AQS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AQS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1362

Appeal from: AQS15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2176
File number: NSD 1025 of 2015
Judge: PERRY  J
Date of judgment: 17 November 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for a protection visa – appeal from Federal Circuit Court – where appellant relied upon photographs of banners carried in a protest march – relevance of statements on banners to claim to fear persecution by reason of (imputed) political beliefs - whether Tribunal failed to consider a claim or integer of a claim by reference to the banners depicted in the photographs – where claim arose squarely on the material before the Tribunal – appeal allowed.
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 414

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, [1954] ATS 5 (entered into force 22 April 1954)

Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267, [1973] ATS 37 (entered into force 4 October 1967)

Cases cited:

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 233 FCR 136

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; (2013) 210 FCR 505

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRMA [2013] FCAFC 161; (2013) 219 FCR 287

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs(No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1

NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 124

NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695

Plaintiff M61/2010 v Commonwealth of Australia  [2010] HCA 41; (2010) 243 CLR 319

SZSSC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 863; (2014) 317 ALR 369

WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593

Date of hearing: 17 November 2015, 5 April 2016, 20 June 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 67
Solicitor for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person on 17 November 2015; Mr S Hodges, solicitor of Hodges Legal (on 5 April 2016 and 20 June 2016)
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms S Zarucki (17 November 2015), Mr J Kay Hoyle (5 April 2016 and 20 June 2016)
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1025 of 2015
BETWEEN:

AQS15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY  J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 NOVEMBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Appeal…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1362
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In AQS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a Sri Lankan national, sought a protection visa on the basis of a fear of persecution due to imputed political beliefs. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appeal, and the appellant sought review by the Full Court of the Federal Court. The central issue in the appeal was whether the Tribunal failed to consider a claim or a component of a claim based on the appellant's participation in a protest march, as evidenced by photographs he submitted. The appellant argued that the Tribunal did not adequately consider the significance of the banners carried during the march which referenced his imputed political beliefs, and that this omission was a failure to consider material that was squarely relevant to his claims.

The Full Court held that the Tribunal did not properly evaluate the evidence of the appellant's participation in the protest march, particularly the banners that could substantiate his imputed political beliefs. The court found that the Tribunal's reasons did not adequately address how the evidence of the march and the banners factored into the appellant's claims of a well-founded fear of persecution. This failure meant that the Tribunal did not properly consider a claim or an integer of a claim that was directly relevant to the appellant's application for a protection visa.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Federal Circuit Court was set aside. The Full Court quashed the decision of the Minister made on 10 April 2015 and mandated that the Minister reconsider the appellant's application for review, ensuring all relevant material is properly considered. If the parties could not agree on costs, they were directed to file written submissions within 14 days of the orders, after which the costs would be determined by the court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Order 2 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dated 12 August 2015 be set aside.

3. A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent, quashing its decision made on 10 April 2015.

4. A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent, requiring the second respondent to determine the appellant’s application for review made on 22 August 2013 according to law.

5. If costs of the appeal cannot be agreed between the parties, each party is to file and serve short written submissions on the issue of costs within 14 days of these orders, and costs will be determined thereafter on the papers.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

