Aur23 v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUR23 v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2023] FCA 1440

File number(s): VID 932 of 2023
Judgment of: WHEELAHAN J
Date of judgment: 21 November 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION — where previous general duty judge granted an interim injunction prior to the commencement of a proceeding, to restrain the deportation of the (now) applicant, which was to continue indefinitely subject to further order if an originating application filed – where the applicant filed an originating application seeking to compel the Secretary of the Department to bring before the Minister a request for Ministerial intervention under ss 46A and 48B of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where respondents filed an interlocutory application seeking the discharge of the injunction on the basis that the request had been communicated to the office of the Minister – where, after the making of that interlocutory application, the Minister refused to intervene in exercise of the ss 46A and 48B powers – where the executive intended to remove the applicant from the country on 21 November 2023, subject to the injunction being discharged – where the applicant sought leave to amend his originating application to challenge the Minister’s decision not to intervene on grounds of apprehended bias, irrelevant considerations, and improper purpose or, alternatively, that the Departmental officer’s referral of the applicant’s request to the Minister was ineffective because it resulted in a decision affected by jurisdictional error – where granting the respondents’ interlocutory application would have the effect of eliminating the subject-matter of the claim on a summary basis and with limited argument – respondents’ interlocutory application dismissed – leave to amend the applicant’s originating application granted
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 23

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 46A, 48B, 198, 351, 476A

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 39.05

Cases cited:

AUR23 v Commonwealth of Australia [2023] FCA 1394

AUR23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1349

BP Chemicals ANZ Pty Ltd v Manildra Starches Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 1189

CNY17 v Minister for Immigration[2019] HCA 50; 268 CLR 76

Davis v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 213; 288 FCR 23

Davis v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 10; 408 ALR 381

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy[2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337

McHugh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 223; 283 FCR 602

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ [2016] HCA 29; 259 CLR 180

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 47
Date of hearing: 20 November 2023
Counsel for the Applicant Ms L De Ferrari SC
Solicitor for the Applicant Human Rights for All
Counsel for the Respondents Dr S Hartford Davis
Solicitor for the Respondents Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 932 of 2023
BETWEEN:

AUR23

Applicant

AND:
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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 1440
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the Court involves an interlocutory application by the respondents seeking to discharge an interim injunction that was previously granted by Hespe J, which restrained the respondents from removing the applicant from Australia. The applicant, a citizen of Jordan and unlawful non-citizen currently in immigration detention, had sought protection from deportation by filing an originating application. This application aimed to compel the Secretary of the Department to bring a request for Ministerial intervention before the Minister under sections 46A and 48B of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The respondents filed their interlocutory application after the Minister refused to intervene in the exercise of the powers mentioned.

The key legal issues before the Court were whether the respondents' interlocutory application should be granted and, if not, whether the applicant should be granted leave to amend his originating application to challenge the Minister's decision not to intervene on grounds of apprehended bias, irrelevant considerations, and improper purpose. Additionally, the Court needed to consider whether the Departmental officer's referral of the applicant's request to the Minister was ineffective due to jurisdictional error.

In dismissing the respondents' interlocutory application, the Court found that there was a sufficiently tenable case that the Minister's decision was affected by jurisdictional error. The applicant argued that the Minister's decision was made to foreclose the relief sought in this proceeding, suggesting it was a device to avoid litigation. The Court acknowledged the principles guiding the exercise of the power to set aside an interlocutory injunction and concluded that there were good reasons to intervene due to the significant change in circumstances and the potential for unwarranted harm.

The Court granted the applicant leave to amend his originating application to challenge the Minister's decision on the grounds of apprehended bias, irrelevant considerations, and improper purpose, and to argue that the Departmental officer's referral was ineffective due to jurisdictional error. The Court also made interim non-publication orders regarding certain documents tendered at the hearing and directed the parties to confer and provide a joint short minute describing parts of the documents over which permanent non-publication orders should be made.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondents’ interlocutory application, filed 17 November 2023, is dismissed.

2. By 4.00 pm on 5 December 2023, the applicant have leave to file and serve an amended originating application so as to amend paragraphs 1 and 2 of the details of claim, substantially in the form of the draft furnished to the Court on 20 November 2023.

