John Emmanuel Rose v Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

JOHN EMMANUEL ROSE v MERITON APARTMENTS PTY LTD [2011] FMCA 721
BANKRUPTCY – Application to set aside bankruptcy notice – whether counter-claim, set-off or cross demand within s.40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act.
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss.27, 30, 40, 41, 60, 134
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss.601AB, 601AH
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s.91
Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW), ss.106, 108
Federal Magistrates Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2006 (Cth), r.3.02
Industrial Relations Commission Rules 1996 (NSW), regs.89, 203
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r.42.7

Ainsworth v Burden [2005] NSWCA 174
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2000) 174 ALR 688; [2000] NSWSC 316
Axarlis and Another v Pets Paradise Franchising (SA) Pty Ltd (2010) 183 FCR 521; [2010] FCA 319
Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] FCAFC 51; [2002] FCA 223
Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Amcor Limited (No 3) [2008] FCA 1668
Carriage v Stocklands Developers Pty Ltd, in the matter of Carriage [2004] FCA 930
Crimmins v Glenview Home Units [1999] FCA 515
Dekkan v Macquarie Leasing Pty Limited (No.2) [2008] FCA 1431

Ebert v The Union Trustee Company of Australia Limited (1960) 104 CLR 346; [1960] HCA 50
Guss v Johnstone (2000) 74 ALJR 884; [2000] HCA 26

In re A Debtor [1958] 1 Ch. 81; [1957] 2 All ER 551
In re Foster, Ex Parte Basan (1885) 2 Morr 29
James v Hill (No 2) (2005) 3 ABC(NS) 631; [2005] FCA 981
John Emmanuel Rose v Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd and Anor [2006] NSWIRComm 298
Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd and Another v Industrial Court (NSW) and Another (2009) 263 ALR 556; [2009] NSWCA 434
Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd and Another v Industrial Court of New South Wales and Another (2008) 171 FCR 380; [2008] FCAFC 172
Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 243
National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd and Others v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) (formerly Hillier, Parker (Qld) Pty Ltd) and Another (2001) 183 ALR 700; [2001] FCA 237
O’Meara v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCA 1575
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Proprietary Limited (1981) 147 CLR 589; [1981] HCA 45
Re Brink; Ex parte Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd (1980) 30 ALR 433; [1980] FCA 78
Re Cox (1934) 7 ABC 98
Re Donkin; Ex parte AGC Advances Limited (1994) 52 FCR 271; [1994] FCA 1285
Re Duncan; Ex Parte Modlin (1917) 17 SR (NSW) 152; (1917) 34 WN (NSW) 49
Re Glew; Glew v Harrowell of Hunt & Hunt Lawyers; Re Tresidder; Tresidder v Harrowell of Hunt & Hunt Lawyers (2003) 198 ALR 331; [2003] FCA 373
Re James and Another; Ex parte Carter Holt Harvey Roofing (Australia) Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 183
Re Player (1962) 19 ABC 277
Rivett; Ex parte Edward Fay Ltd (1932) 5 ABC 182
Re Verma; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 4 FCR…

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Details
Case
[2011] FMCA 721
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

John Emmanuel Rose has applied to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued against him by Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd. The dispute involves the interpretation of costs orders made in relation to previous proceedings between the parties. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The primary legal issue for the court to decide was whether Rose had a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or exceeding the judgment debt on which the bankruptcy notice was based. This hinged on whether the costs order from the Industrial Court proceedings was quantifiable and payable, given that the order did not specify a time for payment and the substantive proceedings had been quashed.

The court found that the costs order from the Industrial Court proceedings was not payable until the conclusion of those proceedings and had not been quantified. The order was neither taxable nor payable until the proceedings were concluded, and therefore did not constitute a crystallized claim as required by s.40(1)(g). The court noted that even if the order were to remain unchallenged, Rose would not have a presently enforceable right to recover any monies unless and until the substantive proceedings were determined. The court also highlighted that there was no evidence that Rose had approved the quantification of his costs by paying the solicitor's tax invoice.

Consequently, the court held that Rose did not have a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or exceeding the amount of the judgment debt, and dismissed the application. The court ordered that Rose pay Meriton's costs of the proceedings as agreed or, in the absence of agreement, taxed in accordance with the Federal Court Rules.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application is dismissed.

2.

The applicant pay the respondent’s costs as agreed and in the absence of agreement taxed in accordance with the Federal Court Rules.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In any event, the parties were in agreement that r.42.7 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules was applicable (and see former reg.89 of the Industrial Relations Commission Rules as in force at the relevant time). It provides:(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, the costs of any application or other step in any proceedings, including: (a) costs that are reserved, and(b) costs in respect of any such application or step in respect of which no order as to costs is made,are to be paid and otherwise dealt with in the same way as the general costs of the proceedings.(2) Unless the court orders otherwise, costs referred to in subrule (1) do not become payable until the conclusion of the proceedings. (Emphasis added). The costs of the appeal to the Full Bench of the Industrial Court in relation to the strike out and security for costs applications of Meriton and the Owners Corporation and Mr Rose’s amendment application were dealt with by the orders made on 14 February 2008. One of those orders provided specifically that the Owners Corporation was to pay “forthwith” Mr Rose’s costs of the appeal proceedings. However the order that is relevant in these proceedings simply ordered Meriton to pay his costs of the hearing at first instance. This was the hearing of Meriton’s strike out application. The costs order did not nominate a time for payment of such costs. In the absence of an order that those costs were payable forthwith, they would not be payable until the conclusion of the proceedings (either on the basis of the Industrial Relations Commission Rules or having regard to r.42.7 of the UCPR). Moreover, the order in favour of Mr Rose that led to this costs order has been quashed against Meriton. The matter has been remitted to the Industrial Court on the basis that the Industrial Court is prohibited from making the substantive orders sought by Mr Rose in his summons. Even if the costs order were for some reason to remain unchallenged and the Industrial Court proceedings remain on foot, notwithstanding the Court of Appeal decision, Mr Rose has no presently enforceable right to recover any monies as a result of the order made by the Full Bench of the Industrial Court. Unless and until the substantive proceedings are determined (which would in practical terms depend on Mr Rose succeeding in establishing jurisdiction or reformulating a claim) he may never have such a right. Moreover the draft application for assessment of party/party costs annexed to Mr Rose’s affidavit does not suffice to quantify the claims. There is no evidence that the applicant is at liberty to have his costs taxed until the end of the proceedings (and no evidence of any order to the contrary by the Industrial Court). Nor is there any evidence that the solicitor’s recent tax invoice has been paid, such that it could be contended that Mr Rose had given some sort of imprimatur to the quantification of the bill by paying it. There has not been such quantification of the costs order and as the order is not taxable or payable until the end of the proceedings, it has not been established that there is a “crystallised claim of the kind contemplated by s.40(1)(g)” (see Carriage v Stocklands Developers Pty Ltd, in the matter of Carriage [2004] FCA 930 at [9] per Madgwick J). That case is directly in point. On this basis I am not satisfied that Mr Rose has an extant counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or exceeding the amount of the judgment debt relied on in the Bankruptcy Notice.