FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2)
[2012] FCA 766
Citation: Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2012] FCA 766 Parties: JAMES HUNTER ASHBY v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA and PETER SLIPPER File number: NSD 580 of 2012 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 13 July 2012 Catchwords: EVIDENCE – privilege – journalist’s privilege – journalist’s assertion of privilege under s 126H(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – where journalist asserts that he or she is not compellable to produce a document in answer to a subpoena under ss 126H(1) and 131A – whether document falling within the ambit of a subpoena discloses, or enables to be ascertained, the identity of a person who provided information to the journalist in the expectation of confidentiality – where party issuing subpoena has not applied to the Court to exercise its discretion under ss 126H(2) or 131A(1A) to override journalist’s privilege on public interest grounds
Held: under s126H(1), a journalist is not compellable to produce a document that would disclose, or enable to be ascertained, the identity of the journalist’s informant as the source of the particular information for which the informant sought confidentiality – no such privilege exists if the informant’s identity as the journalist’s source of the particular information has already been disclosed or is able to ascertained
Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 126G, 126H, 131A
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 17(4) and 50
Official Secrets Act 1920 (UK)Cases cited: Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] FCA 640 referred to
Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440 considered
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v DB Management Pty Ltd (2000) 199 CLR 321 appliedHearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125 referred to
John Fairfax & Sons Limited v Cojuangco (1988) 165 CLR 346 considered
LordAshburton v Pape [1913] 1 Ch 469 referred to
McGuiness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73 referred to
Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1070 referred toDate of hearing: 13 July 2012 Place: Sydney Division: FAIR WORK DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 34 Counsel for the Applicant: Ms R Francois with Ms J McDonald Solicitor for the Applicant: Harmers Workplace Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms M Richards Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr I Neil SC with Mr D Chin Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Maurice Blackburn Lawyers Counsel for the Subpoenaed Party: Mr A Leopold SC with Mr M J Smith Solicitor for the Subpoenaed Party: Ashurst Australia
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
FAIR WORK DIVISION
NSD 580 of 2012
BETWEEN: JAMES HUNTER ASHBY
ApplicantAND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First RespondentPETER SLIPPER
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
13 JULY 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The interlocutory application filed by Steve Lewis on 2 July 2012 be dismissed.
2.The subpoena issued to Steve…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 766
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the privilege under s 126H(1) is not absolute and only applies if the identity of the informant remains confidential. The court interpreted the term "disclosed" in the context of the statute to mean that the privilege is only relevant if the informant's identity as the source of the information has not already been revealed or is ascertainable. If the identity of the informant is already in the public domain or ascertainable, then the privilege does not apply, and the journalist must comply with the subpoena. The court noted that the statutory privilege provides a stronger protection than the common law "newspaper rule," but it still requires the journalist to assess whether the privilege applies based on whether the informant’s identity remains confidential.
The court dismissed Steve Lewis's interlocutory application seeking to avoid the subpoena. However, it stood the subpoena over to allow Lewis to reassess whether he could assert the privilege correctly. The court concluded that if the informant's identity had been revealed or was ascertainable, Lewis would be required to produce the document. The court’s decision hinged on the interpretation of the statutory language and the understanding that the privilege is designed to protect the confidentiality of the informant only when such confidentiality still exists.
The final orders of the court were to dismiss the interlocutory application by Steve Lewis and to stand over the subpoena until a later date, giving Lewis the opportunity to reassess the applicability of the journalist’s privilege.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The interlocutory application filed by Steve Lewis on 2 July 2012 be dismissed.
2. The subpoena issued to Steve Lewis on 18 June 2012 stand over until 9:30 am on 20 July 2012.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Slipper also contended that substantial material existed in the public domain, including the radio interview with Mr Lewis, and in documents that had been obtained in the course of these proceedings, to suggest that Mr Ashby had been publicly identified as an informant of Mr Lewis in a series of newspaper articles that began appearing shortly before these proceedings were commenced on 20 April 2012. Mr Slipper argued that this material demonstrated that if Mr Ashby were Mr Lewis’ confidential source, then production of the document in accordance with the command of the subpoena will not disclose Mr Ashby’s identity or enable his identity to be ascertained for the purposes of s 126H(1). This is because, so Mr Slipper contended, Mr Ashby has already been revealed as an informant of Mr Lewis for the purposes of Mr Lewis’s publications and that the privilege created by s 126H(1) will not prevent Mr Lewis being compellable to produce the document.CONSIDERATION Despite it being the only relevant relief sought in his interlocutory application, Mr Lewis does not now seek to set aside the narrowed subpoena. The question is whether or not his asserted construction of s 126H(1) is erroneous; if it is, then it is common ground that Mr Lewis must reassess whether he is required to produce the document. Depending on the conclusion he reaches on a proper understanding of the legislation, he will then be in a position to assess if he is compellable to produce the document. The amendments to the Act have created a statutory right of journalists, as defined in s 126G, to assert a privilege from disclosure of their sources which has greater force than the common law rule of practice known as the “newspaper rule”: McGuiness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73 particularly at 104-105 per Dixon J. In John Fairfax & Sons Limited v Cojuangco (1988) 165 CLR 346 at 351-352 Mason CJ, Wilson, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ described the precise area of operation of the newspaper rule as being “shrouded in uncertainty”. Their Honours explained (165 CLR at 354-355) that the courts had refused to accord absolute protection on the confidentiality of a journalist’s source of information while at the same time imposing some restraints on the entitlement of litigants to compel disclosure of the identity of the source. They said:“In effect, the courts have acted according to the principle that disclosure of the source will not be required unless it is necessary in the interests of justice. So generally speaking, disclosure will not be compelled in an interlocutory stage of a defamation or related action and even at the trial the court will not compel disclosure unless it is necessary to do justice between the parties.” Some of those concepts are repeated in s 126H. However, this provision replaced the common law uncertainty with a prima facie entitlement of the journalist to assert a privilege against disclosing his or her informant or source. How can the privilege be asserted? First, s 126G defines the informant as being the person who gives information to a journalist in the ordinary course of the journalist’s work in the expectation that that information may be published in a news medium. Secondly, the section defines the “journalist” as being the person who, in the practice of his or her profession, may be given information by an informant in the expectation that that information may be published in a news medium. Thus, the statutory definitions of “informant” and “journalist” in s 126G create a relationship that must exist between the particular information conveyed and the persons between whom it is communicated. The privilege in s 126H(1) relates to an anterior promise made by the journalist not to disclose the informant as the journalist’s source of that particular information: i.e. the journalist’s promise of confidentiality referred to in s 126H(1) is not to disclose the informant’s identity, or to enable that identity to be ascertained, in respect of that person as being the source of the particular information.