Anderson and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation) [2016] AATA 228 (8 April 2016)
Division
GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s)
2014/3486
Re
Mark Anderson
APPLICANT
And
Australian Postal Corporation
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Dr Damien Cremean, Senior Member
Date 8 April 2016 Place Melbourne The decision under review is set aside.
..........[sgd].......................................
Dr Damien Cremean
COMPENSATION– ailment – osteoarthritis left thumb – whether compensable – “aggravation” – “significant” – whether notice required – whether false and wilful statement – decision under review set aside
Legislation
Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) sections 4, 5A, 5B, 7(7), 14, 53
Cases
Abrahams v Comcare [2006] FCA 1829
Australian Postal Corporation v Bessey [2001] FCA 266
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541
Comcare v Lofts (2013) FCR 220
Comcare v Reardon [2015] FCA 1166
Commonwealth of Australia v Beattie (1981) 35 ALR 369
Federal Broom Co Pty Ltd v Semlitch (1964) 110 CLR 626
Georgoulas and National Australia Bank Ltd [2013] AATA 512
Muscat and Australian Postal Corporation [2016] AATA 13
Tippett v Australian Postal Corporation (1998) 27 AAR 40
Weigand v Comcare Australia [2002] FCA 1464
Wilson and Comcare [1996] AATA 862
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REASONS FOR DECISION
Dr Damien Cremean
8 April 2016
Application is made to review a decision of the Respondent made on 14 May 2014.
That decision affirmed a determination made on 28 March 2014 that the Respondent was not liable to pay compensation to the Applicant under section 14 of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (‘the Act’) in respect of left thumb severe pain. The Applicant, Mr Anderson, gave sworn evidence at the hearing and called medical witnesses. The Respondent called only a medical witness.
In what follows I provide an outline of the Applicant’s and the witnesses’ evidence.
OUTLINE OF EVIDENCE
Applicant
The Applicant is aged 47 years and was born on 13 October 1968.
He commenced work with Australia Post on 19 March 1997. He was working in the Northern Parcels Centre. He had previously completed an apprenticeship as a diesel mechanic with Saab-Scania, and had also worked as a storeman and in various other driving and delivering jobs.
In about March 2000 the Applicant became a full-time Postal Delivery Officer (‘PDO’), first at the Brunswick Delivery Centre and then at the Preston Delivery Centre.
By 2002, the Applicant worked as a PDO in the suburban areas around Fairfield. He would start work each day at about 6.00am and would begin sorting the mail for about two to three hours. He would then go out on his motorcycle and do deliveries. Sometimes he would work overtime on another round within his area, if needed. While delivering mail he would also collect depot bags along the way.
On his round there were as many as 900 delivery points (addresses) or more.
The Applicant is right hand dominant. This is fortunate because the motorcycle’s controls are on the right handle. He used his right hand for braking and…
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- Case
- [2016] AATA 228
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the AAT was whether the Applicant’s osteoarthritis in his left thumb was a compensable injury under section 14 of the Act. This required the AAT to consider whether the Applicant’s condition was an ailment or an aggravation of an ailment that was contributed to a significant degree by his employment. The AAT also needed to decide whether the Respondent had acted in accordance with the Act in its handling of the Applicant’s claim.
In its decision, the AAT found that the Applicant did suffer from osteoarthritis in his left thumb, a condition that met the definition of an ailment under the Act. However, the AAT concluded that the condition did not meet the threshold of being contributed to a significant degree by the Applicant’s employment. The AAT emphasised that the Applicant’s pre-existing habit of using a flicking motion with his left thumb to deliver mail did not sufficiently aggravate his condition to meet the statutory requirements. The AAT also found that the Respondent did not act in accordance with the Act when it failed to provide the Applicant with notice of the reasons for rejecting his claim, and when it made a false and wilful statement in its review of the decision.
Based on these findings, the AAT set aside the decision under review, meaning the original decision by the Respondent to deny the Applicant’s claim for compensation was overturned. The AAT’s decision was grounded in its interpretation of the statutory language and the evidence presented regarding the nature and cause of the Applicant’s condition.
Orders
Orders of the court
The decision under review is set aside.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Respondent goes further and submits that the Applicant falls under section 53 and/or section 7(7) of the Act with the consequence that the Applicant cannot succeed in any event. CONSIDERATIONCompensable injury By section 14 of the Act the Respondent is liable to pay compensation in accordance with the Act in respect of any injury suffered by an employee if the injury results in death, incapacity for work, or impairment. This has often been called a “gateway” provision: Comcare v Lofts (2013) FCR 220 at [8]. By section 4(9) of the Act an incapacity for work means an incapacity for work suffered by an employee as a result of an injury, being: an incapacity to engage in any work, or to engage in work at the same level the employee was engaged in immediately before the injury occurred. An injury is defined in section 5A(1) as a disease suffered by an employee; or an injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee, that is a physical or mental injury arising out of, or in the course of, such employee’s employment… A disease is defined in section 5B(1) of the Act as an ailment suffered by an employee; or an aggravation of such an ailment; that was contributed to, to a significant degree, by the employee’s employment... An ailment is defined in section 4(1) of the Act as meaning any physical or mental ailment, disorder, defect or morbid condition (whether of sudden onset or gradual development). A significant degree is defined in section 5B(3) of the Act as meaning a degree that is substantially more than material. Matters which may be taken into account by the Tribunal are set out in section 5B(2) of the Act. They include the duration of an employee’s employment and the nature of, and particular tasks involved in, that employment. Other matters may be taken into account and section 5B places no limit on those. I am satisfied it is correct to describe the Applicant as suffering osteoarthritis in the left thumb. I rely upon the evidence in particular of Associate Professor Johnstone, the treating specialist. I do not consider it could be seriously in issue, as far as the Respondent is concerned, that such condition satisfies the descriptor of an ailment and that, subject otherwise to satisfying section 5B of the Act, it meets the definition of a disease and likewise, subject otherwise to satisfying section 5A of the Act, it is an injury under the Act. The question for me to determine, is whether or not the correct or preferable decision is that the Applicant’s condition is compensable under section 14 of the Act. That is to say whether his condition is an ailment or an aggravation of an ailment that was contributed to, to a significant degree, by his employment as a PDO. Should his condition satisfy this requirement, then it follows he has a disease under the Act and thus an injury which is compensable; if it may also be said that such disease arose out of or in the course of his employment. The word aggravation in section 5B(1) is not defined in the Act except in section 4(1) as including acceleration or recurrence. I have said previously that I see the word aggravation as synonymous with exacerbate. See Muscat and Australian Postal Corporation [2016] AATA 13 at [47]. In Wiegand v Comcare Australia [2002] FCA 1464 at [21] von Doussa J said: I do not think there is any material distinction to be drawn between an exacerbation of an ailment and an aggravation of an ailment. In the context of that case his Honour said both expressions convey the same notion, namely that the depression became worse.