FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Esanda Finance Corporations Limited v Smart [1999] FCA 1209
BANKRUPTCY – creditor’s petition – notice of intention to oppose creditor’s petition –whether cross-demand could not have been set up in the proceeding in which judgment was obtained.
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 40(1)(g) and 52(1)
ESANDA FINANCE CORPORATIONS LIMITED V SMART
V7241 of 1999
JUDGE: MERKEL J
DATE: 30 JULY 1999
PLACE: MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V7241 OF 1999
BETWEEN:
ESANDA FINANCE CORPORATION LIMITED
ApplicantAND:
ANTHONY IVAN SMART
RespondentJUDGE:
MERKEL J
DATE:
30 JULY 1999
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Pursuant to its creditor's petition Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (“Esanda”), as the applicant creditor, is claiming that the respondent debtor has failed to pay an amount of $12,779.45, being the monies owing pursuant to a judgment in that amount entered in the County Court of Victoria at Melbourne against the respondent debtor on 3 December 1997. The respondent debtor has given a notice of intention to oppose the petition on the ground that he has a cross-demand equal to or exceeding the amount of the sum payable under the judgment on which the creditor's petition is based, being a cross-demand that could not be set up in the proceeding in which the judgment was obtained: see s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
The history of the dispute underlying the applicant creditor's claim is long and complicated. However, stripping that dispute down to its essentials, it relates to the purchase of two items of equipment said to be the subject of hire‑purchase contracts by Esanda to the respondent debtor, Mr Smart. The contracts were said to have been entered into in 1990. In July 1992 Esanda issued a proceeding in the County Court claiming the sum of $72,029.20 against Mr Smart, being the money allegedly due under the two contracts. A default judgment was entered by Esanda in that proceeding in August 1992. There were four applications by Mr Smart to set aside that judgment, the last being in September 1998.
The applications either did not proceed or were dismissed. In particular, the last application was dismissed by Judge Stott on 19 November, but was the subject of a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal. Mr Smart has made certain serious allegations against Esanda in respect of the hire-purchase contracts including allegations of fraud, forgery and non‑payment of the purchase price. If all of those allegations are made out and he persuades the Court of Appeal to set aside the default judgment in that proceeding, he will be entitled to claim that he owes no money to Esanda as a result of the hire‑purchase contracts.
After the issue of its proceeding, Esanda obtained possession of goods and sold the equipment, reducing the debt to a sum of some $20,000 to $30,000. That occurred during 1992 or 1993. In pursuit of his complaints against Esanda, Mr Smart…
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- Case
- [1999] FCA 1209
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether Smart's cross-demand could be considered as a defence to the creditor's petition under s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The section requires that the cross-demand must be equal to or exceed the amount of the judgment debt and that the cross-demand could not have been set up in the action or proceeding in which the judgment or order was obtained. The court also needed to determine if the cross-demand was in fact raised in the original proceeding in which the judgment was obtained.
The court found that Smart's cross-demand was not a valid defence to the creditor's petition. The court held that the cross-demand was in fact raised in the original proceeding in which the judgment was obtained, and therefore could have been set up in that proceeding. The court found that Smart's opposition to the creditor's petition had not been made out, and that there was no basis upon which the court could decline to make the orders sought by Esanda. The court made a sequestration order against the estate of Anthony Ivan Smart and ordered that Esanda's costs including reserve costs be taxed and paid in accordance with the Act.
The final orders of the court were that a sequestration order be made against the estate of Anthony Ivan Smart and that Esanda's costs including reserve costs be taxed and paid in accordance with the Act.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case began with Esanda filing a creditor's petition against Smart for the debt of $12,779.45, which arose from a judgment in the County Court of Victoria. Smart responded by giving notice of his intention to oppose the petition on the ground that he had a cross-demand that could not have been set up in the original proceeding. The matter proceeded to a hearing before Justice Merkel on 30 July 1999, where Smart contested the creditor's petition on the specified ground. The court considered the evidence and arguments presented and delivered its judgment the same day.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the cross-demand that Smart intends to set up could not have been set up in the proceeding in which judgment was obtained, as required by s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
2. Whether Smart has a valid defence to the claim by Esanda based on the underlying hire-purchase contracts.
3. Whether the court can decline to make the orders sought by Esanda based on the circumstances presented.
Held
1. The court concluded that the cross-demand Smart intends to set up could have been set up in the proceeding in which judgment was obtained, as required by s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). Therefore, Smart's opposition to the creditor's petition based on this ground was dismissed.
2. The court did not make a determination on whether Smart has a valid defence to the claim by Esanda based on the underlying hire-purchase contracts, as this was not the issue before the court.
3. The court decided that it could not decline to make the orders sought by Esanda based on the circumstances presented.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the requirements of s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and concluded that Smart's cross-demand could have been set up in the proceeding where the judgment was obtained. The court referred to the case of Ling v Commonwealth (1995) 130 ALR 596, which established that "could not have been set up" means "could not by law have been set up in the action". Since Smart's proceeding was issued with the assistance of counsel and the events he relied upon occurred in the early part of the 1990s, the court found that the cross-demand was indeed raised in the proceeding. This led to the dismissal of Smart's opposition to the creditor's petition based on this ground.
Furthermore, the court observed that Smart had not taken any steps to challenge the original order by which his proceeding was struck out. The court held that there was no basis to decline making the orders sought by Esanda. Consequently, the court made a sequestration order against Smart's estate and ordered that Esanda's costs, including reserve costs, be taxed and paid in accordance with the Act. The ratio decidendi of this case is that a cross-demand, to be a valid ground for opposing a creditor's petition under s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), must be one that "could not by law have been set up in the action" in which the judgment was obtained.