Aql21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AQL21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 564

File number: PEG 51 of 2021
Judgment of: JUDGE KENDALL
Date of judgment: 24 March 2021
Catchwords: MIGRATION – partner visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the Tribunal found the applicant and sponsor were not in a genuine and continuing relationship – where claims of family violence – whether the Tribunal, in any event, had jurisdiction – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 375A, 476

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), cll 820.211, 820.221, 820.311 of Sch 2

Cases cited:

ALN19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1592

Bala v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCA 600

BMY18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 189

Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64

Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Abdul Manaf [2009] FCA 963

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng (2001) 178 ALR 421

MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392

SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor (2005) 228 CLR 294

SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80

Number of paragraphs: 118
Date of hearing: 22 March 2021
Place: Perth
Applicants: The first applicant appeared in person and on behalf of the second applicant and the third applicant
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr L Dennis
Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs
Solicitor for the Respondents: Minter Ellison Lawyers

ORDERS

PEG 51 of 2021
BETWEEN:

AQL21

First Applicant

AQM21

Second Applicant

AQN21

Third Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE KENDALL

DATE OF ORDER:

24 MARCH 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE KENDALL

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicants are citizens of Kenya. The first applicant is the second applicant’s mother and the third applicant’s grandmother (Court Book (“CB”) 24-27).

  2. The applicants arrived in Australia on a visitor visa on 6 July 2016 (CB 167). On 21 September 2016, the first applicant married her sponsor (an Australian Permanent Resident) (CB 47).

  3. On 24 September 2016, the applicants applied for a Partner (Temporary) (class UK) (subclass 820)/Partner (Residence) (class BS) (subclass 801) visa (the “visa”) (CB 20-94).

  4. On 20 October 2017, the then Department of Immigration & Border Protection wrote to the sponsor advising that it had received his notification that the relationship with the first applicant…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCCA 564
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for judicial review brought by the applicants against the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs. The applicants sought to challenge a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal, alleging that the Tribunal had committed jurisdictional error. The core of the dispute revolved around the Tribunal's assessment of a psychologist's report and its impact on the applicants' visa application.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Tribunal had engaged in jurisdictional error by incorrectly determining that a statutory declaration from a registered psychologist did not meet the requirements of the Migration Regulations 1994. The applicants contended that this finding constituted a jurisdictional error. The Court was required to consider whether any error made by the Tribunal was material to the ultimate outcome of the review.

Kendall J found that while the Tribunal had indeed concluded that the psychologist's statutory declaration did not meet the regulatory requirements, this finding was not material to the outcome of the visa application. The Court reasoned that an error is only jurisdictional if it realistically deprives an applicant of a successful outcome. In this instance, the Tribunal itself recognised that its conclusion regarding the statutory declaration had no bearing on the ultimate decision. The visa was refused on the basis that the first applicant was not considered the "spouse" of the sponsor, a finding made independently of the psychologist's report. Furthermore, the Tribunal had still had regard to the content of the statutory declaration when considering other relevant criteria, meaning the finding did not prevent its consideration.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 22 May 2020, the applicants applied for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in this Court. The application is brought pursuant to s 476 of the Act. The applicants must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error.TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The Tribunal’s decision is 11 pages long and spans 68 paragraphs. The Tribunal began by identifying the type of visa the applicants had applied for and noted that the applicants had claimed that the relationship between the first applicant and her sponsor had ceased because of family violence (at [1]-[2]). The Tribunal then summarised the delegate’s decision and confirmed that the applicants had attended a hearing and were represented by a migration agent (at [3]-[5] and [7]). The Tribunal then noted:6. At the commencement of the hearing the Tribunal informed the applicant that information in folio 1 of the Departmental file [BCC2016/3176368] was the subject of a 375A certificate. This certificate prevents the Tribunal disclosing any document, matter or information referred to in the certificate as it would be contrary to the public interest. In this case the reason disclosure would be contrary to the public interest was stated to be that the information included information provided to the Department in confidence. The Tribunal decided the certificate was valid. The Tribunal decided the information was relevant to this review and informed the applicant that it would provide the gist of the information to her during the hearing under s.359AA of the Act. The Tribunal provided the applicant with a copy of the s.375A certificate. The Tribunal noted that the first applicant had claimed that her relationship with the sponsor ended on 1 September 2017 and that she had been the victim of family violence (at [9]). Accordingly, the Tribunal determined, the issue before it was whether the first applicant met cl 820.221(3)(a) and (3)(b)(i) (at [10]). The Tribunal then summarised the relevant legislative requirements, as follows:10. Relevantly cl.820.221(3)(a) and (3)(b)(i) say:An applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if:(a) the applicant would meet the requirements of subclause 820.211(2), (5) or (6) except that the relationship between the applicant and the sponsoring partner has ceased; and (b) either or both of the following circumstances applies:(i) either or both of the following:(A) the applicant;(B) a dependent child of the sponsoring partner or of the applicant or of both of them;has suffered family violence committed by the sponsoring partner; 11. The provisions of cl.820.221 indicate that a genuine partner relationship within the meaning of the Act must have existed before the relationship ceased and the applicant would have otherwise met the criteria in subclauses 820.211(2) (5) or (6). This means that, while the claims of family violence do not have to cause the cessation of the relationship, the relationship which has ceased must have been one which would otherwise have met the requirements of the relevant legislation. 12. This approach was approved in the case of Guven v MIMIA [2006] FMCA 311 at [22]-[26] where Hartnett FM found that when considering the grant of a Subclass 100 Spouse (Residence) visa it was open to the Tribunal to consider whether at any point of time the relationship between the parties could properly be regarded as a spousal relationship within the meaning of the Regulations and only where it found that such a spousal relationship existed, was it required to make a further finding in relation to claims of domestic violence (as it was then referred to).13. Therefore before assessing whether the applicant has suffered relevant family violence, the Tribunal must assess whether at any point of time the applicant and the sponsoring partner were in a spousal relationship within the meaning of the Regulations

