Anavaratham v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Anavaratham v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 903
MIGRATION - application for protection visa - applicant a Sri Lankan national - whether effective protection available in a third country, India - effect of Tribunal’s failure to refer to Art. 33 of Refugees Convention - whether Tribunal erred in failing to note that India not a signatory to Convention - whether “no evidence” in the sense required by s 176(1)(g) of Migration Act to justify finding that effective protection available in India - finding, in the alternative, that applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason in the event of return to Sri Lanka - application of “real chance” test - whether “no evidence” to justify that finding so as to make s 176(1)(g) available.
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Ex parte Durairajasingham(2000) 168 ALR 407
VISVANATHAN ANAVARATHAM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
V992 of 2000
RYAN J
17 JULY 2001 MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V992 of 2000
BETWEEN:
VISVANATHAN ANAVARATHAM Applicant
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS Respondent
JUDGE:
RYAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 JULY 2001
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V992 of 2000
BETWEEN:
VISVANATHAN ANAVARATHAM Applicant
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS Respondent
JUDGE:
RYAN J
DATE:
17 JULY 2001
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 2 November 2000 affirming a decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister refusing…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The case of Anavaratham v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved the applicant challenging the decision of the Tribunal to refuse his application for a protection visa on the basis that he was not a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under the Convention. The High Court was tasked with determining whether the Tribunal erred in its application of Article 33 of the Convention, which addresses the exclusion of refugees from protection under certain circumstances. Specifically, the Court examined whether the Tribunal made an error of law by finding that there was evidence to support the conclusion that the Indian Government would not deport the applicant to Sri Lanka and that he was safe in India.
The legal issues before the Court included whether the Tribunal erred in finding that there was no error of law in applying Article 33, and whether the Tribunal's reasoning regarding the applicant's fear of persecution in Sri Lanka was legally sound. The Court concluded that the Tribunal did not err in its application of the law, as there was evidence to support its findings, including the applicant's own testimony about the renewal of his father's Indian residence permits. The Court further noted that the Tribunal was not required to affirmatively establish a particular matter to refuse the application, but rather was entitled to make a decision based on a reasonable satisfaction that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution.
In its decision, the Court found that the Tribunal had correctly applied the principles for determining whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason. The Court emphasized that the obligation to consider the possibility that past events might have occurred, even if the Tribunal thought they probably did not, was part of the correct application of the law. The Court rejected the applicant's argument that the Tribunal must explicitly state its degree of conviction or confidence in its findings, finding that the Tribunal's reasoning was sufficient as long as it appeared to have no doubt that the probability of error was insignificant.
The Court ultimately dismissed the application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
For these reasons, the applicant has not established that the Tribunal made an error of law in the application to his circumstances of Art. 33 of the Convention.Was there “no evidence” in the sense contemplated by s 476(1)(g)? The applicant contended in relation to this first basis of the Tribunal’s decision that there was no evidence to justify the finding that the Indian Government would not deport him to Sri Lanka and that he was safe in India and had previously enjoyed protection there. I do not accept that there was no evidence of those matters. The applicant himself produced evidence that he and his father had to renew their Indian residence permits every three months. The available inference that the applicant’s father had been able to do that without particular difficulty in the three years since May 1998 supports the conclusion that the Indian government would not capriciously or maliciously refoule the applicant or his father to Sri Lanka. In any event, s 176(4) of the Act provides;The ground specified in paragraph (1)(g) is not to be taken to have been made out unless: (a)the person who made the decision was required by law to reach that decision only if a particular matter was established, and there was no evidence or other material (including facts of which the person was entitled to take notice) from which the person could reasonably be satisfied that the matter was established; or (b) the person who made the decision based the decision on the existence of a particular fact, and that fact did not exist.” As I said in Pei Lan He v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 446 at [37];It was contended on behalf of the applicant that a failure by the Tribunal to refer to evidence on which it based “crucial” findings of fact gives rise to a presumption that there was no evidence for those findings. However, in the present case, the Tribunal was not required by the Act to reach a decision refusing the application only if a particular matter was affirmatively established which, I consider, s 476(4) requires. The Tribunal was entitled to make a decision refusing the application upon being satisfied that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The attainment of that state of satisfaction did not require the affirmative establishment of a particular matter.” That observation can be paraphrased to apply with equal force to a decision that a protection visa be refused because, as a result of the application of Art. 33 of the Convention, an applicant is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention.The attack on the Tribunal’s conclusion that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in the event of return to Sri Lanka. The applicant also complained that the Tribunal had erred in law in its approach to this second question which only arose if its conclusion on the first question had been wrong. Somewhat inconsistently with that complaint, the applicant contended that “having decided that I had protection in India and therefore Article 33(1) was a bar to the consideration of the application itself the Respondent incorrectly interpreted its function by proceeding to decide the merits of the protection visa application out of “extra precaution”.”
