Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union

[2022] FedCFamC2G 156

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining And Energy Union [2022] FedCFamC2G 156

File number(s):

BRG 625 of 2020

Judgment of:

JUDGE VASTA

Date of judgment:

11 March 2022

Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – Penalty hearing –contravention of s 500 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – imposition of appropriate penalty – relevant factors

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 500, 546, 550, 793

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld)

Cases cited:

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2018] HCA 3

Commonwealth of Australia v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46

Mason & Harrington Corporation Pty Ltd t/as Pangea Restaurant & Bar [2007] FMCA 7

Pattinson v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner [2020] FCAFC 177

Division:

Division 2 General Federal Law

Number of paragraphs:

77

Date of last submission/s:

2 March 2022

Date of hearing:

2 March 2022

Place:

Brisbane

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr Smith

Solicitor for the Applicant:

Ashurst Australia

Counsel for the Respondents:

Ms Doust

Solicitor for the Respondents:

Hall Payne Lawyers

ORDERS

BRG625 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSIONER

Applicant

AND:

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MARITIME, MINING AND ENERGY UNION

First Respondent

ANDREW BLAKELEY

Second Respondent

LUKE GIBSON

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:	JUDGE VASTA
DATE OF ORDER:	11 MARCH 2022

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1.On 30 April 2020, while exercising rights in accordance with Pt 3-4 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) at the Marine Parade Apartments Project located at Marine Parade in Labrador (Site), the Second Respondent, Mr Blakeley entered exclusion zones without authorisation and stood behind concrete trucks, blocking the delivery of concrete to concrete pumps and thereby:

a.   intentionally hindered and obstructed persons at the Site; and

b.   acted in an improper manner,

in contravention of section 500 of the FW Act (Blakeley Contravention).

2.On 30 April 2020, while exercising rights in accordance with Pt 3-4 of the FW Act at the Marine Parade Apartments Project located at Marine Parade in Labrador (Site), the Third Respondent, Mr Gibson entered exclusion zones without authorisation, stood behind concrete trucks, blocking the delivery of concrete to concrete pumps, and engaged in abusive and intimidatory behaviour, and thereby:

(a)intentionally hindered and obstructed persons at the Site; and

(b)acted in an improper manner,

in contravention of section 500 of the FW Act (Gibson Contravention).

3.The First Respondent (CFMMEU) is taken to have contravened section 500 of the FW Act in that, by operation of sections 793 and 550 of the FW Act, it was involved in the Blakeley Contravention.

4.The CFMMEU is taken to have contravened section 500 of the FW Act in that, by operation of sections 793 and 550 of the FW Act, it was involved in the Gibson Contravention.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

5.Pursuant to section 546(1) of the FW Act, the Second Respondent pay pecuniary penalties as a result of his contraventions of s 500 of the FW Act fixed in the sum of $7,000.00.

6.Pursuant to section 546(1) of the FW Act, the Third Respondent pay pecuniary penalties as a result of his contraventions of s 500 of the FW Act fixed in the sum of $10,000.00.

7.Pursuant to section 546(1) of the FW Act, the First Respondent pay pecuniary penalties as a result of its contraventions of s 500 of the FW Act fixed in the sum of $85,000.00.

8.Pursuant to section 546(3) of the FW Act, the pecuniary penalties imposed on the Respondents, be paid to the Commonwealth of Australia within 28 days of the Court’s order.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE VASTA

INTRODUCTION

1. On 30 April 2020, the Second Respondent, Andrew Blakely, and the Third Respondent, Luke Gibson, entered a project site at the Marine Parade Apartments, Labrador. The Second and Third Respondents were officials of the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (“the CFMMEU”) who is the First Respondent in this matter. Whilst they were able to enter that site lawfully, their subsequent actions on the site contravened s 500 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“the FW Act”).

2. On 2 December 2020, the Applicant, the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (“the ABCC”), asked this Court to make declarations that all three respondents had contravened the FW Act and to impose pecuniary penalties on all three Respondents.