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court will address these submissions below. CONSIDERATION – GROUNDS OF REVIEWGround 1 For ease of reference, ground 1 states:The Tribunal engaged in jurisdictional error by incorrectly deciding that the psychologists report (in statutory declaration form) mentioned in paragraph 16 of its decision did not meet the statutory requirements of the Migration Regulations 1994. At [16], the Tribunal states:16. Notwithstanding, at hearing the Tribunal advised the applicant’s representative that its preliminary view was that a statutory declaration of registered psychologist (Ms Kaye Barr) did not meet the requirements under the Regulations. The Tribunal explained that Ms Barr had not provided an opinion and based on the information given, she had not treated the applicant while performing the duties of a psychologist but had only assessed her after two clinical interviews. The Tribunal afforded the applicant additional time following the hearing to submit any further information on which she seeks to rely. On 14 April 2020 a statutory declaration made by Ms Barr on 7 April 2020 was provided. In that statutory declaration Ms Barr provides an opinion however she makes it clear that her three interviews with the applicant were for assessment purposes only and states that the applicant has been treated by another psychologist. As such the statutory declaration does not meet the requirements under the Regulations. However for the reasons that follow, this does not affect the outcome of the application for review. (Emphasis added) As the emphasised passage above highlights, the fact that the Tribunal found that the psychologist’s report did not meet the Regulations was immaterial to the outcome of the review. An error is only jurisdictional if the error is material to the outcome – i.e., it realistically deprived an applicant of a successful outcome: Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3. Here, the Tribunal itself recognised that its conclusion had no effect in relation to the ultimate outcome for review. That finding is correct. The basis upon which the Tribunal refused the visa was that the first applicant was not “the spouse” of the sponsor at the time of application or any time thereafter (at [64]). The finding that the statutory declaration did not meet the Regulations was only relevant if the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant and the sponsor were in a genuine and continuing relationship and the relationship had ceased. The finding that the statutory declaration did not meet the Regulations was only “material” if it was necessary to consider cl 820.221(3). Here, as the Tribunal recognised, it was unnecessary to do so as the Tribunal was not that satisfied cl 820.211 was met (at [65]). Further, as [47]-[48] demonstrate, the Tribunal did, in fact, have regard to the statutory declaration when considering whether cl 820.211 was satisfied. Hence, the finding that the statutory declaration did not meet the requirements of the Regulation did not prevent the Tribunal from considering its content.