AWT15 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AWT15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2016] FCCA 2282
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Protection visa – judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal.

Legislation:

Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, s. 75(v)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss. 36, 414, 430, 474, 476

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630
BZAHO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2014] FCCA 2981

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389
Gomez v Minister for Immigration and Multiculatural Affairs (2002) 190 ALR 543
Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136
Kianfar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1754
Li Shi Ping & Anor v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 35 ALD 225
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 329 ALR 491
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG (2010) 115 ALD 303
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Muralidharan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 40 ALD 265
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 144 FCR 1
Norvill v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451

SZAYG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 90
SZFSK v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 7
SZMAR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1530
SZSGA v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCA 774
SZSSC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 142 ALD 150
SZSUY v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1
SZTFZ v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 1861
Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54

Applicant: AWT15
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: BRG 470 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Howard
Hearing date: 5 May 2016
Date of Last Submission: 9 June 2016
Delivered at: Brisbane
Delivered on: 2 September 2016

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant: Rasan T. Selliah & Associates
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr McGlade
Solicitors for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

  1. That the application be dismissed.

  2. That the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in an amount to be fixed by the Court.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT BRISBANE

BRG 470 of 2015

AWT15

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background

  1. The applicant was born on 24 March 1977. 

  2. The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka.  He was born in Batticaloa in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka.  The applicant belongs to the Tamil ethnic group. 

  3. In July 2012 the applicant arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival.

  4. In November 2012 the applicant applied for a Protection (class XA) visa. 

  5. In August 2013 a delegate of…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCCA 2282
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application brought by AWT15 against the Minister for Immigration. The dispute revolved around a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The case was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error, which would permit the Federal Circuit Court to exercise its jurisdiction to issue constitutional writs, notwithstanding the privative clause contained within the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). Specifically, the court considered whether the Tribunal had failed to consider relevant evidence or had otherwise made an error of law that vitiated its decision.

The court reasoned that while section 474 of the *Migration Act 1958* renders decisions of an administrative character made under the Act final and conclusive, this protection does not extend to decisions affected by jurisdictional error. Drawing on *Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf* (2001) 206 CLR 323, the court affirmed that jurisdictional error occurs when an administrative tribunal identifies a wrong issue, asks itself a wrong question, ignores relevant material, relies on irrelevant material, or makes an erroneous finding or mistaken conclusion in a way that affects the exercise of its powers. Such errors mean the tribunal has exceeded its authority. The court also noted, citing *Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs* (2003) 75 ALD 630 and *Muralidharan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs* (1995) 40 ALD 265, that a tribunal is not obliged to refer to every piece of evidence or contention, and the absence of a specific reference does not necessarily mean evidence was ignored. However, the court found that even if certain evidence had been overlooked, this would not necessarily constitute jurisdictional error.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Further, I note what was stated by French (as His Honour then was), Sackville and Hely JJ in Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 at paragraph 46 where their Honours stated, inter alia:-“It is plainly not necessary for the tribunal to refer to every piece of evidence and every contention made by an applicant in its written reasons”. Furthermore, in Muralidharan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 40 ALD 265 at 269 Whitlam J stated:-“In the present case the primary application comprised 145 pages. The tribunal is not obliged to record verbatim the material before it, especially where much of it is referred to in the delegate's primary decision that is under review. The tribunal said that the applicant's reasons for claiming refugee status were “fully described in his primary application and the application for review”. It ought not to be assumed that the tribunal has ignored the burden of those submissions. The absence of any reference in the tribunal's statement to a specific item of evidence does not necessarily mean that it has not considered that evidence. It is also quite unrealistic to overlook the reliance placed upon material by the applicant before the tribunal: Guo Wei Rong v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 38 ALD 38.” Whitlam J’s comments in the decision of Muralidharan (supra) are apposite in the present case. I have concluded that the Tribunal did not overlook the evidence contained at pages 242, 306 and 342. In any event, even if the Tribunal had overlooked such evidence – I accept the submission made on behalf of the first respondent that such a failure would not amount to jurisdictional error. I note what was stated by the Full Court in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 144 FCR 1 at paragraph 53 where Black CJ, French (as His Honour then was) and Selway JJ stated:-“53. It is desirable first to restate the uncontroversial proposition that mere factual error by the Tribunal will not ground judicial review unless it relates to a jurisdictional fact or is a manifestation of some error of law, substantive or procedural, which constitutes jurisdictional error and thereby vitiates the purported decision. This is evident from the discussion, in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323, of jurisdictional error as a ground for the review of Tribunal decisions under the former Pt 8 of the Migration Act. If the Tribunal identifies a wrong issue or poses the wrong question for itself or does not have regard to relevant material or takes into account irrelevant material, so as to affect the exercise of its powers, error of law and/or jurisdictional error may be identified (at 351-352 per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). An error of fact in the course of a decision is unlikely to be a jurisdictional error unless the fact is a jurisdictional fact:‘Courts should be slow to find that an erroneous finding of fact or an error of reasoning in finding a fact, made in the course of making a decision, demonstrates that an administrative tribunal so misunderstood the question it had to decide that its error constituted a jurisdictional error.’ Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Cohen [2001] HCA 10; (2001) 177 ALR 473 at 481 [35] per McHugh J.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

The jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to issue constitutional writs is subject to section 474 of the Act. Section 474 of the Act relevantly provides:-“474. Decisions under Act are final(1) A privative clause decision:(a) is final and conclusive; and(b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.(2) In this section:“privative clause decision” means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).” The relevant decision of the Tribunal in this case was made on 1 May 2015 and is a privative clause decision. However, the Court does still have jurisdiction to issue constitutional writs in relation to the Tribunal’s decision – provided the Court is satisfied that the decision made by the Tribunal is, in fact, affected by jurisdictional error. In the decision of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated at paragraph 82:-“82. It is necessary, however, to understand what is meant by “jurisdictional error” under the general law and the consequences that follow from a decision-maker making such an error. As was said in Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 if an administrative tribunal (like the Tribunal):-“falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the Tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the Tribunal which reflects it”.“Jurisdictional error” can thus be seen to embrace a number of different kinds of error, the list of which, in the passage cited from Craig, is not exhaustive. Those different kinds of error may well overlap. The circumstances of a particular case may permit more than one characterisation of the error identified, for example, as the decision-maker both asking the wrong question and ignoring relevant material. What is important, however, is that identifying a wrong issue, asking a wrong question, ignoring relevant material or relying on irrelevant material in a way that affects the exercise of power is to make an error of law. Further, doing so results in the decision-maker exceeding the authority or powers given by the relevant statute. In other words, if an error of those types is made, the decision-maker did not have authority to make the decision that was made; he or she did not have jurisdiction to make it. Nothing in the Act suggests that the Tribunal is given authority to authoritatively determine questions of law or to make a decision otherwise than in accordance with the law.” [1][1] In these reasons for judgment the emphasis and the underlining has been added.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) provides:-“476(1) Subject to this section, the Federal Circuit Court has the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution.” Section 75 of the Constitution relevantly provides:-75. Original jurisdiction of High CourtIn all matters:…v. in which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth;the High Court shall have original jurisdiction.” The jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to issue constitutional writs is subject to section 474 of the Act. Section 474 of the Act relevantly provides:-“474. Decisions under Act are final(1) A privative clause decision:(a) is final and conclusive; and(b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.(2) In this section:“privative clause decision” means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).” The relevant decision of the Tribunal in this case was made on 1 May 2015 and is a privative clause decision. However, the Court does still have jurisdiction to issue constitutional writs in relation to the Tribunal’s decision – provided the Court is satisfied that the decision made by the Tribunal is, in fact, affected by jurisdictional error. In the decision of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated at paragraph 82:-“82. It is necessary, however, to understand what is meant by “jurisdictional error” under the general law and the consequences that follow from a decision-maker making such an error. As was said in Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 if an administrative tribunal (like the Tribunal):-“falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the Tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the Tribunal which reflects it”.“Jurisdictional error” can thus be seen to embrace a number of different kinds of error, the list of which, in the passage cited from Craig, is not exhaustive. Those different kinds of error may well overlap. The circumstances of a particular case may permit more than one characterisation of the error identified, for example, as the decision-maker both asking the wrong question and ignoring relevant material. What is important, however, is that identifying a wrong issue, asking a wrong question, ignoring relevant material or relying on irrelevant material in a way that affects the exercise of power is to make an error of law. Further, doing so results in the decision-maker exceeding the authority or powers given by the relevant statute. In other words, if an error of those types is made, the decision-maker did not have authority to make the decision that was made; he or she did not have jurisdiction to make it. Nothing in the Act suggests that the Tribunal is given authority to authoritatively determine questions of law or to make a decision otherwise than in accordance with the law.” [1][1] In these reasons for judgment the emphasis and the underlining has been added.