Angel v Hawkesbury City Council

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:
Angel v Hawkesbury City Council [2008] NSWCA 130

FILE NUMBER(S):
40337/07

HEARING DATE(S):
29 February 2008

JUDGMENT DATE:
25 June 2008

PARTIES:
Joan Ann Angel
Hawkesbury City Council

JUDGMENT OF:
Spigelman CJ Beazley JA Giles JA Tobias JA Campbell JA 

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
DC 3898/05

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:
Sorby DCJ

LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:
28 November 2006

COUNSEL:
A: G B  Hall QC / D Elliott
R: G Laughton

SOLICITORS:
A: Gerard Malouf & Partners, North Parramatta
R: McCulloch & Buggy, Sydney

CATCHWORDS:
NEGLIGENCE – Civil Liability Act 2002 – Duty of care – Pedestrian – Footpath under management of Council defective – Actual knowledge of risk of harm – Whether defect constituted an ‘obvious risk’ to reasonable person in position of appellant – Defect obscured by shadows – Relation between obviousness of risk and breach of duty – Whether appellant took reasonable care for own safety – EVIDENCE – Interpretation of photographs – Lay opinion – DAMAGES – Future gratuitous attendant care services – Whether need for care arose solely because of injury – Construction of ‘solely’ in s 15(2).

LEGISLATION CITED:
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) sections 5F, 5G, 5H, 15 and 45
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) section 78

CATEGORY:
Principal judgment

CASES CITED:
Blacktown City Council v Hocking [2008] NSWCA 144
Brodie v Singleton Shire Council [2001] HCA 29; (2001) 206 CLR 512
Carey v Lake Macquarie City Council [2007] NSWCA 4; (2007) Aust Torts Reports 81-874
Dederer v Roads & Traffic Authority [2005] NSWSC 185; (2005) Aust Torts Reports 81-792
Fallas v Mourlas [2006] NSWCA 32; (2006) 65 NSWLR 418
Geaghan v D’Aubert [2002] NSWCA 260; (2002) 36 MVR 542
Hastings Council v Giese [2003] NSWCA 178; (2003) 127 LGERA 109
C G Maloney Pty Ltd v Hutton Potts [2006] NSWCA 136
North Sydney Council v Roman [2007] NSWCA 27; (2007) 150 LGERA 419
Randwick City Council v Muzic [2006] NSWCA 66
Short v Barrett [1990] NSWCA 164; unreported, 5 October 1990; BC9003193
Smith v R [2001] HCA 50; (2001) 206 CLR 650
Temora Shire Council v Stein [2004] NSWCA 236; (2004) 134 LGERA 407
Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2005] HCA 62; (2005) 223 CLR 422
C Van der Lely NV v Bamfords Ltd (1963) RPC 61
Wagstaff v Haslam & Anor [2006] NSWSC 294
Woolworths Ltd v Lawlor [2004] NSWCA 209
Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12; (1980) 146 CLR 40

TEXTS CITED:

DECISION:
(a) Dismiss the Ordinary Summons for Leave to Appeal filed on behalf of the appellant on 30 May 2007.
(b) The respondent to pay the costs of that Summons except those costs relating to the preparation of the Summons itself including any affidavits filed and relating to the application for an extension of time, which costs are to be paid by the appellant.
(c) Extend the time within which the appellant…

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Details
Case
[2008] NSWCA 130
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Angel v Hawkesbury City Council* involved an appeal to the New South Wales Court of Appeal concerning a pedestrian's fall on a defective footpath managed by the Council. The appellant, Ms. Angel, tripped and fell on a displaced concrete slab on George Street, Windsor, sustaining injuries. She alleged negligence on the part of the Council, arguing that the defect in the footpath created a foreseeable risk of harm. The Council, in turn, raised defences including that the risk was an "obvious risk" and that the appellant had not taken reasonable care for her own safety. A significant aspect of the appellant's evidence was that the area where she fell was heavily overshadowed by trees, obscuring the defect.

The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the Council owed a duty of care to the appellant, whether that duty had been breached, and whether the defect constituted an "obvious risk" within the meaning of the *Civil Liability Act 2002* (NSW). The court was required to consider the relationship between the obviousness of a risk and the breach of a duty of care, and to determine if the appellant had taken reasonable care for her own safety. Furthermore, the appeal addressed the assessment of damages, specifically concerning future gratuitous attendant care services and the interpretation of the word "solely" in section 15(2) of the *Civil Liability Act 2002* (NSW) in relation to whether the need for care arose solely because of the injury.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the primary judge and entering a verdict and judgment for the appellant. The court reasoned that the primary judge had erred in finding the risk to be obvious, failing to adequately consider the circumstances, including the significant shadowing from trees which obscured the defect. The court found that the evidence, particularly from independent witnesses, indicated that the raised lip of the concrete slab was not obvious until one was very close to it, and that the shadows created a deceptive appearance. This lack of obviousness, combined with the Council's management of the footpath, led the court to conclude that the Council had breached its duty of care. The court also found in favour of the appellant regarding the assessment of damages for future gratuitous attendant care services.

