiona Miller, appeal from those parts of the judgment of Riley FM ([2009] FMCA 1216) given on 15 December 2009 whereby her Honour dismissed their application to set aside or extend time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice issued on 15 May 2009 (“the bankruptcy notice”) on the application of the respondent, Pets Paradise Franchising (SA) Pty Ltd (“Pets Paradise”). The bankruptcy notice was based on a judgment debt of $151,110.92 obtained by Pets Paradise on 18 March 2009 in the County Court of Victoria (see [2009] VCC 0168). Pets Paradise, a franchisor of retail pet and pet accessory businesses under that name, issued a proceeding in the County Court of Victoria against the appellants, claiming payment under guarantees they had given of the obligations of Krescendo Pty Ltd (“Krescendo”). Krescendo as franchisee and Pets Paradise as franchisor were party to a franchise agreement dated 21 June 2005. The appellants, as directors of Krescendo, guaranteed to Pets Paradise Krescendo’s obligations under the franchise agreement by guarantees given on 29 May 2006. Krescendo subsequently defaulted, went into liquidation and was deregistered. At the hearing of the County Court proceeding, Mr Axarlis (the son of the first appellant) although not legally qualified, was granted leave to appear on behalf of the appellants. Mr Axarlis sought an adjournment on grounds including the appellants’ wish to raise further defences. On the following day, Judge Anderson struck out various paragraphs of the defence, including those based on s 47 of the Trade Practices Act. His Honour stated ([2009] VCC 0169 at [7]):As a consequence of that discussion I made orders striking out paragraphs 4.4, 4.5, 5.2, 5.3, and the schedule to the defence. In summary, my reasons for doing so were as follows:a. The principal assertion by the defendants was that the plaintiff had required the first defendant to deal exclusively with Global Pet Products Pty Ltd in obtaining supplies for the business, and that this was in contravention of the exclusive dealing provisions in s.47 of the Trade Practices Act 1974.b. Section 47 is not within one of the parts of the Act in respect of which state courts are invested with federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, that matter was not justicible (sic) in this court.c. This same issue was raised in different guises in other paragraphs of the particulars in the schedule, and also in the defence itself, including the following:i.In paragraph (4)(b)(i), the allegation that the agreement was unenforceable “as an unreasonable restraint of trade” depended upon an argument that clause 9 of the franchise agreement, relating to “stock”, required the first defendant to exclusively deal with the plaintiff or its nominated supplier.ii.In paragraph (4)(b)(iii), the alleged contravention of the provisions of the Trade Practices Act relating to unconscionable conduct arose from the plaintiff’s failure to “disclose its intention to oversupply and overcharge for product and computing services” and raised a similar allegation.iii.The allegation in paragraph 4.4 of the defence largely related to matters concerning alleged exclusive dealings.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Alternatively, the appellants submitted that (if the court were not satisfied to the necessary degree of their damages claim in the required quantum) it should go behind the County Court judgment. It would suffice if the court were satisfied that the franchise agreement contravened the Trade Practices Act, including s 47. The franchise agreement and the guarantees would consequently be invalid and unenforceable and no debt could be owed thereunder. The Appellants’ Evidence The first appellant, by her affidavit sworn on 20 November 2009, deposed that the allegations made in the amended statement of claim in the Federal Court proceeding were true and correct, in so far as they concerned her and Krescendo. The first appellant deposed:Loss and Damage3.As a result of the conduct of the respondent and others complained of in the Federal Court proceeding, in addition to the loss of the Pets Paradise Franchise business formerly conducted by Krescendo, I have suffered substantial loss and damage as follows:(a)personal liability to the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (“ANZ Bank”) for a business loan of $170,000 plus interest, now totalling over $180,000;(b)personal liability to ANZ Bank for a shop fitting and stock loan for Krescendo now totalling over $89,000;(c)personal liability to ANZ Bank for $410,000 plus interest, now totalling $450,000, for Krescendo’s purchase of a residential property for which repayments became impossible due to respondent’s conduct and subsequent liquidation of Krescendo; and(d)the amounts claimed against me by the respondent in the judgments and bankruptcy notices which are the subject of the present proceeding. In her affidavit dated 7 September 2009, the first appellant exhibited an amended statement of claim filed in the South Australian Registry of the Federal Court in a class action (to which the appellants are not party) against Pets Paradise, which makes allegations similar to those made in the appellants’ Federal Court proceeding. The second appellant, by an affidavit sworn 20 November 2009, also deposed that the factual allegations made in the amended statement of claim were true and correct so far as they concerned her and, inter alia, Krescendo. The second appellant further deposed:Loss and damage3.As a result of the conduct of the respondent and others complained of in the Federal Court proceeding, in addition to the loss of the Pets Paradise franchise businesses formerly conducted by Krescendo and Fimill, I have suffered substantial loss and damage as follows:(a) personal liability to the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (“ANZ Bank”) for a business loan in excess of $300,000 plus interest;(b) personal liability to the ANZ Bank for a shop fitting and stock loan for Finmill [sic] and Krescendo, on which I anticipate a short fall of $110,000 or more plus interest; and(c) the amounts claimed against me by the respondent in the judgments and bankruptcy notices which are the subject of the present proceeding.
