FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AMZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1195
Appeal from: AMZ15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 473 File number: NSD 580 of 2016 Judge: KATZMANN J Date of judgment: 7 October 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION ― appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court ― whether primary judge erred in failing to find that Refugee Review Tribunal did not comply with s 425(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ― whether Tribunal gave appellant opportunity to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ― illogicality or irrationality ― whether primary judge erred in failing to find that Tribunal’s decision illogical or irrational
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ― unreasonableness ― whether primary judge gave inadequate consideration to whether Tribunal’s decision legally unreasonable
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 65, 425 Cases cited: House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZGQZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1091
Date of hearing: 8 August 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 81 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S Tully Solicitor for the Appellant: Legal Aid Commission of NSW Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice. ORDERS
NSD 580 of 2016 BETWEEN: AMZ15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
KATZMANN J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 OCTOBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The appellant is a Sri Lankan national, who desires a protection visa to enable him to remain in Australia. Like any other visa, provided the application is valid the Minister must grant the visa if he is satisfied that the relevant statutory criteria have been met; if not, he must refuse to grant it: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 65. The principal criteria for the grant of a protection visa are contained in s 36 of the Act. Relevantly they include the criterion in s 36(2), which at the time required that the appellant be:
(a)a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol; or
(aa)a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1195
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge had erred in not finding that the Tribunal had failed to comply with section 425(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by not giving the appellant an opportunity to give evidence and present arguments, and whether the Tribunal's decision was illogical or irrational. The court also considered whether the primary judge had given inadequate consideration to whether the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had failed to consider his mental health and the effect it had on his ability to give consistent evidence, and that this was a failure to properly consider relevant material.
The court found that the primary judge had not erred in any of these respects. The court held that the Tribunal had considered the appellant's mental health and the effect it had on his ability to give consistent evidence, and that it was open to the Tribunal to reject the appellant's credibility by reason of evidentiary inconsistencies. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was not illogical or irrational, and that it was a matter of ordinary experience that people are capable of recalling "fundamental matters" in their lives, though many have difficulty with some matters of detail. The court held that in the absence of evidence to prove otherwise, a tribunal of fact is entitled to act on the basis of that experience.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge did not misconstrue or misapply SZBEL and the Tribunal did not fail to comply with s 425. Did the primary judge err in not finding that the Tribunal decision was illogical or irrational (ground 2)? The appellant contended that the Tribunal’s conclusion at [29] that he could be expected to give a consistent account of fundamental matters in his life was illogical or irrational either because it was “simply not open on the evidence” or “there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn” (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [135] per Crennan and Bell JJ). The fact that the Tribunal acknowledged that the appellant could have difficulty recalling certain events, including consistently recalling when they occurred, does not, as a matter of logic, as the appellant implied at one point in his submissions, require the conclusion that he would have difficulties recalling all events in his life. Indeed, the appellant acknowledged that it was open to the Tribunal to accept the PTSD diagnosis, consider that it was based on the appellant’s own account which the Tribunal had itself considered and rejected, and then reject the appellant’s credibility by reason of evidentiary inconsistencies. It seems to me, however, that that is what the Tribunal did. The Tribunal accepted that the appellant had chronic PTSD and major depressive disorder and that those conditions might account for some of his claimed lapses in memory, including difficulties in consistently recalling when certain events occurred, but not all of them, and, in particular, not the “fundamental matters” identified in [27]. This was no more than an application of common sense to the evidence. It was neither illogical nor irrational. It is a matter of ordinary experience that people are capable of recalling “fundamental matters” in their lives, though many have difficulty with some matters of detail. In the absence of evidence to prove otherwise, a tribunal of fact is entitled to act on the basis of that experience. Here, the evidence did not prove otherwise. The appellant provided a long list of references in the appeal book to the appellant’s professed memory deficits and his inability to give a consistent or coherent account. Some of them appear in the transcript in the passage extracted above at [17]–[18]. But the only expert evidence that touched upon the matter was the report of the clinical psychologist obtained after the hearing. The appellant drew attention to two passages in the psychologist’s report. The first is the passage extracted above at [25]. The second appears under the heading “Assessment Findings”:[M]emory deficits and fragmented recollections, dissociation as well as avoidance of triggers of the trauma and irritability, are also clinical features associated with PTSD. The psychologist did not say, however, that all the appellant’s difficulties of recollection were attributable to the presence of dissociation or were indicative of a dissociative state. The specific matters the Tribunal raised with the appellant were not apparently canvassed with the psychologist. Certainly they did not appear anywhere in her report. Moreover, it is one thing not to recall an event, another to recall it differently on different occasions. The psychologist did not deal with the latter, which was the basis for the Tribunal’s conclusion and the basis upon which she was apparently retained.