Orders

Orders of the court

(a) Dismiss the Ordinary Summons for Leave to Appeal filed on behalf of the appellant on 30 May 2007. (b) The respondent to pay the costs of that Summons except those costs relating to the preparation of the Summons itself including any affidavits filed and relating to the application for an extension of time, which costs are to be paid by the appellant. (c) Extend the time within which the appellant may file a Notice of Appeal with Appointment up to and including 25 September 2007. (d) The appellant to pay the costs of the Notice of Motion for an extension of time filed on 24 September 2007. (e) Appeal allowed and Cross-Appeal dismissed. (f) Set aside the orders made by his Honour Judge Sorby on 28 November 2006 and in lieu thereof there be a verdict and judgment for the appellant in the sum of $165,178.20 to date from 28 November 2006. (g) The respondent to pay the appellant's costs of the trial before Judge Sorby, the appeal and the Cross-Appeal. (h) Liberty to the appellant to apply within 7 days of the date of these orders to vary the amount of the verdict referred to in order (f) above in the event that it does not accurately reflect the amount of damages determined by the primary judge.

Background

Background to the litigation

However, as will appear, it is unnecessary for leave to be granted to the appellant in the present appeal to argue the correctness of the majority judgment in Roman as the appellant is entitled to succeed whether one applies the majority or minority opinion in that case. At least from my perspective, the position is somewhat different in the Hocking appeal.The relevant facts The primary judge found that at approximately 10.30 am on 29 July 2005 the appellant parked her motor vehicle on the eastern side of George Street, Windsor, near the pedestrian crossing opposite South Windsor Post Office. She alighted from her vehicle and crossed George Street to its western side and proceeded into the Post Office. Upon leaving the Post Office she returned to the eastern side of George Street via the pedestrian crossing. She then turned left and proceeded along the concrete slab footpath with a view to returning to her vehicle. After she had walked approximately two car lengths from the pedestrian crossing, and then being approximately one car length from where her vehicle was parked, her left foot caught on the leading edge of one of the concrete slabs which had become displaced due, it was accepted, to tree roots and which, therefore, stood proud of the immediately adjoining slab over which the appellant had just walked. The maximum point of displacement of the slab was that nearest the roadway which then tapered over its width from approximately four to five centimetres to one centimetre or less. The appellant said in evidence that she was walking just to the left of the middle of the footpath. She therefore tripped on that part of the slab which was closer to its maximum rather than its minimum point of displacement. The appellant gave evidence, which was accepted by the primary judge, that she was looking where she was going as she walked along the footpath but that the location where she fell was overshadowed by the adjoining trees. Her evidence in chief was that the pavement was scattered with the shadows of tree branches to the extent that the area of the footpath in front of her at the location where she tripped was “quite dark”. In cross-examination she insisted that she was looking where she was going as it was her practice to scan the area in front of her when she was walking. Although challenged, she was resolute that the location where she fell was “very shady with trees”, “it was covered with shade from the branches” of the adjoining trees. She denied that the effect of the sunlight was that the displacement of the slab on which she tripped cast its own shadow which appeared as a black line across the footpath. She was observant of the fact that the trees were casting shadows across the footpath but said that it was because of the shadowing that she did not see the leading edge of the displaced slab before she tripped over it. Two independent witnesses, a Ms Coull and a Ms Wilmington, who attended to the appellant immediately after she fell, gave evidence as to the shadows across the relevant section of the footpath which was summarised by the primary judge in the following terms (at [18]):“The [appellant] described shadows of trees across the footpath where she fell. Ms Wilmington, who went to the assistance of the [appellant] after her fall, said she saw the raised lip of concrete pavement and the shade of a tree went over the raised join in the footpath, she said. She said the shade from the trunk of the tree was ‘directly over the joint in the footpath’. In cross-examination Ms Wilmington said because of the shade, she ‘really had to look to see the difference in the slabs’ on the footpath. Ms Tania Coull, another person who assisted the [appellant] at the scene, said when told by the [appellant] that she had tripped, she saw the footpath ‘lifted 4-5 centimetres’. She said this area of the footpath was covered by shade. She said the lift in the footpath ‘was not obvious until you were very close to it’. In cross-examination she said the shadows from the trees stretched along the footpath, but ‘it was deceiving until you were a couple of feet away’.