Arhbal v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Arhbal v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCAFC 220

Appeal from: Arhbal v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCCA 480
File number(s): SAD 62 of 2021
Judgment of: PERRY, CHARLESWORTH AND BURLEY JJ
Date of judgment: 6 December 2021
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision dismissing application for judicial review of decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) – where delegate was not satisfied that the applicant was the spouse of the sponsor – where certificate issued pursuant to s 376 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where information disclosed to applicant pursuant to s 359AA – whether primary judge erred in failing to find that Tribunal misunderstood breadth of discretion in s 376 – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss5, 5F, 65, 359, 359AA, 359A, 360, 362A, 363(1)(c), 375, 375A, 376, 424, 424AA, 425 and 438(3)(b)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.15A, Sch 2 cll 820.211(2)(a), 820.211(2)(d) and 820.22

Cases cited:

Arhbal v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCCA 480

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 264 CLR 421

Division: General Division
Registry: South Australia
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 45
Date of hearing: 12 November 2021
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S Ower QC
Solicitor for the Appellant: Work Visa Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Liu
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

SAD 62 of 2021
BETWEEN:

MOHAMMED ARHBAL

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

PERRY, CHARLESWORTH AND BURLEY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

6 DECEMBER 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1       INTRODUCTION

[1]

2       RELEVANT LEGISLATION

[6]

3       THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL

[15]

4       THE REASONS OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE

[24]

5       THE APPEAL

[31]

5.1      The appellant’s submissions

[31]

5.2      Consideration

[36]

6       DISPOSITION

[45]

THE COURT:

1.                 INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant is a citizen of Morocco whose application for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant appeals from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) (Arhbal v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCCA 480, Judge Heffernan) dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision made by the second respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, on 11 January 2019 affirming the delegate’s refusal decision.

  2. On 30 May 2011 the appellant married an Australian citizen, Ghizlane Ghilane. On 8 June 2011, the appellant applied for the visa. The primary issue before the delegate, and before the Tribunal on merits review, was whether or not the appellant…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCAFC 220
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Arhbal v Minister for Home Affairs, the applicant appealed against the decision of the primary judge, who dismissed his application for judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal). The Tribunal had rejected the applicant's application for a partner visa on the basis that the delegate was not satisfied that the applicant was the spouse of the sponsor. The applicant challenged the Tribunal's decision, contending that the Tribunal misunderstood the breadth of its discretion under s 376 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant argued that the Tribunal failed to properly consider the information disclosed to him pursuant to s 359AA of the Act.

The court considered whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal misunderstood the breadth of its discretion in s 376. The court found that the appellant misconstrued the reasons of the Tribunal by contending that the Tribunal considered the exercise of its discretion pursuant to s 376(3)(b) to be somehow subordinate to the application of s 359AA. The court held that the Tribunal had a discretion under s 438(3)(b) to disclose to the applicant the information or any matter contained in the document, and that the Tribunal had no power under s 427(1)(c) and no obligation under s 424AA, s 424A or s 425 to disclose to the applicant the information or any matter contained in the document unless the discretion was affirmatively exercised.

The court held that the appellant's argument was without foundation and dismissed the appeal. The court further held that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs. The court's decision was based on the finding that the Tribunal had properly exercised its discretion under s 376 of the Migration Act, and that the primary judge did not err in failing to find that the Tribunal misunderstood the breadth of its discretion.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant also contends that such errors on the part of the Tribunal were material, and that the primary judge erred in failing to reach that conclusion.5.2 Consideration The difficulty with the appellant’s primary submission is that it misconstrues the reasons of the Tribunal by contending that the Tribunal considered the exercise of its discretion pursuant to s 376(3)(b) to be somehow subordinate to the application of s 359AA. We consider that this submission is without foundation. The passages relied upon by the appellant in SZMTA are at [24] and [30] and are as follows:24.Second, the Tribunal has a discretion under s 438(3)(b), after taking account of such advice as the Secretary may have given to the Tribunal under s 438(2)(b), to disclose to the applicant the information or any matter contained in the document. Implicit in the conferral of that discretion and in the hierarchy of provisions within Pt 7 is that the Tribunal has no power under s 427(1)(c) and no obligation under s 424AA, s 424A or s 425 to disclose to the applicant the information or any matter contained in the document unless the discretion is affirmatively exercised. No doubt, the discretion under s 438(3)(b) must be exercised within the bounds of reasonableness and the obligations imposed by ss 424AA, 424A and 425, where engaged, must be performed to the maximum extent permitted by the reasonable exercise of that discretion.…30.A notification by the Secretary to the Tribunal that a document or information given by the Secretary to the Tribunal is a document or information to which s 438 applies is an event which alters the procedural context within which the Tribunal’s duty of review is to be conducted. If valid, the notification erects a procedural impediment to the otherwise unfettered ability of the Tribunal to take into account the document or information if the Tribunal considers it to be relevant to an issue to be determined in the review, constrains the power of the Tribunal under s 427(1)(c), and truncates the specific obligations of the Tribunal under ss 424AA, 424A and 425. The very fact of notification also changes the context in which the entitlement of the applicant under s 423 – to give the Tribunal a written statement in relation to any matter of fact that the applicant wishes the Tribunal to consider and written arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review – falls to be exercised. The terms of s 438(3)(b), s 424AA, s 424A and s 425 are relevantly equivalent, respectively, to s 376(3)(b), s 359AA, s 359A and s 360. It is apparent from [24] of SZMTA that the discretion resides in the Tribunal under s 438(3)(b) insofar as there is a valid certificate, and that there is no obligation under s 424AA, s 424A or s 425 to disclose to the appellant the information nor any matter contained in the document “unless the discretion is affirmatively exercised”. The same applies for the cognate provisions in relation to Part 5 reviewable decisions.