   Background

3. Rawcorp was the company that was undertaking the construction of the project, a multi-level residential apartment building.  On 30 April 2020, Rawcorp had the appropriate permits to close a section of Marine Parade for the purposes of a concrete pour.

4. Rawcorp had engaged two subcontractors for the concrete pour; the first was Classic Concrete Pumping who were to provide the concrete and the second subcontractor was Dallem Concrete Constructions who were to ensure that the concrete was distributed and spread properly after it had been poured.

5. Rawcorp had also engaged Risk Essentials Pty Ltd to provide health and safety services relating to the site.  Ms Jennifer Petterson was the consultant on site this particular day.

6. The concrete pour was scheduled for the first floor deck of the building.  Normally a boom pipe would be utilised for such a pour but because of overhead power lines at this site, a static line had been set up to feed concrete from street level to the first floor. 

7. It is common knowledge that a concrete pour must occur within a set specified time because concrete hardens quickly.  If concrete stays still in the static line, it can harden and cause clogging and thereby damage machinery.  Similarly if a slab is being poured and there is a long interruption, the already poured concrete hardens and the new concrete will not mix with the old concrete.  This creates a defect in the slab which must then be jack hammered, disposed of and the whole pour started again.

8. There has been evidence put before me that, on the days preceding this concrete pour, Work Health and Safety Queensland had attended the site and issued nine improvement notices and two prohibition notices.  It would seem that these notices concerned the nature of the scaffolding at the site.

   30 April 2020

9. Inspector Kitchener from Work Health and Safety Queensland, was apparently present on the site at about 8:23 AM on 30 April 2020.  Another inspector also arrived soon afterwards.

10. The Second and Third Respondents then exercised their rights under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) (“the WHS Act”) to enter the site. Both Respondents produced their right of entry permit issued under the FW Act, an entry permit issued under the WHS Act and a notice that they were entering the site to enquire into a suspected contravention of the WHS Act.

11. The two respondents went to Ms Pettersen and began talking to her about the static line.  During those discussions, the Third Respondent was loud and aggressive.  During the conversation with Ms Petterson, he said words to the effect that “Rawcorp is a fucking disgrace”, “Rawcorp does not care for its workers” and “Rawcorp’s director is a fucking disgrace”. 

    The notebook of Inspector Kitchener and Notices issued

12. The notebook of Inspector Kitchener reveals that he took notes concerning events that were occurring that day.  I have paid attention to what the inspector has written to give some context to the happenings of that day.  Such an exercise is somewhat limited because there is no evidence from Inspector Kitchener himself to elaborate on what is in his notebook.

13. From the notebook, it would seem that all of the matters that had been an issue for the inspector, in the days preceding 30 April 2020, had been rectified.  However, on the date itself, an immediate compliance notice was issued at 08:45 hours regarding handrails at the front of the site.  These were immediately rectified. 

14. The inspector noted the arrival of the Second and Third Respondents on site at 09:00 hours.  He noted that “CFMEU identified issues with static pump lines from concrete pump”.  He then noted that this issue was rectified.

15. Inspector Kitchener then noted “CFMEU issue with stretcher stairs and (scaffold) adjacent.  Sole plates not centred, legs on block wall and plywood.  CFMEU wanted stakes out and work on deck ceased until stairs rectified”.  The inspector noted that the rectifications were taking place as he was making his notes.  There was an immediate compliance notice issued at 11:00 hours regarding this issue.  It would seem that he photographed the rectifications and sent them to someone identified as “OM HOUSTON”.

16. It would seem that the information he received was that plywood wasn’t sufficient and there had to be solid hardwood.  He noted that he was awaiting rectification.  From what is seen later in the notes, the rectification was accepted.  Another immediate compliance notice was issued at 12:00 hours which noted the rectifications but required the structure to be inspected by a competent person.  Again, considering the notes, this was done.

17. The inspector then noted that the emergency procedures did not include the crane operator and that an improvement notice was to be issued.

