ARX18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ARX18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1351

Appeal from: ARX18 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 3021
File number: VID 1190 of 2019
Judgment of: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 23 September 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court refusing a reinstatement application – insufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration on appeal – no arguable case – application refused
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 65

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 13.03C(1)(c)

Cases cited:

ARX18 v Minister for Immigration & Another [2019] FCCA 3021

CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1344

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc. [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397

Guo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 34

House v King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110; (2016) 152 ALD 478

MZXQQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 250

MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530

MZYPB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FMCA 226

SZBQJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 143

SZHSY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 793

SZIGC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1725

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 34
Date of last submission/s: 12 August 2020
Date of hearing: Heard on the papers
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant was self-represented
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R J White
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear

ORDERS

VID 1190 of 2019
BETWEEN:

ARX18

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MURPHY J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 SEPTEMBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal is refused.

2.The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MURPHY J:

  1. The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia who arrived in Australia in March 2017.  She seeks leave to appeal from an interlocutory order of the Federal Circuit Court (FCC) made 24 October 2019 which refused her application for reinstatement of a proceeding in that Court.  The proceeding sought judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 16 January 2018 affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Home Affairs, not to grant her a protection visa pursuant to s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The proceeding was initially dismissed because the…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1351
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In ARX18 v Minister for Home Affairs, the applicant, a Malaysian citizen, sought leave to appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court which dismissed her application for reinstatement of her challenge to the refusal of a Protection (class XA) visa. The primary issue before the court was whether the application for leave to appeal demonstrated sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration on appeal. The applicant, who had arrived in Australia on an Electronic Travel Authority visa, had applied for a Protection visa on the basis of family and economic hardship, particularly due to her husband's medical issues and the family's limited income. The delegate and the Tribunal had both found that the applicant did not meet the criteria for a Protection visa under the Act.

The Federal Circuit Court had previously dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review due to her non-appearance at a scheduled hearing. Subsequently, the applicant applied for reinstatement, which was also dismissed by the court. The court evaluated the merits of the reinstatement application by assessing whether the grounds for judicial review were arguable. The primary judge concluded that neither of the grounds presented in the application for reinstatement—dissatisfaction with the Tribunal's decision and dissatisfaction with the translation provided by the interpreter—were arguable. The judge found that the first ground merely expressed disagreement with the Tribunal's decision without identifying any jurisdictional error, and the second ground lacked particulars and evidence to support a claim of inadequate translation.

Given the findings, the court held that there was insufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration of the matter on appeal. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was refused, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal is refused.

2. The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons I explain the application for leave to appeal must be refused.BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia who arrived in Australia on 8 March 2017 on an Electronic Travel Authority visa. On 10 May 2017 she lodged an application for a Protection (class XA) visa in which she identified the following matters:(a)she came from a poor family in a small town;(b)she was married with two children;(c)her husband “had a problem at his work place” which meant that he could not work;(d)her husband was subsequently “diagnosed with anemia hemoragi, hypertrophic cardiomyopathy and hypertension”;(e)because of her husband’s health issues, she had to work to support her family;(f)she hoped that working in Australia would give her enough money to support her husband’s medical treatment; and(g)she could not go back to Malaysia because she would not earn enough money to support her family. The delegate’s decision On 17 August 2017 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant the visa and gave reasons. The delegate identified the applicant’s claims for protection and after considering relevant country information concluded that the applicant was not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as outlined in s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.The Tribunal’s decision On 1 September 2017 the applicant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision. Following a hearing at which the applicant was assisted by a Malay interpreter, on 16 January 2018 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a visa and gave reasons for its decision. The learned primary judge summarised the Tribunal’s reasons (at [10]-[12]) as follows, and I respectfully adopt that summary: The Tribunal considered the applicant’s claims of economic and family hardship: [15]-[19]. The Tribunal accepted that while the applicant may have come from modest circumstances, her family was not underprivileged in a general sense: [16]. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant’s husband was no longer working due to medical ailments, and that their extended family only had limited income. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the family’s economic circumstances, considered cumulatively and also taking into account any associated psychological pressures, involved serious harm amounting to persecution as required by the Act: [18]. In its assessment of the refugee criterion, the Tribunal found that even against the backdrop of her husband’s health problems and her children’s expenses, the applicant’s economic pressures did not result in serious harm such as to attract protection obligations by Australia: [21].For those reasons, the Tribunal found that the applicant did not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) or the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act and affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant her a Protection visa: [27]-[30].The Federal Circuit Court