Decision
Reasons for decision
By the amended statement of claim, the appellants claimed, inter alia, the following relief:50. In the premises of paragraphs [45]-[47] herein:…c.the Krescendo Franchise Agreement was contrary to law, is void ab initio, and is liable to be set aside under section 87 of the TPA; andd.the Krescendo Guarantee was contrary to law, is void ab initio, and is liable to be set aside under section 87 of the TPA.Whether bona fide claim under s 47(6) of the Trade Practices Act equal to or exceeding judgment debt In order to avoid committing an act of bankruptcy, the appellants must either comply with the bankruptcy notice or satisfy the Court that they have a cross demand equal to or exceeding the amount of the judgment that they could not have set up in the proceeding in which the judgment was obtained. Riley FM on 15 December 2009 rejected the appellants’ submission that their claim against the respondent pursuant to s 47(6) of the Trade Practices Act was equal to or exceeded the judgment debt and could not have been set up in the proceeding in which the judgment was obtained. The appeal from Riley FM’s decision, which is brought pursuant to s 24(1)(d) and s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), is not an appeal stricto sensu, but by way of a rehearing. In Ebert v The Union Trustee Co of Australia Limited (“Ebert”) (1960) 104 CLR 346, the High Court dismissed a debtor’s appeal from Clyne J’s dismissal of her application to set aside a bankruptcy notice on the ground that she had a valid cross demand. The High Court (Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Windeyer JJ) stated (at 350):The appellant cannot satisfy the Court that a cross demand exists by showing no more than that she propounds one and states how she suggests that she can make it out. In Re Duncan; Ex parte Modlin Street J. said that the debtor need not satisfy the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he will establish his cross action, but only that he has a bona fide claim which he is fairly entitled to litigate. This perhaps is expressed too favourably to the debtor. The High Court apparently preferred the formulation of Roxburgh J who, in Re A Debtor (1958) 1 Ch 81 stated (at 99):But not every demand will suffice. A demand made in bad faith would not be good enough. The debtor must satisfy the Court that he has a genuine demand. … But in my opinion a demand must be more than bona fide. The Court must be satisfied that it had a reasonable probability of success. The High Court in Ebert concluded (at 350): Perhaps the standard may be expressed by saying that the debtor must show that he had a prima facie case, even if then and there he does not address the admissible evidence which would make out a prima facie case before a court trying the issues that are included in the counter-claim, set off or cross demand. In Guss v Johnstone (2000) 171 ALR 598, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ, in their joint judgment, considered the discretion in relation to a debtor’s counterclaim, set-off or cross demand of the kind referred to in s 40(1)(g). Their Honours stated (at 606):The nature of the exercise … is well established by a long line of authority.In Vogwell v Vogwell, Latham CJ said, in relation to a corresponding provision:[T]he authorities show that the matter to which the court looks is this, – whether it is just that the claim should be determined before the bankruptcy proceedings are allowed to continue; in other words, whether it is a claim which it is proper and reasonable to litigate.The state of satisfaction referred to in s 49(1)(g), and s 41(7) involve weighing up considerations as to the legal and factual merit of the claim relied upon by the debtor, and the justice of allowing the bankruptcy proceedings to go ahead or requiring them to await the determination of the claim
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Circuit Court considered whether the appellants' claim against Pets Paradise pursuant to section 47(6) of the Trade Practices Act is equal to or exceeds the judgment debt, whether the appellants could not have set up their claim in the proceeding in which the judgment was obtained, and whether the appellants have a genuine demand that has a reasonable probability of success. The court noted that to avoid committing an act of bankruptcy, the appellants must either comply with the bankruptcy notice or satisfy the Court that they have a cross demand equal to or exceeding the amount of the judgment that they could not have set up in the proceeding in which the judgment was obtained. The court referred to Ebert v The Union Trustee Co of Australia Limited, where the High Court stated that the debtor must show that he had a prima facie case, even if then and there he does not address the admissible evidence which would make out a prima facie case before a court trying the issues that are included in the counter-claim, set off or cross demand. The court also referred to Guss v Johnstone, where the court stated that the matter to which the court looks is whether it is just that the claim should be determined before the bankruptcy proceedings are allowed to continue; in other words, whether it is a claim which it is proper and reasonable to litigate. The court concluded that the appellants' claim against Pets Paradise pursuant to section 47(6) of the Trade Practices Act is not equal to or exceed the judgment debt, that the appellants could not have set up their claim in the proceeding in which the judgment was obtained, and that the appellants do not have a genuine demand that has a reasonable probability of success. The court held that the appeal was dismissed. The ratio decidendi of this case is that to avoid committing an act of bankruptcy, the appellants must either comply with the bankruptcy notice or satisfy the Court that they have a cross demand equal to or exceeding the amount of the judgment that they could not have set up in the proceeding in which the judgment was obtained, and that the debtor must show that he had a prima facie case, even if then and there he does not address the admissible evidence which would make out a prima facie case before a court trying the issues that are included in the counter-claim, set off or cross demand. The court distinguished prior authority by holding that the appellants' claim against Pets Paradise pursuant to section 47(6) of the Trade Practices Act is not equal to or exceed the judgment debt, that the appellants could not have set up their claim in the proceeding in which the judgment was obtained, and that the appellants do not have a genuine demand that has a reasonable probability of success.