A determination of whether there is a real risk for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa) requires a consideration of whether there is a “real chance” that an applicant will suffer “significant harm” (as defined in s 36(2A)) if returned to her or his country of origin: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; (2013) 210 FCR 505 at 551 [242]-[246] (Lander and Gordon JJ) (with whom Besanko and Jagot JJ at 557-558 [297] and Flick J at 565 [342] relevantly agreed). The level of risk of harm under s 36(2)(aa) is therefore the same as the level of risk required under s 36(2)(a) of the Act. 4. BACKGROUND4.1 The appellant’s application for a protection visa and the delegate’s decision It is necessary to set out the way in which the appellant put his claims with some care, given that ground 1 of the appeal raises the question of the proper characterisation of the appellant’s claims. In his Irregular Maritime Arrival Entry Interview in August 2012, the appellant said that he left Sri Lanka when he was 17 because of the war, the army were shooting male youths and his life was in danger. He also said that he left India because “there is a lot of opportunity or possibility to be sent back from India. … There are people being abducted in white vans and cannot be questioned.” The appellant applied for a protection visa in December 2012. In a statutory declaration accompanying his visa application, the appellant claimed that: (1)he fled Sri Lanka in 1990 due to ethnic conflict;(2)it was not safe for young Tamil males to remain in the North of Sri Lanka as the army was targeting persons like him;(3)he believes his parents helped the LTTE as his family’s grocery store was burned by the Sri Lankan army on two occasions prior to his departure in 1990;(4)he entered India illegally where he was accepted as a refugee;(5)approximately 10 years after his departure, the appellant learned that his brother was conscripted by the LTTE although he is unsure as to how long his brother served in the LTTE;(6)the Indian government has been threatening to return Tamil Sri Lankan refugees back to Sri Lanka;(7)he believes he would be targeted by the Sri Lankan authorities if returned, including being arrested, detained and subjected to harsh treatment; and(8)due to this fear, and the fear that his wife and children would be returned to Sri Lanka, he decided to travel to a safe country. In an interview with the delegate on 11 June 2013, the appellant provided further detail relating to his claims and (as summarised by the delegate) “referred to a rally he attended which he was ‘in the front of’ in January 2012; appealing to the ‘Delhi government’ (in India) regarding ‘Tamil problems’. He was a photographer during the rally and has a USB of these photographs.” He also said that “[e]arlier he had also attended a ‘funeral meeting’ for someone who had committed suicide in India in support of Sri Lankan people.” The appellant claimed that he had offered for SERCO staff to view the USB at times. It was agreed that the appellant’s agent would send the photographs to the delegate together with an explanation of where the appellant was pictured, within a week of the interview although apparently that did not occur.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 14 August 2013, the delegate rejected the appellant’s application, having not been satisfied that the appellant was a non-citizen in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations under the Refugees Convention under s 36(2)(a); nor that the complementary protection obligations in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act were engaged. 4.2 The decision of the Tribunal On 22 August 2013 the appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. Through a migration agent, the appellant provided a submission to the Tribunal by email on 27 January 2015. In that submission, the agent confirmed that all of the written and oral claims made previously by the appellant were relied upon. The submission was largely comprised of country information including information relevant to the appellant’s claim to fear persecution by reason of his alleged perceived links with the LTTE and the treatment of returnees to Sri Lanka who have departed illegally. The written submission did not specifically mention or make submissions on the appellant’s claim based upon his participation in the march. The appellant also attended a Tribunal hearing to give evidence and elaborate on his claims on 29 January 2015. At that hearing, the appellant submitted a bundle of photographs of the march which the Tribunal accepted as genuine and as “providing substantiation for the Applicant’s claims to have participated in the event” (Tribunal reasons at [32]). The Tribunal also noted that in some of the photographs the marchers are carrying banners: see further below. The Tribunal summarised the appellant’s claims and evidence presented in his visa application and accompanying statutory declaration at [9]-[15] of its reasons. In so doing, the Tribunal noted at [11] the appellant’s claim at his protection visa interview that he had attended a rally in India in January 2012, taking a prominent part in front, and that he had taken a number of photographs (at [11]). When summarising the appellant’s evidence presented to it, the Tribunal noted (at [17]):ŸHe submitted a number of photographs which he said showed the sixty-eight day procession (or march) he had joined in India. This began at the memorial in the village …and made its way eventually to New Delhi. It was organised by the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) a Tamil organization based in India, and received support from the government of Tamil Nadu. Its aim was to stop the war and give Sri Lankan Tamils their rights. On arrival in New Delhi the marchers presented a petition to the Indian government. Asked if he was a member of the ENDLF he said he was a supporter but not a member. The procession was the only activity he had been involved in to protest against the actions of the Sri Lanka government. I noted that he had made no mention of it in his entry interview. He agreed this was so and said he had not realised for some time that it could be relevant to his protection visa application.ŸAsked when it was that the CID had shown his mother the photographs of him in the procession he said it was about two months previously. They had also questioned his brother about him. I noted this meant it had taken them three years before they had got around to doing so. He said he did not know about this- they showed them to her two months ago. He did not know where they had obtained the photographs. Asked if they were among those he had submitted he said he did not know. He confirmed that the procession had been publicised in the Indian media at the time and said he was one of about fifteen or sixteen marchers who took photographs of the event.(emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At the further hearing on 20 June 2016, I granted leave for the appellant to amend the notice of appeal which was not opposed by the Minister and heard further argument on the amended notice of appeal. 3. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE MIGRATION ACT The Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) provides for the circumstances in which a person who is not a citizen of Australia (a non-citizen) may enter and remain in Australia. The Act provides for different classes of visa, one of which is a protection visa under s 36 of the Act. A protection visa may be granted where the criteria in s 36(2)(a) are met, namely, where the Minister is satisfied that the person is a person to whom protection obligations are owed because the person is a refugee as defined in article 1A(2) of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, [1954] ATS 5 (entered into force 22 April 1954) as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267, [1973] ATS 37 (entered into force 4 October 1967) (collectively, the Refugees Convention). Article 1A(2) defines a refugee as a person who:…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return it. A determination of whether a (subjective) fear is (objectively) “well-founded” requires the Tribunal to assess what will occur in the future. A fear is “well-founded” when there is “a real and substantial basis for it” even though the chance of the fear eventuating is less than 50 per cent (often described as a “real chance”): Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559 (Guo) at 572 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). Conversely, a fear of persecution is not well-founded “if it is merely assumed or if it is mere speculation”: ibid. Section 36(2)(aa) provides in the alternative for the grant of a protection visa to a non-citizen where the Minister is not satisfied that the person is a refugee but is nonetheless satisfied that the person is entitled to protection under Australia’s international non-refoulement obligations (described as complementary protection), being a person:…in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm… A determination of whether there is a real risk for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa) requires a consideration of whether there is a “real chance” that an applicant will suffer “significant harm” (as defined in s 36(2A)) if returned to her or his country of origin: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; (2013) 210 FCR 505 at 551 [242]-[246] (Lander and Gordon JJ) (with whom Besanko and Jagot JJ at 557-558 [297] and Flick J at 565 [342] relevantly agreed). The level of risk of harm under s 36(2)(aa) is therefore the same as the level of risk required under s 36(2)(a) of the Act. 4. BACKGROUND4.1 The appellant’s application for a protection visa and the delegate’s decision