APIR Systems Ltd v Donald Financial Enterprises Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

APIR Systems Limited v Donald Financial Enterprises Pty Limited [2009] FCAFC 45

TRADE PRACTICES AND RELATED MATTERS – whether primary judge erred in finding that respondent suffered loss or damage by misleading conduct of appellants – test in Marks v GIOAustralia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494 – not open to appellants to raise issue as ground of appeal as issue not raised by appellants at first instance – in any event, primary judge applied correct test in determining loss and damage

TRADE PRACTICES AND RELATED MATTERS – no error demonstrated in finding of non-disclosure of material fact

COSTS – no error of principle in primary judge’s decision to make “Bullock” or “Sanderson” costs order – appellants cannot rely on Calderbank offer or other open offers where offers were found by primary judge not to be commensurate with the orders made

INTEREST – appellants sought to limit interest to date on which settlement offer was made – award of pre-judgment interest is to compensate successful plaintiff for loss of use of money – no error of principle demonstrated by appellants as basis for interfering with primary judge’s order – appeal dismissed

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1325, 1041H
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 82, 87

APIR Systems Limited v Donald Financial Enterprises Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1448 referred to
Aristotite v Gladstone Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 334 applied
Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424 applied
Compagnie Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Company (1882) 11 QBD 55 referred to
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 applied
Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459 referred to
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 referred to
HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 640 followed
Marks v GIOAustralia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494 referred to
Murphy v Overton Investments Pty Limited (2004), 216 CLR 388 followed
Potts v Miller (1940) 64 CLR 282 referred to
Wardley Australia Limited v Western  Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514 referred to
Whitaker v Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 82 FCR 261 applied

APIR SYSTEMS LIMITED (ACN 081 044 957), ANDREW WILLIAM HUTCHINGS BROSO, ANDREW JOSEPH RILEY, MAUREEN CANE, NOEL FRANCIS WICK and DAVID MCGREGOR v DONALD FINANCIAL ENTERPRISES PTY LTD

(ACN 083 141 628) (AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ELYSUM TRUST)

NSD 1306 of 2008

GOLDBERG, JACOBSON AND PERRAM JJ
9 APRIL 2009
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1306 of 2008

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

APIR SYSTEMS LIMITED (ACN 081 044 957)
First Appellant

ANDREW WILLIAM HUTCHINGS BROSO
Second Appellant

ANDREW JOSEPH RILEY
Third Appellant

MAUREEN CANE
Fourth Appellant

NOEL FRANCIS WICK
Fifth Appellant

DAVID MCGREGOR
Sixth Appellant

AND:

DONALD FINANCIAL ENTERPRISES PTY LIMITED (ACN 083 141 628) (AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ELYSUM TRUST)
Respondent

JUDGES:

GOLDBERG, JACOBSON AND PERRAM JJ

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Details
Case
[2009] FCAFC 45
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of APIR Systems Ltd v Donald Financial Enterprises Pty Ltd involved the respondent, Donald Financial Enterprises Pty Ltd (DFE), alleging that the appellants, APIR Systems Ltd and its executive directors, Mr Andrew Hutchings Broso and Mr Andrew Riley, engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct by not disclosing the existence of certain executive remuneration arrangements. This disclosure, DFE claimed, was necessary as it pertained to the subscription for and purchase of shares in APIR. The dispute was heard and determined by the court, which had to decide whether the executive remuneration agreements were legally binding and if the appellants had a duty to disclose these to DFE.

The court needed to decide several key legal issues, including whether the agreements between APIR and the executive directors constituted legally binding contracts and if there was a duty of disclosure imposed on the appellants. The court also needed to assess whether the appellants had deliberately withheld information from DFE and if such conduct constituted misleading or deceptive behaviour. Another issue was whether the relief sought by DFE was appropriate given the established principles and authorities.

In its reasoning, the court found that both the First and Second Heads of Agreement were legally binding agreements. The court held that APIR had an obligation to disclose these agreements to DFE, and their failure to do so constituted misleading or deceptive conduct. The court was particularly influenced by the evidence presented by Mr Donald Sharp, who was not made aware of the agreements' existence and content prior to the subscription and purchase. The court also found that the executive directors deliberately withheld this information and had a clear intention to execute the agreements before they came to Mr Sharp's attention. The court further determined that DFE was entitled to relief as the loss was ascertainable and not merely prospective.

