FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Metcash Trading Limited [2011] FCAFC 151
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Details
- Case
- [2011] FCAFC 151
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (the Commission) appealed against a decision of the Federal Court of Australia, which dismissed the Commission’s application for injunctive relief concerning Metcash Trading Limited's (Metcash) acquisition of shares in Interfrank Group Holdings Pty Limited (Franklins). The Commission sought a declaration that Metcash's acquisition would likely substantially lessen competition in the Independent Wholesale Grocery Market, in breach of section 50(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (the Act). The central legal issues revolved around whether the primary judge correctly applied the competition test and the standard of proof required for establishing a counterfactual case. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the primary judge correctly defined the relevant market as a wholesale market and whether the market should be defined by reference to multiple functional levels.
The appeal court found that the primary judge did not err in rejecting the Commission's market definition and the counterfactual scenario. The court held that the primary judge's rejection of the market definition was entitled to deference, and the Commission had not demonstrated that the primary judge's findings were erroneous. Regarding the counterfactual case, the court determined that the primary judge did not err in applying the appropriate standard of proof, and even if the court had adopted the Commission's suggested approach, it would not have altered the outcome of the appeal. The primary judge had decisively rejected the Commission's scenario as speculative and unlikely, whether assessed on the balance of probabilities or a "real chance" test.
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. The court also ordered that the appellant, the Commission, pay the respondents' costs. The final orders were to dismiss the appeal and for the appellant to pay the respondents’ costs.
The appeal court found that the primary judge did not err in rejecting the Commission's market definition and the counterfactual scenario. The court held that the primary judge's rejection of the market definition was entitled to deference, and the Commission had not demonstrated that the primary judge's findings were erroneous. Regarding the counterfactual case, the court determined that the primary judge did not err in applying the appropriate standard of proof, and even if the court had adopted the Commission's suggested approach, it would not have altered the outcome of the appeal. The primary judge had decisively rejected the Commission's scenario as speculative and unlikely, whether assessed on the balance of probabilities or a "real chance" test.
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. The court also ordered that the appellant, the Commission, pay the respondents' costs. The final orders were to dismiss the appeal and for the appellant to pay the respondents’ costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant is to pay the respondents’ costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
On appeal, the Commission sought a declaration of contravention and stated that, if successful, it intended to commence divestiture proceedings. BACKGROUND In order to understand the Commission’s case and the primary judge’s rejection of it, it is necessary to have some appreciation of the chains of distribution of products that come to be supplied, in the defined territory, as grocery items to the consuming public. The primary judge was called upon to make an evaluative judgment about the product dimension of the market, taking into account the totality of the evidence before him. As I have said, his Honour’s finding was one to which he was entitled to come on that evidence. In my view the Commission has not demonstrated that the primary judge’s rejection of its market definition in this respect was an error, as opposed to simply a different conclusion on the evidence, on which reasonable minds could differ. The functional dimension of the market The Commission submitted that the primary judge erred in a number of respects when dealing with the functional dimension of the relevant market. These submissions reflected the substance of the Commission’s submissions at trial, which were to the following effect. The major supermarket chains operated as an uneven constraint on the pricing behaviour of independent retailers, many of whom exhibited a degree of relative pricing discretion. This meant that the major supermarket chains were not a close competitive constraint on the upstream activities of Metcash as a wholesaler. This was said to be reflected in the fact that Metcash itself exhibited a relative degree of pricing discretion. On the other hand, Metcash responded directly to the threat of Franklins as a wholesale supplier. This was illustrated by Metcash effectively cutting prices and locking in supply under Project Energise, and by taking retaliatory action under Project Ling Chi. These features showed that Franklins provided a greater constraint than the major supermarket chains on Metcash as a wholesaler. Accordingly, the correct framework to analyse the competitive effect of Metcash’s acquisition was a wholesale market, and the primary judge was in error in concluding otherwise. I turn now to consider the elements of the Commission’s case on appeal in this regard.Failure to consider functionally separate markets The Commission submitted that the primary judge failed to consider that functionally separate wholesale operations indicated a functionally separate wholesale market. It referred to the fact that Metcash was not vertically integrated (despite its contractual relationship with IGA suppliers) and supplied only independent retailers, many of whom did not operate under the IGA banner and therefore did not receive the range of ancillary services offered by Metcash to IGA retailers. In my view this submission cannot be sustained. It is plain that the primary judge did consider and take into account the existence and extent of transactions occurring at the wholesale level when dealing with this aspect of the Commission’s case. There was, however, a significant body of other evidence before the primary judge which served to show, on his Honour’s findings, that the true market behavioural constraints on Metcash came, to a great extent, from the major supermarket chains.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
If it is appropriate to apply that test at all, I agree with the approach taken by the trial judge. Moreover, in the circumstances of the present case, even adopting the full scope of the approach urged by the ACCC would not have changed my view about the outcome of the appeal. Even if I had been persuaded that the trial judge had erred in applying a requirement of proof on the balance of probabilities to the establishment of the facts constituting the so-called “counterfactual” (which I am not), testing the matter on the basis of whether it should have been concluded that there was a “real chance” of the outcome suggested by the ACCC would have made no difference. The trial judge decisively rejected that suggested outcome as involving any “real chance”. He said, plainly, that he had come to that view applying the “real chance” test to that issue, in case it was necessary to do so. Contrary to the submissions advanced for the ACCC the analysis which preceded that statement is not confined by the terms in which it is expressed to the application of a test on the balance of probabilities. The trial judge said repeatedly that it was unlikely that various elements of the scenario suggested by the ACCC would occur. It follows necessarily that he did not accept that it was likely that they would occur, whether as a “real chance” or otherwise, nor that the overall hypothesis had a “real chance” of recurring. Conclusion For the reasons I have given I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (the Commission) appeals from a judgment dismissing its application for injunctive relief in relation to the acquisition by Metcash Trading Limited (Metcash) of shares in Interfrank Group Holdings Pty Limited (Franklins) from Pick n Pay Retailers (Pty) Limited (Pick n Pay). On 1 July 2010 Metcash entered into an agreement with Pick n Pay to acquire all the issued shares in the capital of Franklins for $215 million. On 8 December 2010 the Commission commenced its proceeding in this Court seeking, in effect, to restrain the share acquisition from proceeding to completion. The Commission’s case was that the effect or likely effect of the share acquisition would be to substantially lessen competition in what it defined as the Independent Wholesale Grocery Market (the defined market), in contravention of s 50(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (the Act). This market was defined as a market in New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory (the defined territory) in which: (a)the suppliers were Metcash, Franklins and SPAR Australia Limited (SPAR); (b)the acquirers were Independent Supermarket Retailers, as defined by the Commission; and(c)the products were a range of Wholesale Packaged Groceries, as defined by the Commission. I will return to describe aspects of the definition of this market. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that this market was one that was functionally delineated as a wholesale market.
Ratio Decidendi