3. Pursuant to s 37AI(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), an interim non-publication order is made with respect to each of the following documents tendered at the hearing conducted on 20 November 2023:

(a) the entire affidavit of Hervee Dupont Dejean, dated 17 November 2023, which was marked as exhibit R1;

(b) the entire affidavit of Alison Mary Battisson, dated 20 November 2023, which was marked as exhibit A2; and

(c) Annexure AMB-3 to the affidavit noted in sub-paragraph (b), above, which was separately tendered and marked as exhibit R2.

4. By 4.00 pm on 24 November 2023, the legal practitioners for the parties are to confer and to provide, by way of email to the Chambers of the Hon. Justice Wheelahan, a joint short minute describing the parts of the documents, referred to in the sub-paragraphs to order 3, over which permanent non-publication orders should be made pursuant to ss 37AF and 37AG of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and shall furnish redacted copies of the relevant documents for the purposes of being available for public inspection.

5. The costs of all applications be costs in the proceeding.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before me in a Duty Judge capacity is an interlocutory application lodged by the respondents on Friday 17 November 2023 to discharge an order made by Hespe J made on 10 November 2023 which restrained the respondents from removing the applicant from Australia: AUR23 v Commonwealth of Australia [2023] FCA 1394. Subject to the outcome of the respondents’ application, the applicant is scheduled to depart Australia for Jordan later today, 21 November 2023. The proposed departure date is of some importance to the respondents because on 23 October 2023, the Jordanian embassy issued a temporary travel document for the applicant, which is valid only until 23 November 2023. Background The applicant is a citizen of Jordan who is an unlawful non-citizen currently in immigration detention. He arrived on Christmas Island in 2013. In 2017, the applicant sought a protection visa which was refused by a delegate of the Minister. The delegate’s decision was subsequently affirmed by the Immigration Assessment Authority in December 2018. The applicant did not seek judicial review of the Authority’s decision, and was taken into immigration detention in February 2022. Subsequently, on 11 January 2023 the applicant made a request for Ministerial intervention under ss 46A and 48B of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to “lift the bar” so as to enable him to make a further application within the migration zone for a protection visa. The powers of the Minister under these provisions are special powers which may be exercised only personally, where the Minister thinks that it is in the public interest to do so. By their terms, the Minister is not obliged to consider exercising the power, or whether it is in the public interest to do so, and under no circumstances can the Minister be compelled to exercise the powers: s 46A(7); s 48B(6); Davis v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 10; 408 ALR 381 (Davis HCA) at [12] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Gleeson JJ) and [98] (Gordon J) in relation to s 351 of the Act which is relevantly indistinguishable. However, because the powers are only exercisable in the public interest by the Minister personally, the Minister cannot delegate the decision to exercise or not to exercise the power by reference to public interest criteria, thereby requiring or permitting officers of the executive government to make a decision that only the Minister may make: Davis HCA at [28] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Gleeson JJ), [66], [97], [101] (Gordon J), [194] (Edelman J), [254] (Jagot J). The applicant’s January 2023 request for Ministerial intervention was made by his migration agent, who is his representative in this proceeding. The application was made on the basis of claimed new information giving rise to new or additional protection claims that warranted further consideration. The new information included new grounds on which the applicant claimed that he feared persecution and would be at risk of significant harm should he be returned to Jordan, and on the ground that after he made his protection visa application, a protection visa was granted to the applicant’s father in October 2017 following which the applicant’s parents and four of his siblings have settled permanently in Australia.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In support of the respondents’ application, counsel for the respondents commenced with the statement by Hespe J at [32] of her Honour’s reasons for judgment that the application for the interlocutory injunction would not be supportable if the applicant’s request for Ministerial intervention was in fact referred to the Minister. Counsel submitted that the circumstances since the making of the order on 10 November 2023 had changed because the foundation of the order made by Hespe J, being to preserve the subject-matter of the proceeding, had now fallen away because not only had the applicant’s request been referred to the Minister, but the Minister had exercised his power by personally refusing the applicant’s request.The Minister’s decision At this point, I will say a little more about the Minister’s decision. The record of the Minister’s decision takes the form of a signed indorsement on the cover of the submission that was provided to the Minister by the Department. The substance of the recommendation to the Minister was that he should agree to exercise his powers under s 46A and 48B of the Act to “lift the bar” to allow the applicant to apply for a protection