Amz15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AMZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1195

Appeal from: AMZ15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 473
File number: NSD 580 of 2016
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 7 October 2016
Catchwords:

MIGRATION ― appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court ― whether primary judge erred in failing to find that Refugee Review Tribunal did not comply with s 425(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ― whether Tribunal gave appellant opportunity to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ― illogicality or irrationality ― whether primary judge erred in failing to find that Tribunal’s decision illogical or irrational

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ― unreasonableness ― whether primary judge gave inadequate consideration to whether Tribunal’s decision legally unreasonable

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 65, 425
Cases cited:

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZGQZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1091

Date of hearing: 8 August 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 81
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S Tully
Solicitor for the Appellant: Legal Aid Commission of NSW
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice.

ORDERS

NSD 580 of 2016
BETWEEN:

AMZ15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 OCTOBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The appellant is a Sri Lankan national, who desires a protection visa to enable him to remain in Australia.  Like any other visa, provided the application is valid the Minister must grant the visa if he is satisfied that the relevant statutory criteria have been met; if not, he must refuse to grant it:  Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 65. The principal criteria for the grant of a protection visa are contained in s 36 of the Act. Relevantly they include the criterion in s 36(2), which at the time required that the appellant be:

    (a)a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol; or

    (aa)a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1195
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Amz15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant sought to challenge a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal which had rejected his application for a visa. The Federal Circuit Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal, and the appellant appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court. The appeal was concerned with whether the primary judge had erred in not finding that the Tribunal had failed to comply with certain statutory obligations, or in not finding the Tribunal's decision to be illogical or irrational.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge had erred in not finding that the Tribunal had failed to comply with section 425(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by not giving the appellant an opportunity to give evidence and present arguments, and whether the Tribunal's decision was illogical or irrational. The court also considered whether the primary judge had given inadequate consideration to whether the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had failed to consider his mental health and the effect it had on his ability to give consistent evidence, and that this was a failure to properly consider relevant material.

The court found that the primary judge had not erred in any of these respects. The court held that the Tribunal had considered the appellant's mental health and the effect it had on his ability to give consistent evidence, and that it was open to the Tribunal to reject the appellant's credibility by reason of evidentiary inconsistencies. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was not illogical or irrational, and that it was a matter of ordinary experience that people are capable of recalling "fundamental matters" in their lives, though many have difficulty with some matters of detail. The court held that in the absence of evidence to prove otherwise, a tribunal of fact is entitled to act on the basis of that experience.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

No submissions were made to the Tribunal as to the significance of this material or the extent to which, if at all, it could or did explain the inconsistencies in the appellant’s accounts.The Tribunal decision The Tribunal had a number of concerns about the appellant’s credibility based on inconsistencies between statements he had provided to the Department and his oral account to the Tribunal, which differed in material respects from those statements. In the result, the Tribunal concluded that the appellant was not a witness of truth and determined that the account of events on which his visa application rested was false. The appellant attributed the inconsistencies in his evidence to his mental state. According to the Tribunal, he claimed not to be able to concentrate, not to have a clear memory, to be unable to say things in sequence, and not to be getting enough sleep. The critical part of the Tribunal’s decision appears in [28]–[29]. It begins with a reference to the report of the clinical psychologist:28According to this evidence, symptoms reported to a psychologist by the applicant reflected, in the opinion of that psychologist, chronic post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder. This was said to be due to claims the applicant made about his past difficulties with the Army in Sri Lanka and ongoing worry about returning there. This caused the applicant to have difficulty recalling certain things and in overall functioning. The applicant was admitted to hospital in December 2013 and in November 2014 due to his mental health for which he was taking medication and for which the psychologist recommended he continue to receive treatment.29The Tribunal has carefully considered this medical evidence and the applicant’s own claims about his mental state. The Tribunal can appreciate how someone in the applicant’s mental state, as assessed in his medical evidence, could have difficulty recalling certain events including consistently recalling when they occurred. However, even making allowance for this, the inconsistencies in his account relate to fundamental matters in his life about which he can be reasonably expected to give a consistent account. The Tribunal does not accept that these inconsistencies can be explained or excused due to his mental state. It was common ground in the appeal that the “fundamental matters in [the appellant’s] life” to which the Tribunal was referring in [29] were those matters mentioned at [27] of its reasons:·the appellant’s son being taken and held by the Army;·when he and his wife went into hiding; and·the reason for the Army’s suspicion that he and his family were involved with the LTTE. The Tribunal appears to have accepted the assessment of the clinical psychologist that the appellant suffered from post-traumatic stress and major depressive disorders. But the Tribunal did not consider that there was any credible evidence of the cause of those conditions (at [58]). Nor did the Tribunal consider that those conditions exposed the appellant to a real chance that he would suffer serious harm if he were to return to Sri Lanka, saying that once his immigration status had been resolved his mental state “could well improve” and noting that once he returned to Sri Lanka he would have the support of his family to help him access any necessary treatment (at [36], [58]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge did not misconstrue or misapply SZBEL and the Tribunal did not fail to comply with s 425. Did the primary judge err in not finding that the Tribunal decision was illogical or irrational (ground 2)? The appellant contended that the Tribunal’s conclusion at [29] that he could be expected to give a consistent account of fundamental matters in his life was illogical or irrational either because it was “simply not open on the evidence” or “there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn” (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [135] per Crennan and Bell JJ). The fact that the Tribunal acknowledged that the appellant could have difficulty recalling certain events, including consistently recalling when they occurred, does not, as a matter of logic, as the appellant implied at one point in his submissions, require the conclusion that he would have difficulties recalling all events in his life. Indeed, the appellant acknowledged that it was open to the Tribunal to accept the PTSD diagnosis, consider that it was based on the appellant’s own account which the Tribunal had itself considered and rejected, and then reject the appellant’s credibility by reason of evidentiary inconsistencies. It seems to me, however, that that is what the Tribunal did. The Tribunal accepted that the appellant had chronic PTSD and major depressive disorder and that those conditions might account for some of his claimed lapses in memory, including difficulties in consistently recalling when certain events occurred, but not all of them, and, in particular, not the “fundamental matters” identified in [27]. This was no more than an application of common sense to the evidence. It was neither illogical nor irrational. It is a matter of ordinary experience that people are capable of recalling “fundamental matters” in their lives, though many have difficulty with some matters of detail. In the absence of evidence to prove otherwise, a tribunal of fact is entitled to act on the basis of that experience. Here, the evidence did not prove otherwise. The appellant provided a long list of references in the appeal book to the appellant’s professed memory deficits and his inability to give a consistent or coherent account. Some of them appear in the transcript in the passage extracted above at [17]–[18]. But the only expert evidence that touched upon the matter was the report of the clinical psychologist obtained after the hearing. The appellant drew attention to two passages in the psychologist’s report. The first is the passage extracted above at [25]. The second appears under the heading “Assessment Findings”:[M]emory deficits and fragmented recollections, dissociation as well as avoidance of triggers of the trauma and irritability, are also clinical features associated with PTSD. The psychologist did not say, however, that all the appellant’s difficulties of recollection were attributable to the presence of dissociation or were indicative of a dissociative state. The specific matters the Tribunal raised with the appellant were not apparently canvassed with the psychologist. Certainly they did not appear anywhere in her report. Moreover, it is one thing not to recall an event, another to recall it differently on different occasions. The psychologist did not deal with the latter, which was the basis for the Tribunal’s conclusion and the basis upon which she was apparently retained.