18. In evidence before me, there was an improvement notice that was issued at midday on 30 April 2020 in relation to this emergency plan.  It gave Rawcorp until 6 May 2020 to rectify the plan.

19. Whilst the scaffolding was rectified, including the installation of solid hardwood sole plates, the design drawings for the scaffold did not match the current configuration of sole plates for the stretcher stairs.  The inspector was unable to be provided with a current drawing demonstrating that the configuration was in line with scaffold design drawings.  For this reason, Inspector Kitchener issued another improvement notice requiring a current drawing to be provided.  That contravention also needed to be remedied before 6 May 2020.

    The Actions of the Second and Third Respondents

20. While the entry permits of the Second and Third Respondents allowed them to enter the worksite, those permits did not allow them to enter the Marine Parade Exclusion Zone or the Concrete Pump Zone.

21. Notwithstanding that they had no authorisation to do so, both the Second Respondent and the Third Respondent entered those zones at about 10 AM.  The Third Respondent stood in a position between the concrete pump and the concrete truck at the northern pump while the Second Respondent was also standing between the concrete trunk and the concrete pump at the southern pump.  Both men were physically blocking the trucks from reversing back to the concrete pumps which delayed the delivery of concrete to the site.

22. This had the practical effect of not allowing concrete to be delivered to the concrete pumps and, ultimately, to the first floor of the project where it would be poured and finished.  As discussed earlier, this action had the potential for catastrophic results for the machinery and for the project itself.

23. While standing behind the concrete trucks, the Third Respondent said words to the effect of “I’m not letting you guys start pouring anymore concrete” and “you guys won’t be fucking doing any more pouring today”.

24. Because of this, an official of Rawcorp contacted the Queensland Police Service.

25. The two Respondents continued to stand behind the concrete trucks.  At times the Respondents would act together blocking the concrete trucks and, at other times, they would separate and position themselves so that one was blocking the trucks at the northern end pump and the other at the southern end pump.

26. A Rawcorp official spoke to the Third Respondent and made several requests for him to remove himself from behind the trucks.  At one stage a conversation to this effect took place:

    O: Luke, can I just ask you to move so we can keep going with what we are doing?  We can have another conversation later.  Just move away.

    G: I am on a public road.  Ring the cops then.

27. While the Third Respondent was standing behind the concrete trucks, he was goading the truck drivers with words to the effect of “Come on, fucking hit me.  I want you to hit me” and “keep on coming back”.

28. The workers for Dallem also asked the Third Respondent to move from behind the trucks.  The Third Respondent said in reply to them, words to the effect of, “Hit me, Fucking hit me.  Come on, fucking hit me, you weak cunts”.

29. When the police arrived, about 45 minutes after the two Respondents first stood behind the trucks, both the Second and Third Respondents left the site before the police could speak with them. 

30. Ultimately, the concrete pour was delayed by 45 minutes, but fortunately there were none of the catastrophic consequences that might have occurred if the pour had been delayed by a longer time. 

    The Contraventions

31. Section 500 of the FW Act provides that “a permit holder exercising, or seeking to exercise, rights in accordance with this part must not intentionally hinder or obstruct any person, or otherwise act in an improper manner”.

32. The Second Respondent entered exclusion zones without authorisation, stood behind concrete trucks, blocked the delivery of concrete to concrete pumps and refused to obey directions to leave the area. Clearly the Second Respondent was intentionally hindering and obstructing all workers on this worksite and he was acting in an improper manner. Therefore he has contravened s 500 of the FW Act.

33. The Third Respondent entered exclusion zones without authorisation, stood behind concrete trucks, blocked the delivery of concrete to concrete pumps, refused to obey directions to leave the area and engaged in abuse of workers in an intimidatory manner. Clearly, the Third Respondent was intentionally hindering and obstructing workers on this worksite and he was acting in an improper manner. Therefore he has contravened s 500 of the FW Act.

