Arhbal v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Arhbal v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCCA 480

File number(s): ADG 37 of 2019
Judgment of: JUDGE HEFFERNAN
Date of judgment: 15 March 2021
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether decision of Tribunal unreasonable – whether error of law – whether Tribunal misunderstood breadth of discretion in s 376 – whether s 359AA provides disclosure mechanism for ‘any matter’ under s 376 – materiality – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5F, 353(b), 375, 357A, 358AA, 359A, 359AA, 362A, 376 & 376(3)(b)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2, cll 820.211(2)(a), 820.22 & reg 1.15A

Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2016) 244 FCR 305

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Kumar (2009) 238 CLR 448

Number of paragraphs: 34
Date of hearing: 9 & 16 July 2020
Place: Adelaide
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Ower SC
Solicitor for the Applicant: Work Visa Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr P d’Assumpcao
Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

ADG 37 of 2019
BETWEEN:

MOHAMMED ARHBAL

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE HEFFERNAN

DATE OF ORDER:

15 MARCH 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the costs of the first respondent in the amount of SEVEN THOUSAND, TWO HUNDRED AND SIX DOLLARS ($7,206).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE HEFFERNAN

  1. This is an application for constitutional writs with respect to a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’).  That decision affirmed an earlier decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) Subclass 820 visa (‘the visa’).

  2. The applicant raised two grounds of review in his application filed 31 January 2019 but indicated that he only sought to press ground one:

    1.The second respondent (the Tribunal) committed jurisdictional error in making its decision in Case Number 1730152 dated 11 January 2019 (the Decision) in that the Tribunal’s exercise of discretion under s. 376 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) was subject to an error or law and/or was unreasonable and this materially affected the Decision.

    Particulars

    1.1 The Secretary provided information to the Tribunal documents or information to which s. 376 applied.

    1.2    The Tribunal had regard to those documents or information in respect of making the Decision.

    1.3 The Tribunal erred in law in that it failed to consider whether to disclose those documents or information under para. 376(3)(b), but only considered whether to disclose the documents pursuant to ss. 359A and 359AA and thereby erred in law and/or fettered its discretion under the former paragraph.

    1.4    In the alternative, if the Tribunal did consider whether to disclose those documents or information under…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCCA 480
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Mr Arhbal against the Minister for Home Affairs. The dispute centred on whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) had properly exercised its discretion to disclose information to Mr Arhbal under section 376 of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). Heffernan J of the Federal Court of Australia heard the application.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal understood the nature of its power to disclose information under section 376, and whether it had failed to consider exercising this discretion. Specifically, the court considered whether the Tribunal was permitted to make disclosure under section 359AA of the Act, and how this section interacted with the concept of "non-disclosable information" as defined in section 5 of the Act.

Heffernan J reasoned that the Tribunal had specifically acknowledged its power to disclose information under section 376. The court rejected the applicant's submission that the Tribunal misunderstood the breadth of this discretion, noting that the Tribunal had specifically referred to the power of disclosure. The court found that section 359AA provided a valid mechanism for disclosure contemplated by section 376(3)(b), and that the reference to "non-disclosable information" in section 359A did not preclude the application of section 359AA. The court distinguished the authority cited by the applicant, which concerned section 359A, from the present case which involved section 359AA. Therefore, the court concluded that an inference of failure to consider the discretion under section 376(3)(b) could not be drawn, as the Tribunal had adverted to the discretion and determined to apply the disclosure mechanism provided for in section 359AA.

The court was not satisfied that the applicant had established that the Tribunal failed to consider the exercise of its discretion to make disclosure under section 376(3)(b).