Decision
Reasons for decision
That observation can be paraphrased to apply with equal force to a decision that a protection visa be refused because, as a result of the application of Art. 33 of the Convention, an applicant is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention.The attack on the Tribunal’s conclusion that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in the event of return to Sri Lanka. The applicant also complained that the Tribunal had erred in law in its approach to this second question which only arose if its conclusion on the first question had been wrong. Somewhat inconsistently with that complaint, the applicant contended that “having decided that I had protection in India and therefore Article 33(1) was a bar to the consideration of the application itself the Respondent incorrectly interpreted its function by proceeding to decide the merits of the protection visa application out of “extra precaution”.” In light of the conclusion which I have reached on the anterior question, it is strictly unnecessary for me to examine the alternative basis on which the Tribunal resolved to affirm the refusal of a protection visa. However, out of deference to the careful submissions addressed to it, it is appropriate to indicate briefly why I have been unable to discern any error in the Tribunal’s treatment of this second issue. The applicant complained that the Tribunal had foreclosed reasonable speculation on the chance of his persecution for a Convention reason in Sri Lanka by not asking “What if I am wrong?”. He referred, in support of this complaint, to Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 235, and Guo (supra). However, the obligation to ask that question only arises if, in the course of its reasoning, the Tribunal evinces a real doubt about the correctness of one or more of the findings in respect of past events which underpin its conclusion as to the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220, Sackville J, with whom North and Kenny JJ agreed, said, at 239-240;“It follows from the observations of the High Court in Wu Shan Liang and Guo that there are circumstances in which the RRT must take into account the possibility that alleged past events occurred even though it finds that those events probably did not occur. This result, perhaps surprising at first glance, comes about because the ultimate question before the RRT is whether it is satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of future persecution, in the sense of having a “real substantial basis” for the fear. The RRT must not foreclose reasonable speculation about the chances of the hypothetical future event occurring. .....In this context, it is not always possible for the decision-maker to be satisfied as to whether alleged past events have occurred with certainty or even confidence. When the RRT is uncertain as to whether an alleged event occurred, or finds that, although the probabilities are against it, the event might have occurred, it may be necessary to take into account the possibility that the event took place in considering the ultimate question. Depending on the significance of the alleged event to the ultimate question, a failure to consider the possibility that it occurred might constitute a failure to undertake the required reasonable speculation in deciding whether there is a “real substantial basis” for the applicant’s claimed fear of persecution. Similarly, if the non-occurrence of an event is important to an applicant’s case (for example, the withdrawal of a threat to the applicant) the possibility that the event did not occur may need to be considered by the decision-maker even though the latter considers the disputed event probably did occur.Although the “What if I am wrong?” terminology has gained currency, I think, with respect, that it is more accurate to see the requirement discussed in Wu Shan Liang and Guo as simply an aspect of the obligation to apply correctly the principles for determining whether an applicant has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” for a Convention reason. The reasonable speculation in which the decision-maker must engage may require him or her to take account of the chance that past events might have occurred, even though the decision-maker thinks that they probably did not. In the language of s 476(1)(e) of the Migration Act, a failure to do so may constitute “an error involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found”.In my view, there is no reason in principle, and nothing in the reasoning of the High Court, supporting a general rule that the RRT must express findings as to whether alleged past events actually occurred in a manner that makes explicit its degree of conviction or confidence that the findings are correct. In Guo itself, the findings were not expressed this way, yet the joint judgment considered it was enough that the RRT appeared to have no doubt that the probability of error was insignificant. Moreover, had the Court intended to impose such an extraordinary burden on the RRT, it might have been expected to say so.” (original emphasis)