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 17 August 2017 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant the visa and gave reasons. The delegate identified the applicant’s claims for protection and after considering relevant country information concluded that the applicant was not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as outlined in s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.The Tribunal’s decision On 1 September 2017 the applicant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision. Following a hearing at which the applicant was assisted by a Malay interpreter, on 16 January 2018 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a visa and gave reasons for its decision. The learned primary judge summarised the Tribunal’s reasons (at [10]-[12]) as follows, and I respectfully adopt that summary: The Tribunal considered the applicant’s claims of economic and family hardship: [15]-[19]. The Tribunal accepted that while the applicant may have come from modest circumstances, her family was not underprivileged in a general sense: [16]. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant’s husband was no longer working due to medical ailments, and that their extended family only had limited income. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the family’s economic circumstances, considered cumulatively and also taking into account any associated psychological pressures, involved serious harm amounting to persecution as required by the Act: [18]. In its assessment of the refugee criterion, the Tribunal found that even against the backdrop of her husband’s health problems and her children’s expenses, the applicant’s economic pressures did not result in serious harm such as to attract protection obligations by Australia: [21].For those reasons, the Tribunal found that the applicant did not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) or the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act and affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant her a Protection visa: [27]-[30].The Federal Circuit Court On 19 February 2018 the applicant filed an application in the FCC seeking judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. On 12 December 2018 the FCC made orders by consent listing the matter for a show cause hearing on 16 October 2019 at 2:15 pm. When the proceeding was called on for hearing there was no appearance by or on behalf of the applicant. An order was made dismissing the application pursuant to r 13.03C(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2011 (Cth). Sometime later the applicant arrived at the registry apparently stating that she had been present at court at 2:15 pm. Whether that was so or not, arrangements were made for a hearing on 18 October 2019, listing it as an application for reinstatement. The primary judge heard the reinstatement application on 18 October 2019. On 24 October 2019 his Honour made orders to dismiss the application and published reasons. The primary judge noted (at [18]) that when an applicant does not appear at a hearing the court may dismiss the application pursuant to rule 13.03C(1)(c), and (at [19]) that the court may set aside an order made in the absence of a party pursuant to r 16.05(2)(a).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge said (at [21]) that on an application for reinstatement the threshold which is applicable to consideration of the merits of the application is whether the grounds for judicial review are shown to be ‘arguable’. His Honour cited CAL15 at [6] where Mortimer J said:The threshold is whether a ground of review is “arguable”. That means it is not fanciful, illogical, impermissible or devoid of merit, but has a level of rationality and a basis in the material before the Court sufficient for the Court to be satisfied it is appropriate to hear full argument, with the parties having a fair opportunity to prepare for such argument. Thus, at the level of assessing whether a ground is “arguable”, the Court should not expect a ground of judicial review to be fully developed, especially by an unrepresented asylum seeker whose first language is not English. (Emphasis added by the primary judge.) His Honour said (at [23]) that the assessment as to whether a ground of review is arguable is evaluative, and cited the decision in MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530 at [10] where Ryan J explained that the decision whether or not to reinstate a proceeding is “essentially discretionary” and so attracts the principles in House v King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504 to 505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ). The primary judge then turned to consider whether either of the two grounds of the application for judicial review were reasonably arguable. His Honour considered the first two of the factors explained in CAL15 by noting that the Minister accepted the applicant’s explanation for the non-appearance, and the Minister did not suggest that he would suffer any prejudice if the matter were to be reinstated. His Honour then turned to address whether either of the two grounds of the application for judicial review were arguable. Ground 1 of the application alleged:I am requesting due to I am not satisfied with the decision of AAT. It is because I have provided my evidence and I felt I have been neglected by the AAT.The primary judge said that was not a proper ground of review but merely a submission or statement of dissatisfaction with the Tribunal’s decision and demonstrated no more than her emphatic disagreement with it (at [32]-[33]). His Honour considered it did not identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal, and to the extent that the applicant contended that the Tribunal should have come to a different factual conclusion on the evidence the complaint, in substance, sought impermissible merits review. His Honour concluded that Ground 1 did not raise an arguable case for review (at [34]). Ground 2 of the application alleged:I am requesting due to I am not satisfied with the translation from the interpreter.The primary judge noted that the ground was not informed by any particulars and that the applicant had not filed an amended application, further affidavit or an outline of submissions (at [36]-[38]). The applicant had not explained why she was dissatisfied with the quality of the interpreting or how this may have had any impact upon her ability to participate in the hearing. His Honour also found that the applicant had not filed any evidence that identified any deficiencies in the standard of translation provided, and said nothing as to that issue during the hearing of the reinstatement application. There was nothing in the materials to suggest that the applicant received inadequate translation or was otherwise denied a real or meaningful opportunity to participate in the hearing before the Tribunal. His Honour concluded that Ground 2 did not raise an arguable case for review (at [41]).