34. Pursuant to s 793 of the FW Act, any conduct engaged in or on behalf of a body corporate by an officer of the body, within the scope of their actual or apparent authority, is taken to have been engaged in also by the body. The state of mind of a body corporate is the same state of mind as the person who has engaged in the conduct.

35. This means that the conduct engaged in by the Second Respondent was also engaged in by the First Respondent and the state of mind of the Second Respondent was also the state of mind of the First Respondent.

36. It also means that the conduct engaged in by the Third Respondent was also engaged in by the First Respondent and the state of mind of the Third Respondent was also the state of mind of the First Respondent.

37. Pursuant to s 550 of the FW Act, a person who is involved in the contravention of a civil remedy provision is taken to have contravened that provision. A person is involved in a contravention if the person has been, in any way, by act or omission, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention.

38. The combination of ss 550 and 793 of the FW Act means that the First Respondent has contravened s 500 in relation to the contravention of the Second Respondent and has also contravened s 500 in relation to the contravention of the Third Respondent. This proposition was accepted by Counsel for the three Respondents.

39. This means that all three respondents are liable to the imposition of pecuniary penalties.  In relation to the contravention by the Second Respondent, the First Respondent is liable to a maximum penalty of $63,000 and the Second Respondent is liable to a maximum penalty of $12,600.  In relation to the contravention by the Third Respondent, the First Respondent is liable to a maximum penalty of $63,000 and the Third Respondent is liable to a maximum penalty of $12,600.

    Declarations

40. Declarations that the three Respondents have contravened the FW act are appropriate. I will make the declarations in the terms submitted by the parties.

    Pecuniary Penalties

41. The law in relation to assessment of pecuniary penalties has really been laid down quite comprehensively.  The High Court, in Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2018] HCA 3, said, at paragraph 116 of that judgment,

    As has been observed, the principal object of an order that a person pay a pecuniary penalty under s 546 is deterrence: specific deterrence of the contravener and, by his or her example, general deterrence of other would-be contraveners. According to orthodox sentencing conceptions as they apply to the imposition of civil pecuniary penalties, specific deterrence inheres in the sting or burden which the penalty imposes on the contravener. Other things being equal, it is assumed that the greater the sting or burden of the penalty, the more likely it will be that the contravener will seek to avoid the risk of subjection to further penalties and thus the more likely it will be that the contravener is deterred from further contraventions; likewise, the more potent will be the example that the penalty sets for other would-be contraveners and therefore the greater the penalty's general deterrent effect. Conversely, the less the sting or burden that a penalty imposes on a contravener, the less likely it will be that the contravener is deterred from further contraventions and the less the general deterrent effect of the penalty. Ultimately, if a penalty is devoid of sting or burden, it may not have much, if any, specific or general deterrent effect, and so it will be unlikely, or at least less likely, to achieve the specific and general deterrent effects that are the raison d'être of its imposition.”

42. In Mason & Harrington Corporation Pty Ltd t/as Pangea Restaurant & Bar [2007] FMCA 7 (“the Pangea Case”), the Court went through, in effect, a number of factors that Courts should be mindful of when imposing pecuniary penalties.  One must be careful though, in looking at the Pangaea case, that one doesn’t simply look at those matters as some form of checklist to see whether or not the facts of the case, with the particular factors, either aggravate or mitigate the penalty. 

43. As such, the list compiled in Pangaea is extremely useful, but it should not be a formula used by the Court to slavishly come up with some sort of, almost mathematical, guide for the imposition of penalties. 

    Context

44. The reason that I allowed the compliance notices and the notebook of Inspector Kitchener to be part of the evidence, was to put the contraventions into context.  Counsel for all three Respondents has submitted that this matter is not a case of the Second and Third Respondents simply wandering onto a worksite and disrupting the construction work for the fun of it.

45. It was submitted to me that there was good cause for the Second and Third Respondents to be at the site that day.  There had been a number of compliance notices issued in the days preceding 30 April 2020 and an immediate compliance notice was issued 15 minutes before the two Respondents entered the site that morning.  It has also been submitted that the matters that the two Respondents pointed out, were matters that Inspector Kitchener specifically noted.