The outcome of the case was that the appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal. This decision underscored the importance of disclosure in corporate transactions and the obligations of directors in ensuring that relevant information is communicated to parties entering into significant agreements.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellants also seek to set aside or vary the primary judge’s orders for interest and costs. Each of those orders involved an exercise of the judge’s discretion which can only be disturbed if the appellant establishes an error of principle within the well-known test stated in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505.BACKGROUND The proceeding arose out of the subscription by the respondent, Donald Financial Enterprises Pty Limited (“DFE”), for 200,000 shares in the capital of APIR and the purchase by DFE of a further 81,904 shares in APIR from existing shareholders. The subscription and purchase price paid by DFE was $2.65 per share. The communications between the parties which resulted in the acquisition and purchase of the shares were conducted by Mr Donald Sharp for DFE and the executive directors of APIR, Mr Andrew Hutchings Broso and Mr Andrew Riley. DFE claimed that APIR, Mr Hutchings Broso and Mr Riley engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to the subscription for and purchase of the shares, by failing to disclose the existence of contractual arrangements for executive remuneration. Those arrangements included a contingent liability of APIR for a “Completion Payment” due to the executives on the completion of their employment in the form of shares in APIR, the number of which would be “the greater of 100,000 shares or shares to a minimum value of $325,000”. The Completion Payment was a term of an agreement known as the Second Heads of Agreement made between APIR and Mr Hutchings Broso and Mr Riley on or about 14 January 2004. There was an earlier Heads of Agreement made between APIR and Mr Hutchings Broso and Mr Riley between late April and early May 2003 which provided for a Completion Payment payable in cash on the termination of their employment. The formula for that payment was the greater of $350,000 or 100,000 times the share price at the time their employment terminated. The existence of the earlier Completion Payment was not disclosed by Mr Hutchings Broso or Mr Riley in the communications they had with Mr Sharp during the period from November 2003 to January 2004. In the course of those discussions, Mr Sharp offered to subscribe for 200,000 shares at $2.65 per share and to extend an offer to existing shareholders to purchase all or part of their shares for the same price. The offer to existing shareholders was limited so as not to leave DFE with more than 50% of APIR’s issued capital. Mr Hutchings Broso did tell Mr Sharp that he and Mr Riley were to be issued with 50,000 shares “at no cost” by way of executive remuneration. That disclosure was made at a meeting on 8 December 2003 but Mr Sharp’s evidence was that he was not told of any other proposal to provide anything else by way of remuneration to Mr Hutchings Broso or Mr Riley. DFE’s offer to shareholders was sent to the shareholders by APIR on 19 December 2003, that is to say, prior to the date on which the Second Heads of Agreement came into existence.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GOLDBERG, JACOBSON AND PERRAM JJ
It was not until 23 April 2004 that Mr Sharp learned that the executive employment agreements had been executed on 14 April 2004, two days before a board meeting of APIR which Mr Sharp attended on 16 April 2004.THE PRIMARY JUDGMENT At the heart of DFE’s case was the proposition that the First and Second Heads of Agreement were legally binding agreements between APIR and Mr Hutchings Broso and Mr Riley and that APIR and the directors were under an obligation to disclose their existence to Mr Sharp. The duty of disclosure was said to arise from the terms of the Share Subscription Deed and on several other bases. The primary judge found that both the First and the Second Heads of Agreement were legally binding agreements between APIR and the executive directors. He found that APIR was bound to disclose the existence and content of each of those agreements to Mr Sharp. His Honour found, in particular, that the Second Heads of Agreement was legally binding from or about 14 January 2004, that is to say approximately nine days before the execution of the Share Subscription Deed. His Honour also found that it was clear that if Mr Sharp had been aware of the existence and content of the First Heads of Agreement or the Second Heads of Agreement, he would not have agreed to subscribe for 200,000 shares at $2.65 in APIR, nor would he have purchased 81,904 shares from the existing shareholders. In coming to those findings, his Honour was impressed with the evidence of Mr Sharp and did not find Mr Hutchings Broso or Mr Riley to be impressive witnesses. His Honour also held that Mr Hutchings Broso and Mr Riley deliberately withheld the existence of the Second Heads of Agreement and its content from Mr Sharp prior to DFE executing the Share Subscription Deed, signing the application for shares and paying the subscription price. The primary judge was also of the view that there was an inescapable conclusion that Mr Hutchings Broso and Mr Riley desired to have the executive employment agreements executed before they came to Mr Sharp’s attention at the 16 April 2004 board meeting. Another factual issue which his Honour determined adversely to the appellants was the question of whether Mr Sharp was offered access to a folder described by the executive directors as the “due diligence folder”. The primary judge found that in all probability Mr Sharp was offered access by Mr Riley to a folder or bundle of documents on one or more occasions between November 2003 and 23 January 2004 but that the folder was referred to as relating to a different transaction and that the term “due diligence” was never mentioned to describe the character of the documents to which access was being offered. The relief granted by the primary judge His Honour gave close attention to the question of relief. He rejected the submission made by APIR and the directors that DFE had suffered no loss. He described the submission, which was based on the contention that the loss was prospective and could not be determined until the shares in APIR were sold, as “plainly wrong as a matter of first principle and is contrary to the authorities as properly understood and applied.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GOLDBERG, JACOBSON AND PERRAM JJ

Full text does not contain this section.