FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUR23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1349
File number: NSD 277 of 2023 Judgment of: CHEESEMAN J Date of judgment: 3 November 2023 Catchwords: COSTS – where the application has been dismissed by consent – where the dismissal follows concessions being made by the first respondent, the Minister – where the concessions made after an independent High Court decision involving analogous decision-making of departmental officer – where there is a delay between the delivery of the High Court decision and the offer of the concession – Held: Minister to pay applicant’s costs in a lump sum. Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 48B, 474(7(a), 476A(1)(b),(c)
Cases cited: Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Ltd [1993] FCA 585; 44 FCR 194
Davis v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 213; 288 FCR 23
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 10
Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (No 2) [2021] FCA 1337
ONE.TEL Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 270; 101 FCR 548
Re Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (Cth); Ex Parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; 186 CLR 622
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 24 Date of last submission: 25 October 2023 Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Counsel for the Applicant: Ms D Gang Solicitor for the Applicant: Human Rights for All Counsel for First Respondent: Mr S H Hartford-Davis Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
ORDERS
NSD 277 of 2023 BETWEEN: AUR23
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS
Second Respondent
BENJAMIN, POSITION NUMBER 60035600, DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS
Third Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
CHEESEMAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 NOVEMBER 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding in the lump sum of $8,500.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CHEESEMAN J
The parties have reached agreement on orders disposing of the substantive application. The remaining dispute is limited to the question of costs. The applicant seeks his costs in the sum of $12,000 ($6,142.50 for counsel fees and $5,857.50 for solicitor fees). The First Respondent, the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, submits that there should be no costs order in this proceeding. The remaining respondents did not take an active part in the proceeding.
The question of costs arises in circumstances where the substantive application was resolved without a hearing on the merits following the High Court delivering judgment in Davis v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 10 (Davis HCA), a case which, although involving a different statutory provision, had…
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- Case
- [2023] FCA 1349
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the submissions made by the Minister, who argued that both parties had acted reasonably in initiating and defending the application until the High Court delivered its judgment. The Minister also argued that it was reasonable for him to make the concession that rendered the application inutile. However, the court disagreed with the Minister's submission that there should be no order as to costs. The court held that it was one of the relatively rare cases in which, notwithstanding that there had been no hearing on the merits, it was appropriate to order that the Minister pay the applicant's costs. The court was satisfied that the applicant was almost certain to have succeeded if the matter had been fully tried given the outcome in the Davis High Court case. Therefore, the court concluded that the Minister should pay the costs of the applicant.
In conclusion, the court ordered that the first respondent, the Minister, pay the applicant's costs of the proceeding in the lump sum of $8,500. This decision was based on the court's finding that the applicant was almost certain to have succeeded if the matter had been fully tried, given the outcome in the Davis High Court case. The court also took into account the fact that both parties had acted reasonably in initiating and defending the application up until the time when the High Court delivered its judgment. The court did not consider it necessary to reach a view as to whether the delay in the Minister making the concessions as to the impact on this proceeding of the decision in Davis High Court case was reasonable.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding in the lump sum of $8,500.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister’s submission is that up until the decision in Davis HCA, both parties acted reasonably in their conduct in, respectively, initiating and defending the application. Further, that once the High Court delivered judgment it was reasonable for the Minister to make the concession made that rendered the application inutile. In these circumstances, the Minister submits that the appropriate order is that there be no order as to costs.CONSIDERATION The Court’s power to award costs is found in s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The Court has a general discretion, but it is a power that must be exercised judicially. Where, as here, a proceeding is resolved before a hearing on the merits, courts will usually make no order as to costs, such that each party bears its own costs: Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (No 2) [2021] FCA 1337 at [56] (McKerracher J). In an oft-cited passage in Re Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (Cth); Ex Parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; 186 CLR 622 at 624 to 625, McHugh J observed:In an appropriate case, a court will make an order for costs even when there has been no hearing on the merits and the moving party no longer wishes to proceed with the action. The court cannot try a hypothetical action between the parties. To do so would burden the parties with the costs of a litigated action which by settlement or extracurial action they had avoided. In some cases, however, the court may be able to conclude that one of the parties has acted so unreasonably that the other party should obtain the costs of the action. … Moreover, in some cases a judge may feel confident that, although both parties have acted reasonably, one party was almost certain to have succeeded if the matter had been fully tried. … But such cases are likely to be rare.If it appears that both parties have acted reasonably in commencing and defending the proceedings and the conduct of the parties continued to be reasonable until the litigation was settled or its further prosecution became futile, the proper exercise of the cost discretion will usually mean that the court will make no order as to the cost of the proceedings. This approach has been adopted in a large number of cases. I am satisfied that this is one of the relatively rare cases in which, notwithstanding that there has been no hearing on the merits, it is appropriate to order that the Minister pay the applicant’s costs: see the discussion in ONE.TEL Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 270; 101 FCR 548 at [7] (Burchett J). In reaching this conclusion, I have had regard to the fact that the Minister was a party to this application and the Davis proceeding and that both proceedings involved analogous issues of principle. Taking into account the passage of Davis through the court hierarchy, although I am satisfied that both the applicant and the Minister acted reasonably in, respectively, commencing, and defending, the proceeding up until the time when the High Court delivered judgment in Davis HCA, I am also satisfied that the applicant was almost certain to have succeeded if the matter had been fully tried given the outcome in Davis HCA. The applicant has achieved in practical terms the personal outcome for which he contended as a consequence of the decision of Davis HCA. I do not have before me on this application the s 48B Ministerial Guidelines that were in issue in the substantive application, however, as mentioned above, the Minister has not sought to distinguish those guidelines from the instruction in Davis. Once Davis HCA was delivered, it was reasonable for the Minister to make the concession that he did. Once that concession was made, it was reasonable for the applicant to agree to the dismissal of his application. Given the view I have reached it is not necessary to reach a view as to whether the delay in the Minister making the concessions as to the impact on this proceeding of the decision in Davis HCA was reasonable. The evidence on this costs application does not address this issue.