Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chaste Corporation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chaste Corporation
[2003] FCA 180

CORPORATIONS – whether a claim for a pecuniary penalty constitutes a legal or equitable right which permits the making of a preservation of assets order – whether a Mareva order will be granted where no amount up to which the dealing with assets is confined – whether a Mareva order on assets worldwide is competent – whether a Mareva order might be made covering a possible future order for costs.

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 48, 76, 87, 96, 96A
Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK) s 37

TPC v Annand & Thompson (1987) ATPR 40-772 cited
Bayer AG v Winter and Others [1986] 1 All ER 733 approved
Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (Nos 3 & 4) 1990 1 Ch 65 approved
Ashtiani v Kashi [1986] 2 All ER 970 approved
Brereton v Milstein (1988) VR 508 distinguished
Planet International Ltd (in liq.) v Garcia [1989] 2 Qd R 427 approved
ACCC v Hugo Boss (Australia) Pty Ltd (1996) ATPR 41-536 mentioned
ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Limited (2001) 208 CLR 199 followed
Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380 followed
Mercedes Benz AG v Leiduck [1996] AC 284 cited
CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345 referred to
Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612 followed
Rahman (Prince Abdul) v Abu-Taha [1980] 3 All ER 409 referred to
Patterson v BTR Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd and Others (1989) 18 NSWLR 319 approved
Frigo v Culhaci (Court of Appeal NSW, 17 July 1998, Unreported) cited

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION v CHASTE CORPORATION PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 089 837 329) and OTHERS

No Q 252 of 2001

SPENDER J
BRISBANE
12 MARCH 2003


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 252 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
APPLICANT

AND:

CHASTE CORPORATION PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 089 837 329)
FIRST RESPONDENT

BRADDON RALPH WEBB
SECOND RESPONDENT

ORLAWOOD PTY LTD (ACN 059 294 334)
THIRD RESPONDENT

PETER CLARENCE FOSTER
FOURTH RESPONDENT

JILLIAN LOUISE FOSTER
FIFTH RESPONDENT

SEAN PETRIE ALLEN COUSINS
SIXTH RESPONDENT

CONSTANTINE XENOUDAKIS
SEVENTH RESPONDENT

KEVIN ANTHONY MCMULLAN
EIGHTH RESPONDENT

ALAN KENNETH COOPER
NINTH RESPONDENT

STEPHEN D'ALTON
TENTH RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SPENDER J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 MARCH 2003

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for interlocutory relief sought in the notice of motion filed 29 January 2003 against the fourth respondent, is dismissed.

2.The respondent to the motion be released from the undertaking given by his counsel on 3 February 2003.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 252 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
APPLICANT

AND:

CHASTE CORPORATION PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 089 837 329)
FIRST RESPONDENT

BRADDON RALPH…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 180
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) brought an action against Chaste Corporation, seeking various reliefs including pecuniary penalties. The court was required to consider whether Chaste Corporation had sufficient assets that could be used to satisfy any potential judgment or penalty awarded against them. The case centred on whether the principles governing Mareva injunctions, which are used to prevent a defendant from disposing of assets, could be applied to the payment of fines or civil penalties. The court had to determine if the risk of asset dissipation was sufficient to warrant such an injunction and whether the risk could be inferred solely from the existence of a prima facie case.

The court examined the rationale behind Mareva injunctions, emphasizing that they are intended to prevent the defendant from disposing of their assets to avoid satisfying a judgment, rather than to secure the plaintiff's claim or as a condition of allowing the defendant to defend the action. The court distinguished between the satisfaction of a judgment and the payment of a fine or penalty, noting that the latter is not appropriately described as satisfying a judgment. The court also highlighted that while a prima facie case is necessary to seek a Mareva order, it is not sufficient on its own to justify such an injunction; the plaintiff must demonstrate a substantial risk of asset dissipation. The court concluded that the ACCC had not provided enough evidence to support the need for a Mareva injunction against Chaste Corporation.

The court dismissed the application for interlocutory relief against the fourth respondent and released the respondent from the undertaking given by their counsel. This decision underscores the necessity for a robust showing of asset dissipation risk, separate from the existence of a prima facie case, when seeking a Mareva injunction. The court's ruling emphasizes the importance of clear and compelling evidence in such applications, ensuring that the injunctions are not used as a means to secure a claim but rather to preserve the court's ability to enforce a potential judgment.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for interlocutory relief sought in the notice of motion filed 29 January 2003 against the fourth respondent, is dismissed.

2. The respondent to the motion be released from the undertaking given by his counsel on 3 February 2003.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

SPENDER J
In Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612, Deane J with whose reasoning Mason CJ, Wilson, Dawson and Brennan JJ agreed, referred, at 623, to the statement of Lord Denning M.R., in Rahman (Prince Abdul) v Abu-Taha [1980] 3 All ER 409 at 412:“As a general proposition, it should now be accepted in this country that ‘a Mareva injunction can be granted … if the circumstances are such that there is a danger of [the defendant’s] absconding, or a danger of the assets being removed out of the jurisdiction or disposed of within the jurisdiction, or otherwise dealt with so that there is a danger that the plaintiff, if he gets judgment, will not be able to get it satisfied’.” (Emphasis added) In my opinion, there is a real distinction between there being a danger that a plaintiff if he gets judgment will not be able to get it satisfied, and a danger that a fine or penalty ordered to be paid will not be paid. Satisfaction of a judgment is not an apt way of describing the payment of a fine or civil penalty. As Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ noted in Cardile (at 389-390), in that case on the application for interlocutory relief:“At the jurisdictional level, the only real questions for the primary judge were first, whether there was a serious question to be tried as to whether assets presently under the control of Ultra [Modern] and Mr and Mrs Cardile could be available to satisfy a judgment against Eagle [Homes] in favour of [LED], and secondly, whether there was a danger of such assets being dealt with by Eagle [Homes], or the prospective respondents, so that the Court’s process would be frustrated.” The imposition of a pecuniary penalty by a court against Mr Foster is not aptly to be described as a judgment against him in favour of the ACCC. In the ordinary course, it is necessary for a plaintiff seeking a Mareva order to show a prima facie cause of action against the defendant: Patterson v BTR Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd and Others (1989) 18 NSWLR 319 at 321 per Gleeson CJ. In determining whether there is a sufficiently substantial danger of the defendant disposing of assets in order to defeat a judgment that might be obtained against him, the Court may have regard to the evidence adduced by the plaintiff to prove its claim to the substantive relief sought: Patterson per Gleeson CJ at 325, Meagher JA at 326 and Rogers A-JA at 330-331. Ordinarily, however, one cannot infer a risk of dissipation of assets from the mere fact that the plaintiff has a prima facie cause of action. So observed Meagher JA in Paterson at 326. Deane J in Jackson said at 625 that the purpose of the granting of a Mareva order:“… is to prevent a defendant from disposing of his actual assets (including claims and expectancies) so as to frustrate the process of the court by depriving the plaintiff of the fruits of any judgment obtained in the action.”Nor, said his Honour, is the purpose to create a security for the plaintiff or to require a defendant to provide security as a condition of being allowed to defend the action.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SPENDER J