Alliance Craton Explorer Pty Ltd v Quasar Resources Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Alliance Craton Explorer Pty Ltd v Quasar Resources Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 29

Citation: Alliance Craton Explorer Pty Ltd v Quasar Resources Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 29
Appeal from: Alliance Craton Explorer Pty Ltd v Quasar Resources Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 291
Parties: ALLIANCE CRATON EXPLORER PTY LTD (ACN 095 337 385) v QUASAR RESOURCES PTY LTD (ACN 101 227 070) and HEATHGATE RESOURCES PTY LTD (ACN 011 018 232)
File number: SAD 86 of 2012
Judges: NORTH, COWDROY & KATZMANN JJ
Date of judgment: 12 March 2013
Catchwords:

CONTRACTS: General contractual principles – construction and interpretation of contracts – implied terms – whether implied term existed in joint venture agreement giving the right to a party to inspect records of the other party

CONTRACTS: Particular parties – principal and agent – creation of relationship of agency – formation and proof of agency – agency created by other means – implication of agency from particular circumstances

PARTNERSHIP: Joint venture agreement – whether agreement gave rise to a proprietary right to one party to inspect the records of other partner – agreement defining rights of parties – absence of agency – no right of one party to inspect records of other party

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Appeal – evidence – receipt of further evidence – tender of further evidence in submissions in reply rejected – evidence rejected in circumstances where no notification given of proposal to seek leave to rely upon such evidence

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Discovery and inspection – preliminary discovery – access to documents of one partner to a joint venture agreement by the other partner

Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 27, 37M
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.34, 1.39, 36.57
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 15A r 6
Mining Act 1971 (SA) ss 28, 33, and Pt 9B
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52
Cases cited: ACN 007 528 207 Pty Ltd (in liq) v Bird Cameron(Reg) (2005) 91 SASR 570
Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom [2009] UKPC 10
BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266
Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71
Butts v O’Dwyer (1952) 87 CLR 267
CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172
Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Producers and Citizens Co-operative Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1931) 46 CLR 41
Consolo Ltd v Bennett [2012] FCAFC 120
Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41
International Harvester Company of Australia Proprietary Limited v Carrigan’s Hazeldene Pastoral Company (1958) 100 CLR 644
John Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1
John Holland Construction & Engineering Pty Ltd v World Services and Construction Pty Ltd (unreported, Byrne J, Victorian Supreme Court, 27 August 1993)
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145
NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 10) (2000) 107 FCR 270
Peterson v Maloney (1951) 84 CLR 91
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Details
Case
[2013] FCAFC 29
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Alliance Craton Explorer Pty Ltd appealed against a decision of the primary judge who had refused their application for preliminary discovery and an alternative claim for a declaration that they were entitled to inspect the records of Quasar Resources Pty Ltd. The appeal was heard by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, which found that the primary judge’s decision should be upheld and the appeal dismissed. The primary judge had held that Alliance had sufficient information to determine whether to commence proceedings and that there was no proprietary right for Alliance to inspect the records of Quasar. The court found that there was no agency relationship between the parties, and therefore Alliance had no right to inspect Quasar's records. The appeal was dismissed, and Alliance was ordered to pay the costs of the First and Second Respondents.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The Appellant pay the costs of the First and Second Respondents.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The primary judge refused the application for preliminary discovery, holding that Alliance had sufficient information to determine whether to start the proceeding it foreshadowed. His Honour also refused to grant the alternative claim for declaratory relief, finding that Alliance had no such proprietary right in the documents. In this appeal Alliance contests only the refusal to grant the alternative relief. We are of the opinion that the declaration should have been refused and that the appeal should therefore be dismissed.FACTS Exploration Licence 2874 (“Licence 2874”) was issued pursuant to the provisions of s 28 of the Mining Act 1971 (SA) (“Mining Act”) to Gold Stream Mining NL as to 51% and to Bonanza Gold Pty Limited as to 49% (together the “licensee”). The licensee was granted the right to explore for all minerals except extractive minerals or precious stones in the area prescribed in Schedule A of such licence (“the tenement”) for a period of one year commencing on 5 December 2001. Licence 2874 was superseded on 22 December 2006 by Exploration Licence 3666 (“the current licence”) which was issued to Quasar as to 75% and Alliance as to 25%. On 17 June 2002 Alliance became the registered holder of Licence 2874. The lands referred to in Schedule A to the licence were located near Arkaroola, North Western Curmamona Craton, South Australia. The tenement covers an area known as the “Four Mile Uranium Deposits”. On 30 August 2002 Alliance and Heathgate entered into the JVA in respect of the Four Mile uranium project. The JVA delineated the interests of the parties, namely a 75% interest to Heathgate, and a 25% interest to Alliance. Clause 4.1 of the JVA provides:With effect on the Commencement Date the parties establish between themselves a contractual joint venture governed by the terms of this Agreement. Heathgate will farm-into and may earn a 75% beneficial interest in the tenement by expending the Minimum Expenditure during the Earn-In Period. Clause 4.3 of the JVA provides:The purpose of the joint venture is to explore the Tenement for Minerals and to determine whether a viable resource or resources exist therein for Minerals and, if so, developing and mining the relevant part or parts of the Tenement. Pursuant to cl 6.1, Heathgate was appointed as the first manager of the JV. The JVA allowed for an “Earn-In Period”, defined in cl 1. In substance, the provision required Heathgate to notify Alliance that it had expended the “Minimum Expenditure” ($300,000) within two years of the Commencement Date (as defined) of the JVA. By a deed made on 17 December 2002, Heathgate assigned all its right, title and interest in the JVA to Quasar. Heathgate and Quasar have a close relationship, given that the shareholdings in both Heathgate and Quasar are controlled by Baywood Holdings Inc. Notwithstanding the assignment, Heathgate continues to act as manager of the JV and perform the exploration work on Quasar’s behalf as its delegate.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Before considering these submissions, however, it is necessary to deal with a late application Alliance made to tender further evidence.ADMISSION OF FURTHER EVIDENCE During its closing submissions in reply and over the objections of the respondents, Alliance sought the leave of the Court to tender the original Licence 2874, which, as already referred to, was issued to Goldstream Mining NL as to 51% and to Bonanza Gold Pty Ltd as to 49% dated 7 January 2002, and later transferred to Alliance. Licence 2874 was not in evidence before the primary judge, but a copy of the current licence (namely Licence 3666) was before his Honour. Senior Counsel for Alliance referred the Court to various clauses within Licence 2874 which imposed obligations upon the licensee, amongst other things, to submit exploration reports, data and sampling, to the Director of Mines (“the Director”). He submitted that Licence 2874 and the terms of the Mining Act imposed substantial obligations on the licensee including an obligation to keep and make available significant records. He pointed to the fact that s 33 of the Mining Act enables a licence to be cancelled or suspended in the event of a failure to do so. He submitted that Alliance would be unable to comply with such conditions if a request was made to produce the records referred to in the Mining Act, placing it in breach of its licence conditions. Quasar complained about the late timing of the submission, contended that the evidence was not fresh and that it was unprepared to meet it. Heathgate submitted that, had the issue been raised below, the parties would have sought to adduce evidence as to whether the responsibilities referred to in the relevant paragraphs of the current licence were those of the manager, rather than those of the licensee. The evidence is certainly not fresh. There is no apparent reason why, if it were relevant, it was not tendered below. Still, the Court has the power to receive the evidence. The power, conferred by s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“FCA Act”), is not confined to fresh evidence. The discretion is a wide one, constrained only by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the legislation, and there are no invariable rules: Cf. CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 at [116] (McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ), which concerned the operation of s 93A(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), which is in similar terms. Yet, as the Court emphasised in Sobey v Nicol (2007) 245 ALR 389, where the relevant principles are discussed at [68]-[72], the discretion is to be exercised in the context of an appeal by way of rehearing. A rehearing is not a hearing de novo. Its purpose is to correct error. The rules of court lay down a procedure for making an application for the Court to receive further evidence on an appeal (Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (“the Rules”), r 36.57), with which Alliance did not comply. Applications must be filed at least 21 days before the hearing of the appeal and be accompanied by an affidavit stating not only the evidence the applicant wishes the Court to receive but also the facts on which the application relies, the grounds of appeal to which it relates, and the reason why the evidence was not adduced in the court below. The Court has power to abridge the time (r 1.39), indeed to dispense altogether with compliance with the Rules (r 1.34). But no application was made for the Court to exercise either of these powers (at least not formally) and in the present circumstances we see no good reason to do so.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In all the circumstances we do not consider that it is in the interests of justice that leave be granted to receive Licence 2874 into evidence. We therefore refuse the application.CONSIDERATION There was no dispute that where an agent creates documents during his employment with a principal, the documents are the documents of the principal and must be provided to the principal on request: Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71 at 88 (per Dawson and Toohey JJ) and at 101 (Gaudron and McHugh JJ); Leicestershire County Council v Michael Faraday and Partners, Limited [1941] 2 KB 205 at 216 (Mackinnon LJ). The question here is whether the relationship between Heathgate and Quasar on the one hand, whilst acting as manager of the joint venture and Alliance on the other, was one of agent and principal. The primary judge was wrong to state that there was no assertion of agency in the relationship of Joint Venturer/Manager in the proposed Statement of Claim. The draft document, entitled Points of Claim, was amended at the beginning of the hearing to expressly make such an allegation. Nevertheless, we consider that his Honour was not wrong to find that there was no relevant agency relationship. The appeal ultimately turns on the nature of the parties’ agreement and, more particularly, on whether the relationship between the joint venturers and Heathgate (and after the assignment Quasar) is one of principal and agent. The answer to that question depends on the proper construction of the JVA. What did the parties agree to? The JVA was intended to comprehensively address the contractual relationship between Heathgate and Alliance for a discrete period: from the date the agreement was signed (30 August 2002), in the “Free Carry Period” as defined in the JVA, to the “Mine Decision Date” (22 October 2008) and beyond, but only until a new agreement (entitled the Mining Joint Venture Agreement) had been signed. Clause 10.2 in part provides:If Heathgate decides to proceed to develop a commercial mining operation the development and operation of the mine shall be regulated under a separate joint venture agreement and the Mine Development Area will be made subject to that joint venture. The separate Mining Joint Venture Agreement incorporating the broad principles contained in clause 6, this clause 10 and in clause 12 will apply to the Mine Development Area and, pending the execution of such separate Mining Joint Venture Agreement, this Agreement, or any agreement superseding this Agreement, shall govern the parties. Clause 12 of the JVA in part provides:As soon as is practicable and desirable after the Mine Decision Date, the joint venturers shall proceed to document a comprehensive Mining Joint Venture Agreement, to be drafted by Heathgate, to incorporate such matters commonly found in agreements of like nature and, without limitation, such an agreement shall deal with the following matters. The JVA, which imposed onerous obligations upon Heathgate (and later Quasar) to invest substantial sums of money at the exploration stage and before the Mine Decision Date, was directed essentially to regulate the interests of the parties during the initial period of the exploration of the tenement.