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Dr Bodel was of the view that the appellant did not require domestic assistance for household maintenance and cleaning activities.The evidence as to the extent of gratuitous care required The appellant gave evidence that notwithstanding her serious right shoulder injury some years before the subject accident, she managed the household chores without assistance from her son. However, immediately following the accident she maintained that she could not cook or look after herself and found sleeping painful. Since that time, she has had continuous pain in her right hip, which causes her difficulty in sitting and standing, but not walking (judgment [27]-[28]). The appellant’s case was that she had not suffered any disability in her right hip prior to the fall. However, in cross-examination, it emerged that she had suffered a “cramp” in her right hip for a week, for which she saw Dr Tan on 23 January 2004. The appellant also gave evidence that she had been left with some restriction of movement of her left arm, in that she could not straighten and extend it all the way. The appellant said that since her accident she has experienced difficulties in vacuuming, cooking and washing, with these tasks now being undertaken by her son. This evidence was challenged by the Council whose case was that she had a restricted capacity to perform her household duties before the accident and was already being assisted by her son with household chores. In support of its case the Council relied, in particular, upon the appellant’s answer in cross-examination that she still had difficulty raising her right arm and that this was a restriction. However, the appellant had also stated in cross-examination that although that she had a “slight restriction”, she “cope[d] well on a daily basis”. The Council also challenged the appellant’s claim that her son assisted her around the house after the accident, but did not “particularly” do so before the accident, other than mowing the lawns from time to time. The appellant agreed in cross-examination that after the operation on her right shoulder in September 2002, her son assisted with washing the floors, cleaning the bathroom and cooking meals, and that a family friend did the mowing. She said, however, that this assistance only continued until she could do these tasks herself, which was from about four months after the surgery. (There was no vacuuming to be done at this time, as they lived in a house with tiled floors.) The appellant was seriously incapacitated after her accident and required attendant care services for most of her needs, both personal and domestic. Those were provided by Home Care Service New South Wales and by her son. The appellant said that her son did the vacuuming, cooked meals, tidied their home, made the beds, kept the bathroom neat and clean and performed general duties, did the gardening, hung out the washing and did the heavy cleaning such as scrubbing the bath. She said that he performed these tasks for two or three hours in the middle of the day, cooked meals at night, did all the shopping and drove the appellant everywhere she needed to go. The appellant claimed that she required such assistance for 30 hours per week up until Christmas 2004, as she was unable look after herself during this period.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SPIGELMAN CJ (dissent)
McColl JA acknowledged (at 435 [51]) that the use of the expression “actual knowledge” in s 45(1) was plainly intended to prevent a roads authority being civilly liable merely because of constructive knowledge of the relevant risk. Her Honour’s construction of the critical phrase in s 45(1) was expressed by her in the following terms (at 436 [60]):“60In my view, for the purposes of s 45, the knowledge of those persons who, acting within the scope of their duties, learn of the particular risk under an obligation to report it as part of the roads authority’s system of maintaining the roads under its jurisdiction, should be attributed to the roads authority. On the facts of this case, such people were sufficiently ‘relevantly connected’ with discharging the appellant’s responsibility for carrying out road work to hold it prima facie liable in tort where it can be found, whether by direct proof, or inference, that they had actual knowledge of the particular risk which materialised in harm to the plaintiff. Attributing those persons’ knowledge to the roads authority is consistent with the language of s 45, the context in which it appears and the policy discernible in its enactment.”The decision of the primary judge In the present proceedings, the primary judge first dealt with the Council’s defence based on s 5G of the CL Act. He set out at [6] the appellant’s evidence as to how the accident occurred and cited a passage from the judgment of Dunford J in Dedererv Roads & Traffic Authority [2005] NSWSC 185; (2005) Aust Torts Reports 81-792 at [86] in which his Honour had observed that “risk” and “obvious risk” in ss 5F and 5G were references to the risk of harm, i.e., injury resulting from the danger and not a reference to the danger itself. After noting that the fact that the obviousness of the risk must be judged by reference to a “reasonable person in the position of” the plaintiff, the primary judge made the following finding (at [8]):“Here the obvious risk of harm as judged by a reasonable person in the position of the [appellant] was the raised lip of the concrete pavement, stretching across the footpath to a height of two inches.” This finding was unaccompanied by any reasons to support it. In particular, it failed to take account of the requirement of s 5F(1) that the relevant risk must have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of the appellant “in the circumstances”. Those circumstances were that the raised lip of the slab was, according to the evidence, in deep shadow. The primary judge then returned to the issue of shadows setting out the relevant evidence at [18] of his judgment, which we have recorded at [17] above. After referring to the decision of this Court in Temora Shire Council v Stein [2004] NSWCA 236; (2004) 134 LGERA 407 at [50]-[51] in which Giles JA noted that a pedestrian’s perception and avoidance of a hazard depended vitally on illumination and visibility, his Honour found (at [22]) that the shade from the trees and the contrasting shadow along the footpath:“could obscure the view of the raised concrete lip, creating a hazard that could expose pedestrians such as the [appellant] to the risk of injury by tripping on the raised lip of concrete.” (Emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: