Al Muderis v Nine Network Australia Pty Limited (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Al Muderis v Nine Network Australia Pty Limited (No 3) [2024] FCA 204  

File number: NSD 917 of 2022
Judgment of: BROMWICH J
Date of judgment: 8 March 2024
Catchwords: COSTS – where applicant ordered to pay the respondents’ costs for an unsuccessful interlocutory application filed by the applicant challenging the respondents’ claim of journalist privilege under s 126K(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – where applicant applied by leave to vary the costs order to costs in the cause – where interlocutory application wholly unsuccessful – broad discretion of Court under s 43(2) of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – no sufficient reason to depart from default position that costs follow the event – circumstances do not warrant variation – held: application to vary costs order dismissed with costs
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 126K, 135 and 136

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(2)

Federal Court Rules 2011 r 40.04

Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 29A

Cases cited:

Al Muderis v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 1623

Ashby v Commonwealth (No 2) [2012] FCA 766; 203 FCR 440

Australian Securities and Investments Commission, in the matter of Whitebox Trading Pty Ltd v Whitebox Trading Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 385

DHP19 v Secretary of the Department of Health (No 2) [2019] FCA 1531

Duma v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 3) [2023] FCA 47

James v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (No 2) [2015] FCA 599

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Mukiza [2022] FCAFC 105

Murdoch v Private Media Pty Ltd (No 2) [2022] FCA 1607

Murdoch v Private Media Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 1275

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Number of paragraphs: 20
Date of last submission/s: 28 February 2024
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms S Chrysanthou SC, Mr N Olson and Mr T Smartt
Solicitor for the Applicant: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms R Enbom KC and Ms C Roberts
Solicitor for the Respondents: Thomson Geer

ORDERS

NSD 917 of 2022
BETWEEN:

MUNJED AL MUDERIS

Applicant

AND:

NINE NETWORK AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED ACN 008 685 407

First Respondent

FAIRFAX MEDIA PUBLICATIONS PTY LIMITED ACN 003 357 720

Second Respondent

THE AGE COMPANY PTY LTD ACN 004 262 702 (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

BROMWICH J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 MARCH 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s application to vary order 3 of the orders of Justice Bromwich made on 19 December 2023 be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to this application.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BROMWICH J

  1. On 19 December 2023, I made an adverse ruling on an interlocutory application (IA) brought by the applicant, Dr Al Muderis,…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 204
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Dr Al Muderis filed an application to vary the costs order in the matter of Al Muderis v Nine Network Australia Pty Limited (No 3), challenging the decision of Justice Bromwich that he pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to an interlocutory application. Dr Al Muderis sought to have the costs order varied to costs in the cause. The respondents opposed the application, asserting that the default position of costs following the event should apply. The legal issues before the court were whether there were sufficient reasons to depart from the default position of costs following the event, and if so, under what circumstances such a departure would be justified.

The court found that there were no sufficient reasons to depart from the default position. The court held that the respondents did not claim the journalist privilege to gain any forensic advantage in the principal proceeding, and that Dr Al Muderis was generally better off without the respondents having that support for Ms Grieve’s claim of reasonable belief. The court also found that Dr Al Muderis’ submissions on the point of increased costs were meritless, as the delay during the trial was due to a late decision by Dr Al Muderis to defer his oral evidence. The court further held that it was inevitable that the interlocutory application would need to be heard by a different judge, and that Dr Al Muderis only made clear that he intended to cross-examine Ms Grieve on credibility on the date the interlocutory application was originally listed to be heard.

The court dismissed the application to vary the costs order and ordered Dr Al Muderis to pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the application. The court held that the default position of costs following the event should apply, and that there were no circumstances that warranted a variation of the costs order. The court also noted that any issue of increased costs caused by the respondents' conduct could be dealt with in taxation. The court found that Dr Al Muderis’ submissions on this point were meritless, as the delay during the trial was due to a late decision by Dr Al Muderis to defer his oral evidence, and that it was inevitable that the interlocutory application would need to be heard by a different judge.

The court's decision was based on the principle that costs generally follow the event, and that there must be sufficient reasons to depart from this default position. The court found that the respondents did not claim the journalist privilege to gain any forensic advantage in the principal proceeding, and that Dr Al Muderis was generally better off without the respondents having that support for Ms Grieve’s claim of reasonable belief. The court also found that Dr Al Muderis’ submissions on the point of increased costs were meritless, as the delay during the trial was due to a late decision by Dr Al Muderis to defer his oral evidence, and that it was inevitable that the interlocutory application would need to be heard by a different judge. The court dismissed the application to vary the costs order and ordered Dr Al Muderis to pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s application to vary order 3 of the orders of Justice Bromwich made on 19 December 2023 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to this application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondents submit that any issue of increased costs caused by their conduct can be dealt with in taxation but, in any case, Dr Al Muderis’ submissions on this point are “meritless”, noting:(a)the time wasted during the first two weeks of the trial was due to a late decision by Dr Al Muderis to defer his oral evidence, which he originally was to have given as the first witness and for a period of 10 days – this submission is to the effect that this delay was the fault of Dr Al Muderis, not of the respondents, a submission that I accept given that this is precisely what occurred;(b)it was inevitable that the IA would need to be heard by a different judge due to the way Dr Al Muderis chose to advance it as, on his case, the IA required consideration of Ms Grieve’s credibility – I also accept this submission;(c)Dr Al Muderis only made clear that he intended to cross-examine Ms Grieve on credibility on the date the IA was originally listed to be heard before the trial judge, at which point the trial judge correctly decided that another judge should hear the IA – having read the transcript before her Honour upon being allocated this dispute, necessarily prior to hearing the IA, I also accept this submission; and(d)it is wrong to characterise the second Grieve affidavit as being filed late, when provision was made for further evidence in relation to the IA, an extension for filing further evidence had been granted by the trial judge, and, when earlier opposing an application to adjourn the s 126K hearing, Dr Al Muderis indicated that he would not be inconvenienced by receiving the further evidence on the date the second Grieve affidavit was in fact filed – I accept that it is incorrect for Dr Al Muderis to characterise the second Grieve affidavit as being late in any relevant way in all the circumstances.Consideration If Dr Al Muderis is not successful in the principal proceeding, variation of the costs order in the way he requests would likely have no effect as he would most likely be liable for all the respondents’ costs, including for the IA (subject to any offers of settlement that might have been made). However, if he is successful in the principal proceeding, what he now seeks would most likely result in him receiving costs for an application that was wholly unsuccessful, even if it was tactically useful for him, as he seems in substance to submit (again, subject to any offers of settlement that might have been made). I find it difficult to view the latter scenario as just for three reasons, which are also independent reasons as to why the default position of costs following the event should apply. First, it is important context that it is reasonably apparent that the respondents did not claim the s 126K privilege in order to gain any forensic advantage in the principal proceeding, for the reasons set out in the next paragraph. Quite to the contrary, their evidentiary position in the trial of the principal proceeding would most likely have been better in relation to this aspect of the reliance on information from confidential sources had their identity been required to be disclosed, albeit against their wishes. That is because Ms Grieve would have been better able to justify what she had relied upon, rather than having, in effect, to rely upon the nature of the information she was given, without the benefit of the trial judge knowing the identity and thereby being able to have regard to such considerations as the role and status of the person who had provided it. Dr Al Muderis is generally better off without the respondents having that support for Ms Grieve’s claim of reasonable belief. That said, I remain of the view expressed in my prior judgment that the confidential source information is likely to be of quite marginal significance to the respondents’ s 29A defence.