FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AVC19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1752
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal from: AVC19 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 431 File number: NSD 261 of 2020 Judgment of: DAVIES J Date of judgment: 9 December 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court not to reinstate application for extension of time under s 477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) that was dismissed for non‑appearance by applicant
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal from interlocutory decision of Federal Circuit Court – no error of principle in primary judge’s exercise of discretion – merits considered at reasonably impressionistic level – application dismissed
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1)(d), 24(1A)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 477
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 13.03C(1)(c), 16.05
Cases cited: Baig v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 855
CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1344
Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
FBS18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 196
House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; 242 FCR 585
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 10 Date of hearing: 30 November 2020 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr B Dean (pro bono) Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms K Hooper Solicitor for the First Respondent: MinterEllison ORDERS
NSD 261 of 2020 BETWEEN: AVC19
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
DAVIES J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 DECEMBER 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
DAVIES J:
On 9 September 2019, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) dismissed the applicant’s application for an extension of time under s 477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) in which to seek judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The application was dismissed by the FCC under r 13.03C(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (FCC Rules) by reason of the non-appearance by the applicant at the hearing. A subsequent application by the applicant for the reinstatement of the proceeding was dismissed by the FCC on 27 February 2020 on the basis that the FCC was not satisfied…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1752
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the court was whether leave to appeal from the FCC’s decision not to reinstate the proceeding should be granted. Leave to appeal is necessary because the decision refusing to reinstate an application is interlocutory in nature. In order to be granted leave to appeal, the applicant must show both that there is sufficient doubt as to the correctness of the decision below to warrant review and that, if the judgment below is assumed to be wrong, substantial injustice would be suffered by the applicant if leave to appeal were refused. The applicant must also show that there was an error in the exercise of the FCC’s discretion not to reinstate the proceeding.
The court held that the reasons of the FCC did not suggest the existence of any such error. The court noted that the decision of the FCC not to reinstate the proceeding was discretionary and so attracted the application of the principles in House v The King. The court held that it was not enough that the judges composing the appellate court considered that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error had been made in exercising the discretion. The reasons of the FCC did not suggest the existence of any such kind of error.
The application for leave to appeal was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
On 9 September 2019, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) dismissed the applicant’s application for an extension of time under s 477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) in which to seek judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The application was dismissed by the FCC under r 13.03C(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (FCC Rules) by reason of the non-appearance by the applicant at the hearing. A subsequent application by the applicant for the reinstatement of the proceeding was dismissed by the FCC on 27 February 2020 on the basis that the FCC was not satisfied there was utility in reinstating the proceeding because the proposed two grounds of review of the Authority’s decision were, in substance, an attempt at impermissible merits review and failed at an impressionistic level to identify an arguable case of jurisdictional error by the Authority: AVC19 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 431 (FCC judgment) at [35] and [38]. The FCC also rejected the applicant’s request to reinstate the proceedings for compassionate reasons, holding that it had no power to determine whether the proceedings should be reinstated for the compassionate reasons put forward by the applicant: FCC judgment at [38]. The compassionate grounds put to the FCC related to the applicant’s “love and concern for his children, future operations and an injury to his arm”. The applicant has now applied for leave to appeal the decision of the FCC dismissing the application for reinstatement. Leave to appeal the decision of the FCC is necessary as a decision refusing to reinstate an application is interlocutory in nature: ss 24(1)(d) and 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth); FBS18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 196 (FBS18) at [2]; Baig v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 855 at [3]. In Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397, the Full Court held at 398–9 that leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment requires the applicant to show both that there is sufficient doubt as to the correctness of the decision below to warrant review and further that, if the judgment below is assumed to be wrong, substantial injustice would be suffered by the applicant if leave to appeal were refused. The second limb of the test is not in issue, as it may be accepted that substantial injustice would be suffered by the applicant if the first test is met but leave to appeal nonetheless refused. In issue is satisfaction of the first test. The decision of the FCC not to reinstate the proceeding was discretionary and so attracts the application of the principles in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499 at 504–5 where Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ observed:The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. The reasons of the FCC do not, in my view, suggest the existence of any such kind of error.