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 359AA(1) provides for oral disclosure as follows:Information and invitation given orally by Tribunal while applicant appearing (1)If an applicant is appearing before the Tribunal because of an invitation under section 360: (a)he Tribunal may orally give to the applicant clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and (b)if the Tribunal does so--the Tribunal must: (i)ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why the information is relevant to the review, and the consequences of the information being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and (ii)orally invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information; and (iii)advise the applicant that he or she may seek additional time to comment on or respond to the information; and (iv)if the applicant seeks additional time to comment on or respond to the information--adjourn the review, if the Tribunal considers that the applicant reasonably needs additional time to comment on or respond to the information. (2)A reference in this section to affirming a decision that is under review does not include a reference to the affirmation of a decision that is taken to be affirmed under subsection 362B(1F). THE TRIBUNAL DECISION The issue before the Tribunal was whether the applicant was the spouse of Ms Ghilane. As identified by the first respondent in his written submissions, as the challenge to the Tribunal’s decision is the legality of it in light of the provisions I have referred to above and not with respect to the finding that the applicant was not in a spousal relationship with Ms Ghilane, it is not necessary at this point to set out the reasoning of the Tribunal on that matter at great length. The Tribunal considered the matters it was required to by reg 1.15A and was not satisfied that at the time of the application the applicant met the mandatory criteria set out in cl 820.22. With respect to the certificate issued pursuant to s 376, the Tribunal had the following to say:9.On 4 December 2017, the certificate issued under s 375A was revoked and replaced with a certificate issued under s 376 of the Act. This provides the Tribunal a discretion to disclose the information.10.The Tribunal wrote to Mr Arhbal on 13 August 2018 and provided a copy of the certificate issued under s 376 of the Act and invited his comment on the validity of this certificate. No comments on the validity of the certificate were received.11.Where the information covered by the certificate was relevant to Mr Arhbal’s matter this information was put to him under s 359AA of the Act as detailed below. With respect to s 359AA, the reasoning of the Tribunal was as follows: 45.Mr Arhbal was provided a copy of the allegation that the relationship was not genuine. This allegation was also put to him under s 359AA of the Act at the hearing. Specifically it was put to him that an allegation was made to immigration that:•He entered Australia as a student but did not study.•He did not apply for another visa after his student visa expired.•He married in May 2011, maybe late May 2011.•Ms Ghilane met him through his uncle who lives in Australia.•After they married Ms Ghilane learned his intentions were not genuine and that he only married to obtain a visa.•Ms Ghilane had not lodged an application for a visa, and all the papers are with Mr Arhbal and his lawyer.•Ms Ghilane had no awareness of an application where she has sponsored you for a visa.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, the first respondent submitted that the Tribunal disclosed the gist of the information to the applicant and that the plain fact of the matter is that the source of the information the subject of the certificate was revealed to the applicant in correspondence from the Tribunal.[7] That was acknowledged by his representative in a letter sent to the Tribunal.[8][7] CB 562.[8] CB 545.CONSIDERATION The Tribunal specifically recognized that it had power under s 376 to disclose the information in the certificate.[9] I am not satisfied that it has been established that an inference arises that the Tribunal did not understand the nature of the power it had under s 376. Having specifically acknowledged the existence of the power in s 376 was one of disclosure, it is difficult to accept the submission of the applicant that the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that if a discretion arose it could only be exercised under s 359AA or that it misunderstood the breadth of the discretion in s 376.[9] CB 756 [9]. With respect the argument of the applicant that the Tribunal was not permitted to make disclosure to the applicant under s 359AA, it must be rejected. The section specifically refers to circumstances in which an applicant appears at a hearing to which he or she has been invited under s 360. I accept the submission of the first respondent that s 359AA(1) of the Act provides a mechanism by which disclosure contemplated by s 376(3)(b) can occur. The reference to non-disclosable information is contained in s 359A(4)(c). Non-disclosable information is defined in s 5 of the Act in the following terms: "non-disclosable information" means information or matter: (a)whose disclosure would, in the Minister's opinion, be contrary to the national interest because it would: (i)prejudice the security, defence or international relations of Australia; or (ii)involve the disclosure of deliberations or decisions of the Cabinet or of a committee of the Cabinet; or (b)whose disclosure would, in the Minister's opinion, be contrary to the public interest for a reason which could form the basis of a claim by the Crown in right of the Commonwealth in judicial proceedings; or (c)whose disclosure would found an action by a person, other than the Commonwealth, for breach of confidence; and includes any document containing, or any record of, such information or matter. In my view, the reference to non-disclosable information in s 359A means that the terms of s 359A do not apply to non-disclosable information, not that s 359AA does not apply to non-disclosable information. The term ‘non-disclosable information’ is not used in s 359AA. Where information is non-disclosable, the disclosure mechanism contemplated by s 359A(1) does not apply to it. In addition, by virtue of s 359A(3), where the form of disclosure contemplated in s 359AA is used by the Tribunal, s 359A does not apply. That is entirely different to the submission put by the applicant that s 359AA does not permit the disclosure of non-disclosable information. The authority cited by the applicant, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Kumar,[10] dealt with s 359A, not s 359AA. Section 359AA operates as an alternative mechanism to s 359A with respect to matters and information to which that section applies, but it also operates as a disclosure mechanism with respect to s 376(3)(b). When the reasons of the Tribunal are read in light of that, the submission that an inference can be drawn that it failed to consider the exercise of the discretion to make disclosure under s 376(3)(b) cannot be accepted. The relevant passages of the reasons simply demonstrate that the Tribunal adverted to the discretion under s 376(3)(b) and determined appropriately to apply the disclosure mechanism provided for in s 359AA.[10] (2009) 238 CLR 448 [17]-[21].