1. The suggestion seemed to be that the Second and Third Respondents were of the view that there should be no work on site until the rectifications to the scaffolding were completed and that this was the reason that they acted in the way that they did.  However, there is no evidence that this was the case at all.  In fact, both the Second and Third Respondent have not filed any affidavit material at all.

2. Whilst it may be argued that they did not wish to do this whilst the issue of liability was still alive (on the grounds they may incriminate themselves), once liability was admitted, there was no bar to either of Respondent submitting affidavit material.  Instead, the three Respondents filed the affidavit of Ms Birch (which contained the compliance notices and notebook of Inspector Kitchener) and another affidavit (which I ruled as inadmissible).

3. In those circumstances, it is very difficult for me to find that the actions of the Second and Third Respondent were, in any way, the result of their concern for safety at the worksite.

4. The notebook is also instructive in that it discloses that the concerns of the “union” included that there were no permits issued and no plan.  Both of those “concerns” were totally unfounded.  Whilst it may be that the matters about which the two Respondents were concerned, were also matters of concern to Inspector Kitchener, what is clear is that Inspector Kitchener had everything in hand.

5. If there were true dangers associated with the static line or the scaffolding, Inspector Kitchener would not have allowed work to proceed.  Any safety concerns were well within the keeping of both Inspector Kitchener and Ms Pettersen.

6. Any concern for safety does not explain why the Third Respondent behaved in such an appalling manner.  If it were that he was so concerned with the safety of workers, it seems incongruous that he would ask those same workers to hit him with their trucks, let alone fight him.  It would hardly explain why he would refer to them as “weak cunts”.

7. And if concern for safety were the genesis of the actions of the two Respondents, it is totally contradictory behaviour for them to make themselves scarce upon the arrival of the police.  In looking at the flight of the two Respondents upon police arrival, it may very well be inferred that both knew very well the illegality of what it was they were doing which is why they left.  It is clear evidence of a consciousness of guilt.

8. Obviously, the Second and Third Respondents had cause to enter the worksite.  They were within their rights to speak to Ms Petterson about the static line.  They were also within their rights to speak to Inspector Kitchener about any safety issue.  However, it is quite ironic that the two Respondents would then blatantly flout safety rules by entering those zones for which they were forbidden entry. 

9. In reality, nothing justifies their actions from that point on and Counsel for all three Respondents, quite emphatically, submitted that there was no justification for these actions.

10. The damage done by these actions was minimal, notwithstanding the potential for greater, more catastrophic results.  Whilst the behaviour was sustained, it was only for 45 minutes, even though it ceased because of the arrival of the police.

11. Still, it was a flagrant abuse of the power to enter a worksite and act contrary to the Law, as if “those rules don’t apply to us and we can do whatever we want”.

    Mitigation

12. There is little, to no, evidence of any contrition on behalf of any of the three Respondents.  As previously noted, there is no evidence from either the Second Respondent or Third Respondent and therefore there is no evidence to say that either has “changed their ways” or that they won’t behave in a similar manner in the future.  But this simply means that this is not a factor in mitigation.  It cannot aggravate the offending.

13. There is evidence of cooperation with the administration of justice.  On the first court date (10 February 2021), His Honour, Judge Jarrett (as he then was) ordered the parties to file affidavits and to conduct a mediation with a Court Registrar.  When this did not resolve the matter, His Honour ordered (on 12 August 2021) that the matter be set for a three day trial beginning on Monday, 28 February 2022.  The matter eventually came to my docket where I kept the same dates for the trial.

14. On Friday, 25 February 2022, my Chambers was informed that there had been an acceptance of liability, the trial was no longer needed and the parties requested a penalty hearing on, what would have been, the third day of the trial, Wednesday, 2 March 2022.

15. Whilst the indication that no trial was needed came late, I do note that the Applicant no longer sought to proceed with a very significant allegation.  Upon receipt of this information, the three Respondents, soon after, filed an amended defence where there was an admission of the allegations.

