FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
APIR Systems Limited v Donald Financial Enterprises Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1448
Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 12DA, s 12GM
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 1041E, 1041H, 1041I, 1325(1), 1325(5)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 82, s 87Donald Financial Enterprises Pty Ltd v APIR Systems Ltd [2008] FCA 1112 related
Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 followed
Kalifair Pty Ltd v Digi-Tech (Australia) Ltd; McLean Tecnic Pty Ltd v Digi-Tech (Aust) Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 737 distinguished
Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd v Nixon [1999] FCA 1281 followedAPIR SYSTEMS LIMITED ACN 081 044 957, ANDREW WILLIAM HUTCHINGS BROSO, ANDREW JOSEPH RILEY, MAUREEN CANE, NOEL FRANCIS WICKS and DAVID MCGREGOR v DONALD FINANCIAL ENTERPRISES PTY LTD ACN 083 141 628 AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ELYSUM TRUST
NSD 1306 of 2008
FOSTER J
23 SEPTEMBER 2008
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 1306 of 2008
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: APIR SYSTEMS LIMITED ACN 081 044 957
First AppellantANDREW WILLIAM HUTCHINGS BROSO
Second AppellantANDREW JOSEPH RILEY
Third AppellantMAUREEN CANE
Fourth AppellantNOEL FRANCIS WICKS
Fifth AppellantDAVID MCGREGOR
Sixth AppellantAND: DONALD FINANCIAL ENTERPRISES PTY LTD ACN 083 141 628 AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ELYSUM TRUST
Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 SEPTEMBER 2008
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Notice of Motion filed by the appellants on 21 August 2008 be dismissed.
2.The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to that Notice of Motion.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 1306 of 2008
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: APIR SYSTEMS LIMITED ACN 081 044 957
First AppellantANDREW WILLIAM HUTCHINGS BROSO
Second AppellantANDREW JOSEPH RILEY
Third AppellantMAUREEN CANE
Fourth AppellantNOEL FRANCIS WICKS
Fifth AppellantDAVID MCGREGOR
Sixth AppellantAND: DONALD FINANCIAL ENTERPRISES PTY LTD ACN 083 141 628 AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ELYSUM TRUST
Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE:
23 SEPTEMBER 2008
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE PRESENT APPLICATION
The appellants have applied by way of Notice of Motion for a stay of final orders made by Edmonds J on 30 July 2008 pending the hearing of their appeal from those orders.
The orders which his Honour made on 30 July 2008 were in the following terms:
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
1.The Share Subscription Deed between the first respondent, the applicant and the first cross-respondent dated 23 January 2004 is void ab initio.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
2.The first respondent forthwith refunds to the applicant the subscription price of the 200,000 shares in the first respondent for which the applicant applied and subscribed.
3.If the first respondent is unable for any reason beyond its control…
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- Case
- [2008] FCA 1448
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the appellants' prospects on appeal and whether the Amended Notice of Appeal contained sufficient grounds to support their submissions. The court was not convinced that the trial judge's approach to damages and relief was flawed and found the appellants' arguments regarding disclosure and liability to be problematic. The court also found the argument that the offer made by the appellants constituted a satisfactory Calderbank offer to be strained and difficult. The court concluded that the appellants' prospects on appeal were weak and that their actions in tendering the cheques without accepting the respondent's conditions were not appropriate.
The court dismissed the Notice of Motion filed by the appellants and ordered them to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to that Notice of Motion. The court found that the appellants' actions were not justified given their weak prospects on appeal and the respondent's reasonable position in refusing to accept the cheques without agreement on certain conditions. The court's decision upheld the respondent's position and reinforced the importance of adhering to court orders and engaging in good faith negotiations to resolve disputes.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Notice of Motion filed by the appellants on 21 August 2008 be dismissed.
2. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to that Notice of Motion.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case originated from orders made by Edmonds J on 30 July 2008, which the appellants sought to appeal. The appellants filed a Notice of Appeal and subsequently a Notice of Motion seeking a stay of the orders or alternative orders concerning interest and costs. The appellants tendered two cheques to the respondent to partially comply with the orders, which the respondent refused to accept. The proceedings continued with various applications and correspondence between the parties, including a letter from the respondent's solicitor outlining conditions under which the respondent would agree to a transfer of shares pending the appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: FOSTER J
In my view, the present case can be distinguished from the circumstances before the Court in Kalifair 55 NSWLR 737.CONSIDERATION AND CONCLUSIONS In my view, the appellants’ prospects on appeal are weak. I express this view as a tentative or preliminary view and only for the purpose of giving appropriate weight to those prospects when considering the present application. Further, I am not convinced that the Amended Notice of Appeal contains a ground of appeal which supports Mr Bennett’s submission concerning his Honour’s reasoning in respect of damages and relief generally. Ground 8 seems to raise a different point and no other ground of appeal seems apt to cover the matter. In any event, I think that there is real difficulty with the proposition that his Honour approached his consideration of the appropriate relief to be granted in the present case upon the basis that, were damages to be awarded, those damages would be expectation damages. His Honour’s remarks at [188] of his Reasons (Donald Financial Enterprises Pty Ltd v APIR Systems Ltd [2008] FCA 1112) have to be read in context and in light of the arguments advanced to his Honour by the appellants at trial. It must be remembered that his Honour did not award damages to the respondent but, rather, reversed the transactions. His Honour did so because his Honour also held that any assessment of loss or damage which involved the respondent keeping the shares was “… exceedingly difficult, if not impossible” (see Donald Financial Enterprises Pty Ltd v APIR Systems Ltd [2008] FCA 1112 at [190]). The second ground of appeal developed by Mr Bennett in his oral submissions depends upon the appellants persuading the Full Court of two propositions. First, they will have to demonstrate that, within the bundle of papers offered to Mr Sharp but declined by him, there was material which amounted to appropriate and sufficient disclosure of that which his Honour found had not been disclosed. Second, they will have to persuade the Full Court that Mr Sharp’s decision not to look at the material tendered to him operated in some way to relieve the appellants from liability. Both of these propositions are problematic. The final grounds of appeal developed by Mr Bennett in his oral submissions concerned his Honour’s discretionary orders in respect of interest and costs. Much will turn upon the Full Court’s evaluation of the letter dated 27 March 2007. The offer contained in that letter did not address the payment of interest or the costs of the proceedings. The offer was made on behalf of unidentified persons or entities who were not parties to the litigation. Mr Bennett submitted that the respondent could have accepted the offer and gone back to the Court to argue about interest and costs. In this way, Mr Bennett sought to advance an argument that the offer made constituted, in substance, a satisfactory (albeit informal) Calderbank offer. My present view is that this is an extremely difficult argument, based as it is on a somewhat strained interpretation of the letter.