SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Arc Holdings (Aust) P/L v Riana P/L & Anor [2010] QCA 269
PARTIES:
ARC HOLDINGS (AUST) PTY LTD
ACN 111 648 643
(plaintiff/appellant)
v
RIANA PTY LTD
ACN 010 976 815
(first defendant/first respondent)
REPPALS (1) PTY LTD (TRADING AS MAIN COMMERCIAL FIRST NATIONAL)
ACN 085 994 136
(second defendant/second respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 14548 of 2009
SC No 9189 of 2005DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at BrisbaneDELIVERED ON:
8 October 2010
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
25 June 2010
JUDGES:
Fraser and Chesterman and White JJA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order madeORDER:
Appeal dismissed with costs
CATCHWORDS:
CONVEYANCING – STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS OR RESTRICTIONS RELATING TO CONTRACT FOR SALE – PROTECTION OF PURCHASERS – OBLIGATIONS ON VENDOR: DISCLOSURE, WARNINGS AND LIKE MATTERS – where the appellant entered into a contract to buy land from the first respondent – where the second respondent was the first respondent’s real estate agent – where the appellant purported to terminate the contract pursuant to s 367 of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) (“PAMDA”) on the ground that the contract did not include the warning statement required by s 366 – where the appellant sought a declaration that it had validly terminated the contract – where the primary judge found that the appellant was not entitled to terminate the contract as s 366 did not apply as the land was not “residential property” within the meaning of s 17 of PAMDA – whether the primary judge erred in holding that the land was not in an area for “residential purposes” – whether in determining that the land was not “residential property” the primary judge erred in his interpretation of s 17 – whether the primary judge erred in failing to consider the term “future residential purposes” in the definition of “residential purposes” in s 17(4) in determining whether the land was in a “residential area” for the purposes of s 17(1) of PAMDA
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 14A(1), s 32A
Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) (repealed), s 2.1.23(2)
Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld), s 10(1), s 10(2), s 17, s 17(1)(b), s 17(2), s 17(4), s 364, s 366, s 367APM Property 3 Pty Ltd v Blondeau & Ors[2009] QSC 326, applied
Arc Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Riana Pty Ltd and Reppals (1) Pty Ltd t/as Main Commercial First National[2009] QSC 374, related
Carr v Western Australia (2007) 232 CLR 138; [2007] HCA 47, applied
Conde v Gilfoyle & Anor[2010] QCA 109, cited
Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v Southside Tower Developments Pty Ltd, unreported, Byrne J, Supreme Court of Victoria, No 6668 of 1996, 9 October 1996, considered
Hedley Commercial Property Services Pty Ltd v BRCP Oasis Land Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 261, cited
Hedley Commercial…
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- Case
- [2010] QCA 269
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the land in question qualified as "residential property" within the meaning of section 17 of PAMDA, and whether the primary judge was correct in finding that section 366 did not apply due to this characterisation. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the primary judge erred in concluding that the land was not in an area designated for "residential purposes" and whether the primary judge had correctly interpreted section 17 in excluding the term "future residential purposes" from his analysis.
The court held that the primary judge did not err in determining that the land did not qualify as "residential property" under section 17 of PAMDA. The court found that the primary judge's interpretation of "residential purposes" and "residential property" was consistent with the statutory definition and the surrounding context. The term "future residential purposes" was not considered relevant to the primary judge's conclusion that the land was not in a "residential area." The court upheld the primary judge's decision and dismissed the appeal, ordering Arc Holdings to pay costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs
Background
Background to the litigation
The primary judge’s decision hinged on the interpretation of "residential property" and whether the land was in an area for "residential purposes". The appellant argued that the primary judge erred in holding that the land was not in a residential area and in interpreting s 17 of PAMDA. Additionally, the appellant claimed that the primary judge failed to consider the term "future residential purposes" in the definition of "residential purposes" in s 17(4) of PAMDA when determining whether the land was in a "residential area" for the purposes of s 17(1).
The matter first came before the Supreme Court of Queensland. The primary judge ruled on the appellant's application for a declaration that it had validly terminated the contract for sale. The primary judge found against the appellant, holding that the land was not "residential property" within the meaning of s 17 of PAMDA, and therefore s 366 did not apply. The appellant appealed to the Queensland Court of Appeal, challenging the primary judge’s interpretation of s 17 of PAMDA and the failure to consider "future residential purposes" in the definition of "residential purposes". The appeal was subsequently dismissed with costs.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the primary judge erred in holding that the land was not in an area for "residential purposes".
2. Whether in determining that the land was not "residential property" the primary judge erred in his interpretation of s 17 of PAMDA.
3. Whether the primary judge erred in failing to consider the term "future residential purposes" in the definition of "residential purposes" in s 17(4) in determining whether the land was in a "residential area" for the purposes of s 17(1) of PAMDA.
Held
1. The court held that the primary judge did not err in holding that the land was not in an area for "residential purposes".
2. The court held that the primary judge did not err in his interpretation of s 17 of PAMDA in determining that the land was not "residential property".
3. The court held that the primary judge did not err in failing to consider the term "future residential purposes" in the definition of "residential purposes" in s 17(4) in determining whether the land was in a "residential area" for the purposes of s 17(1) of PAMDA.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court found that the primary judge correctly concluded that the land in question did not fall within the definition of a residential area under s 17 of PAMDA. The court examined the definition of "residential purposes" and found that it was concerned with the actual use or intended use of the land at the time of the transaction, rather than any future use. The court further held that the primary judge's interpretation of s 17 was consistent with the legislative intent and the established case law. The court noted that the term "future residential purposes" in s 17(4) was not relevant to the primary judge's determination as the focus was on the present use or intended use of the land. The court upheld the primary judge's decision, finding that the appellant was not entitled to terminate the contract under s 366 of PAMDA as the land did not qualify as "residential property". The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the definition of "residential purposes" under s 17 of PAMDA is to be interpreted strictly in relation to the actual or intended use of the land at the time of the transaction, without considering any potential future use.