FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AQS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1362
Appeal from: AQS15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2176 File number: NSD 1025 of 2015 Judge: PERRY J Date of judgment: 17 November 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for a protection visa – appeal from Federal Circuit Court – where appellant relied upon photographs of banners carried in a protest march – relevance of statements on banners to claim to fear persecution by reason of (imputed) political beliefs - whether Tribunal failed to consider a claim or integer of a claim by reference to the banners depicted in the photographs – where claim arose squarely on the material before the Tribunal – appeal allowed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 414
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, [1954] ATS 5 (entered into force 22 April 1954)
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267, [1973] ATS 37 (entered into force 4 October 1967)
Cases cited: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389
Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 233 FCR 136
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; (2013) 210 FCR 505
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRMA [2013] FCAFC 161; (2013) 219 FCR 287
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs(No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1
NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 124
NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695
Plaintiff M61/2010 v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 41; (2010) 243 CLR 319
SZSSC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 863; (2014) 317 ALR 369
WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593
Date of hearing: 17 November 2015, 5 April 2016, 20 June 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 67 Solicitor for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person on 17 November 2015; Mr S Hodges, solicitor of Hodges Legal (on 5 April 2016 and 20 June 2016) Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms S Zarucki (17 November 2015), Mr J Kay Hoyle (5 April 2016 and 20 June 2016) Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 1025 of 2015 BETWEEN: AQS15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRY J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 NOVEMBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Appeal…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1362
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Full Court held that the Tribunal did not properly evaluate the evidence of the appellant's participation in the protest march, particularly the banners that could substantiate his imputed political beliefs. The court found that the Tribunal's reasons did not adequately address how the evidence of the march and the banners factored into the appellant's claims of a well-founded fear of persecution. This failure meant that the Tribunal did not properly consider a claim or an integer of a claim that was directly relevant to the appellant's application for a protection visa.
Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Federal Circuit Court was set aside. The Full Court quashed the decision of the Minister made on 10 April 2015 and mandated that the Minister reconsider the appellant's application for review, ensuring all relevant material is properly considered. If the parties could not agree on costs, they were directed to file written submissions within 14 days of the orders, after which the costs would be determined by the court.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Order 2 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dated 12 August 2015 be set aside.
3. A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent, quashing its decision made on 10 April 2015.
4. A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent, requiring the second respondent to determine the appellant’s application for review made on 22 August 2013 according to law.
5. If costs of the appeal cannot be agreed between the parties, each party is to file and serve short written submissions on the issue of costs within 14 days of these orders, and costs will be determined thereafter on the papers.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At the further hearing on 20 June 2016, I granted leave for the appellant to amend the notice of appeal which was not opposed by the Minister and heard further argument on the amended notice of appeal. 3. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE MIGRATION ACT The Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) provides for the circumstances in which a person who is not a citizen of Australia (a non-citizen) may enter and remain in Australia. The Act provides for different classes of visa, one of which is a protection visa under s 36 of the Act. A protection visa may be granted where the criteria in s 36(2)(a) are met, namely, where the Minister is satisfied that the person is a person to whom protection obligations are owed because the person is a refugee as defined in article 1A(2) of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, [1954] ATS 5 (entered into force 22 April 1954) as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267, [1973] ATS 37 (entered into force 4 October 1967) (collectively, the Refugees Convention). Article 1A(2) defines a refugee as a person who:…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return it. A determination of whether a (subjective) fear is (objectively) “well-founded” requires the Tribunal to assess what will occur in the future. A fear is “well-founded” when there is “a real and substantial basis for it” even though the chance of the fear eventuating is less than 50 per cent (often described as a “real chance”): Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559 (Guo) at 572 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). Conversely, a fear of persecution is not well-founded “if it is merely assumed or if it is mere speculation”: ibid. Section 36(2)(aa) provides in the alternative for the grant of a protection visa to a non-citizen where the Minister is not satisfied that the person is a refugee but is nonetheless satisfied that the person is entitled to protection under Australia’s international non-refoulement obligations (described as complementary protection), being a person:…in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm… A determination of whether there is a real risk for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa) requires a consideration of whether there is a “real chance” that an applicant will suffer “significant harm” (as defined in s 36(2A)) if returned to her or his country of origin: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; (2013) 210 FCR 505 at 551 [242]-[246] (Lander and Gordon JJ) (with whom Besanko and Jagot JJ at 557-558 [297] and Flick J at 565 [342] relevantly agreed). The level of risk of harm under s 36(2)(aa) is therefore the same as the level of risk required under s 36(2)(a) of the Act. 4. BACKGROUND4.1 The appellant’s application for a protection visa and the delegate’s decision