16. This saved the community time and money.  Notwithstanding that the Court had no other work to fill the Monday and Tuesday of the trial, because of flooding in Brisbane, the Commonwealth Courts Building was closed for those two days in any event.

17. This is really the full extent of any factors in mitigation.

    The First Respondent

18. Each of the Respondents have factors unique to them which need to be considered by the Court.  The First Respondent has an unenviable record before this Court.  They have been described by other members of this Court as a “rogue union” and a “repeat offender”.  I have previously described the First Respondent as “the greatest recidivist offender in Australian corporate history”.

19. What must be avoided is a conclusion that “because the First Respondent is so infamous for contravening the FW Act, any contravention committed by the First Respondent, automatically deserves a crushing penalty”. Such thinking seeks to punish the First Respondent for their past offending and pays scant regard for the offending for which they must be presently punished. The First Respondent is entitled to due process under the law no matter what their past history has been. This is consistent with what was said by the Full Court in Pattinson v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner [2020] FCAFC 177.

20. The appropriate pecuniary penalty awarded to the First Respondent must be one that is proportionate to the actions that constitute the contravention.  The fact of the past offending of the First Respondent, incorrigible as it may be, does not aggravate the offending; rather, it means that there is very little room in which a Court could find mitigation.

21. Whilst the penalty needs to have sufficient “sting” to achieve the desired outcome of specific and general deterrence, it cannot be out of proportion to the maximum penalty available.  As I have mentioned previously in other cases, the Court can only do what the legislation allows it to do.  If the penalties imposed no longer have the requisite “sting”, it is then a matter for the Parliament to give the Court sufficient legislative power to impose a penalty that will truly “sting”.

22. In looking at all matters, in relation to the contravention committed by the Second Respondent, the Court imposes a pecuniary penalty of $35,000 upon the First Respondent.

23. Similarly, in relation to the contravention committed by the Third Respondent, the Court imposes a pecuniary penalty of $50,000 upon the First Respondent.

    The Second Respondent

24. The offending of the Second Respondent was less serious than that of the Third Respondent.  The Second Respondent did not verbally abuse any worker and did not ask anyone to fight him.

25. The Second Respondent was penalised recently for a contravention of s 500 of the FW Act. However, that contravention was for actions that occurred after this present contravention. The maximum penalty for the “previous” contravention was $13,320 as opposed to the $12,600 maximum penalty that applies in the present matter.

26. In that “previous” contravention, the Second Respondent had the benefit of no previous contraventions as a factor in mitigation.  While he comes before me as a person who has a previous contravention to his name, when the Second Respondent committed the present contravention, he had no previous contraventions to his name.

27. It would be somewhat ridiculous if the Second Respondent could contravene s 500 on two totally separate occasions and be given the benefit in mitigation of his having no previous contraventions to his name on both occasions.

28. Because the “previous” contravention is of a similar nature as the present contravention, because he was the follower and not the leader in the present contravention and because there is a lesser maximum penalty, I will not impose as great a penalty upon him on this occasion as was imposed on him previously.

29. I impose a pecuniary penalty on the Second Respondent in the sum of $7,000.

    The Third Respondent

30. The conduct engaged in by the Third Respondent is more serious than that of the Second Respondent.  It seems to me that the Third Respondent was “calling the shots” and the Second Respondent followed his lead.  The demeanour of the Third Respondent was combative and intimidating.  His invitation to the truck drivers to hit him with their trucks and then to the concreters to fight him, illustrates how belligerent he was on this day.

31. The Third Respondent does have a previous contravention of s 500 of the FW Act to his name. That contravention did not involve the totally aggressive and improper behaviour towards workers as was displayed in the present matter. The actions in the previous contravention were not such that they could have led to the catastrophic results to which the present actions could potentially have caused.

32. Having regard to all relevant factors, I impose a pecuniary penalty on the Third Respondent in the sum of $10,000.

I certify that the preceding seventy-seven (77) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Vasta.

Dated:       11 March 2022