visa. The submission was accompanied by decision instruments for the Minister to sign which provided for a window for the bar to be lifted of seven days from the time of notification to the applicant in relation to s 46A, which corresponded to the seven-day period provided for by s 48B(1). The submission was also accompanied by draft statements by the Minister to Parliament, which would be required by s 46A(4) and s 48B(3) of the Act in the event that the Minister made the determinations. The Minister did not agree to the recommendations, and did not sign the determinations or the statements to Parliament.The applicant’s submissions Senior counsel for the applicant submitted that there was a sufficiently tenable case that the Minister’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error as to support an argument that the subject-matter of the proceeding remained alive, and that the respondents’ interlocutory application to discharge the injunction should be refused. The claimed jurisdictional error was put on three grounds –(a)the Minister’s decision was affected by apprehended bias;(b)the Minister had taken account of irrelevant considerations; and (c)the Minister had made the decision for an improper purpose. At the heart of these claims were submissions that the Minister’s decision was made in order to foreclose the relief sought by the applicant in this proceeding, that the decision was a device to avoid litigation, and because the purpose of the decision was to avoid the consequences of litigation, there had been no genuine consideration of the applicant’s claims in accordance with what was referred to as the purpose of the relevant provisions. There were several features of the Department’s submission to the Minister on which senior counsel for the applicant relied. The first was a passage above the recommendations which stated –TimingFor consideration by 20 November 2023, as agreed with Alice [redacted] in order to progress the involuntary removal of [AUR23] at 9.25 pm on 21 November 2023.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Counsel for the respondents submitted that having regard to the wide scope of s 46A and s 48B, there was no proper articulation as to why all the matters referred to in the submission to the Minister, including those relating to the timing of the submission, the departure arrangements, and the litigation background, were not relevant to the Minister’s consideration of the applicant’s request for intervention in the public interest. It was further submitted that there was no suggestion that the applicant’s new claims had not been fairly summarised in the submission to the Minister, and it was submitted that there was no impropriety in furnishing to the Minister the assessment of the applicant’s request for intervention that had been undertaken by the Department in January 2023.Consideration The Court’s power to discharge the order of Hespe J was not in issue. The power to do so arises under r 39.05(c) on the ground that the order was interlocutory, and under r 39.05(d) on the ground that it was an injunction. The terms of the order also contemplate that its duration was subject to further order. The principles which guide the exercise of the power to set aside an interlocutory injunction are well established, and were referred to by Finkelstein J in BP Chemicals ANZ Pty Ltd v Manildra Starches Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 1189 at 5 in the following terms –First I need to determine the circumstances in which it will be proper for a court, other than a court of appeal, to revoke or vary an interlocutory injunction. There is no doubt that a court has power to revoke or vary any interlocutory order that it has made: Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc & Anor (1981) 148 CLR 170 at 178. In the case of an order for an interlocutory injunction it is usual for the order to be expressed to be “until further order”, as in this case, or, if the order is not so qualified, that qualification will be implied: Chanel Ltd v Woolworth & Co Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 485 at 492. So it is that an application to vary or revoke an interlocutory injunction should be regarded as an exercise of the right conferred by the order itself. Notwithstanding the fact that a court retains the power of revocation or variation, it has often been said that the power should be “exercised only sparingly”: Copping v ANZ McCaughan Ltd (1997) 67 SASR 525 at 569. The cases establish that an applicant must show some good reason for the court to intervene. Good reason will be shown where there has been some significant change of circumstances or where a party has become aware of facts which he or she could not reasonably have known at the time of the hearing: Adam P Brown 148 CLR at 178. Another instance is when there has been a change in the applicable law: Regent Oil Co Ltd v J.T. Leavesley (Lichfield) Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 1210. It might also be appropriate for the court to intervene if it appears that an injunction has an effect that is significantly different from that which was perceived to be its effect when the order was made. A court might also intervene when an injunction causes real and unwarranted harm either to a party or to a stranger to the suit: Cretanor Maritime Co Ltd v Irish Marine Management Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 966. No doubt other circumstances will arise when the power should be exercised. But the jurisdiction to revoke or vary an order should not be exercised when the real basis for the application is that the original order was wrongly made. Such an argument should be addressed to a court of appeal.