FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AWX24 v Australian National University (Separate Question) [2024] FCA 1075
File number: ACD 36 of 2023 Judgment of: KENNETT J Date of judgment: 17 September 2024 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – separate question stated for resolution prior to final hearing – whether hearing should proceed in the light of concessions made by respondent as to jurisdictional error
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – statutory disciplinary process of university – where legislation governing disciplinary process provides for appeal – where jurisdictional error in appellate decision conceded by respondent – where court has discretion whether to grant relief – where the Federal Court has issued decision in McGary v Australian National University [2024] FCA 800 (McGary) on the proper task of the appellate decision maker under the relevant statutory scheme – where respondent appealing that decision to Full Court – where respondent does not concede McGary-style jurisdictional error in present proceeding, but concedes it is open to court to find a McGary-style jurisdictional error in present proceeding – whether court should proceed to review initial disciplinary decision – whether statutory appeal process sufficient remedy for error at first instance – whether matter should be referred back to statutory appeal process – whether respondent can maintain submission that statutory appeal process sufficient while contesting the content of that appeal process before the Court in other proceedings
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – where respondent concedes one jurisdictional error in decision under review and consents to relief in the form of certiorari – where applicant wishes to press claim for certiorari on other grounds of judicial review – whether court should proceed to hear claim for certiorari on other grounds
Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5, 10, 16
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Appeals Rule 2018 (Cth)
Appeals Rule 2021 (Cth) s 23
Appeals Rule 2023 (Cth) ss 11, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 23, 32, 33
Australian National University (Legislation) Statute 2023 (Cth) s 26
Discipline Rule 2021 (Cth)
Cases cited: Gondarra v Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2014] FCA 25; 220 FCR 202
Irwin v Military Rehabilitation & Compensation Commission [2009] FCAFC 33; 174 FCR 574
Kamha v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2005] FCAFC 248; 147 FCR 516
Kovalev v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 557; 100 FCR 323
Makowski v Legal Profession Admission Board [2020] NSWCA 305
McGary v Australian National University [2024] FCA 800
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; 209 CLR 597
Division: General Division Registry: Australian Capital Territory National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 45 Date of hearing: 30 August 2024 Counsel for the applicant: P Walker SC with J Bird Solicitor for the applicant: David Healey Solicitors Counsel for the respondent: R Graycar with K Morris Solicitor for the respondent: HWL Ebsworth
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- Case
- [2024] FCA 1075
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues before the court were whether the court should proceed with reviewing the initial disciplinary decisions in light of the University's concession of a jurisdictional error in the appeal decision, whether the statutory appeal process provided sufficient remedy for the error, and whether the court should consider other grounds for certiorari despite the concession. Additionally, the court needed to decide whether to dismiss specific claims and whether the University could maintain that the statutory appeal process was sufficient while contesting its content in other proceedings.
The court held that it should set aside the appeal decision due to the conceded jurisdictional error. However, the court was not satisfied that the concession of procedural unfairness was valid, as the disclosed information was not required to be shared under principles of procedural fairness. Consequently, the court dismissed the claim for relief based on this concession. The remaining claims for relief were set down for hearing, and the case was listed for case management to schedule the hearing on the remaining issues. The court also ordered that the costs of the hearing on the separate question be reserved.
The court's final orders were to set aside the appeal decision, dismiss the claim for relief based on the conceded procedural unfairness, and schedule a case management hearing to timetable evidence and submissions for the remaining issues. The costs of the hearing on the separate question were reserved.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The question stated for separate decision on 7 August 2024 be answered as follows:
(a) The decision of the Appeals Committee of the respondent communicated to the applicant on 12 January 2023 (the Appeal decision) should be set aside.
(b) Prayer 1(f) in the amended originating application should be dismissed.
(c) The remaining prayers for relief should be set down for hearing.
2. In accordance with the answers stated in order 1:
(a) the Appeal decision be set aside; and
(b) the originating application be dismissed in so far as it seeks the relief set out in prayer 1(f).
3. The proceeding be listed for case management on a date to be advised.
4. The parties provide short minutes of order to Justice Kennett’s Chambers 24 hours prior to the case management hearing referred to in order 3 providing for the timetabling of evidence and submissions for a hearing on the remaining issues in the proceeding.
5. The costs of the hearing on the separate question stated on 7 August 2024 be reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicant filed an originating application for judicial review on 20 June 2023, which was followed by a series of interlocutory applications and amendments. The case involved protracted discussions about confidentiality orders and proposed further amendments to the statement of claim. On 11 April 2024, the applicant filed another originating application, effectively reconstituting the case as an ordinary judicial review application under the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Leave to file an amended originating application was granted on 6 August 2024. The court heard arguments on a separate question stated for resolution on 30 August 2024.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The parties filed written submissions on this question and I heard argument on 30 August 2024.ConsiderationThe process and decision of the Appeals CommitteeThe concessions by the University As noted earlier, the University originally proposed to resolve the matter on the basis of a concession that the applicant was denied procedural fairness. In the proposed form of orders submitted by the University’s solicitors, this was described as a failure to invite the applicant to comment on “potentially adverse information”, although the information was not identified. At the hearing of the separate question I was taken to an email chain in the court book which, I was informed, was the material the subject of the concession. The applicant had been in possession of this material (albeit in a redacted form) for some time, thanks to a freedom of information request, and had not sought to make any point about failure to disclose it during the Appeals Committee process. The version in the Court Book is also redacted (and the basis of the redaction is not explained). So far as can be seen, it is an exchange of emails in which one of the Committee members asks whether the alleged sexual assault had been reported to police or otherwise become the subject of a criminal investigation and a staff member replies that (so far as the administration is aware) it has not. Nothing in the exchange constitutes information that was referred to adversely with respect to the applicant in the Committee’s reasons or could rationally have been taken into account adversely to him. The fact that the complainant had made no report to police was something that the applicant had very likely worked out for himself and that he might conceivably have deployed in his favour. It was not “adverse” and on this basis was not required to be disclosed by ordinary principles of procedural fairness (see eg Gondarra v Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2014] FCA 25; 220 FCR 202 at [145]-[149] (Kenny J)). Before making consent orders the Court must be satisfied that they are within power and appropriate. Where the proposed orders would set aside a purported exercise of statutory power, this means that the Court must be satisfied that the exercise of power is vitiated by the conceded error: the consent of the parties is not itself sufficient to empower the making of the order: Irwin v Military Rehabilitation & Compensation Commission [2009] FCAFC 33; 174 FCR 574 at [13]-[15] (Downes, Greenwood and Tracey JJ); see also Kovalev v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 557; 100 FCR 323 at [11] (French J); VNPC v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 921 at [2]-[5] (Colvin J). I am not satisfied that the Appeals Committee denied the applicant procedural fairness in the manner sought to be conceded. Senior counsel for the applicant described this concession as a “confection” and suggested that it was an attempt to prevent his client’s complaints being fully ventilated. While the concession is surprising and suggests a strategic withdrawal, it would be inappropriate for me to speculate as to the University’s motives. It is sufficient to record that I do not accept that there was a denial of procedural fairness of the kind suggested.