Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2)
[2012] FCA 766

Citation: Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2012] FCA 766
Parties: JAMES HUNTER ASHBY v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA and PETER SLIPPER
File number: NSD 580 of 2012
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 13 July 2012
Catchwords:

EVIDENCE – privilege – journalist’s privilege – journalist’s assertion of privilege under s 126H(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – where journalist asserts that he or she is not compellable to produce a document in answer to a subpoena under ss 126H(1) and 131A – whether document falling within the ambit of a subpoena discloses, or enables to be ascertained, the identity of a person who provided information to the journalist in the expectation of confidentiality – where party issuing subpoena has not applied to the Court to exercise its discretion under ss 126H(2) or 131A(1A) to override journalist’s privilege on public interest grounds

Held: under s126H(1), a journalist is not compellable to produce a document that would disclose, or enable to be ascertained, the identity of the journalist’s informant as the source of the particular information for which the informant sought confidentiality – no such privilege exists if the informant’s identity as the journalist’s source of the particular information has already been disclosed or is able to ascertained

Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 126G, 126H, 131A
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 17(4) and 50
Official Secrets Act 1920 (UK)
Cases cited:

Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] FCA 640 referred to
Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440 considered
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v DB Management Pty Ltd (2000) 199 CLR 321 applied

Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125 referred to

John Fairfax & Sons Limited v Cojuangco (1988) 165 CLR 346 considered
LordAshburton v Pape [1913] 1 Ch 469 referred to
McGuiness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73 referred to
Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1070 referred to

Date of hearing: 13 July 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: FAIR WORK DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 34
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms R Francois with Ms J McDonald
Solicitor for the Applicant: Harmers Workplace Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms M Richards
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr I Neil SC with Mr D Chin
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Maurice Blackburn Lawyers
Counsel for the Subpoenaed Party: Mr A Leopold SC with Mr M J Smith
Solicitor for the Subpoenaed Party: Ashurst Australia

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

FAIR WORK DIVISION

NSD 580 of 2012

BETWEEN:

JAMES HUNTER ASHBY
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent

PETER SLIPPER
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 JULY 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The interlocutory application filed by Steve Lewis on 2 July 2012 be dismissed. 

2.The subpoena issued to Steve…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 766
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) involved a dispute regarding the assertion of journalist’s privilege under s 126H(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The central issue was whether a journalist was compellable to produce a document in response to a subpoena when the document would disclose or enable the ascertainment of the identity of the journalist’s confidential informant. The journalist, Steve Lewis, argued that his privilege under s 126H(1) protected him from having to produce the document, as it contained information that could reveal the identity of his confidential source. The court had to decide whether the privilege applied when the identity of the informant had already been disclosed or could be ascertained from other sources.

The court found that the privilege under s 126H(1) is not absolute and only applies if the identity of the informant remains confidential. The court interpreted the term "disclosed" in the context of the statute to mean that the privilege is only relevant if the informant's identity as the source of the information has not already been revealed or is ascertainable. If the identity of the informant is already in the public domain or ascertainable, then the privilege does not apply, and the journalist must comply with the subpoena. The court noted that the statutory privilege provides a stronger protection than the common law "newspaper rule," but it still requires the journalist to assess whether the privilege applies based on whether the informant’s identity remains confidential.

The court dismissed Steve Lewis's interlocutory application seeking to avoid the subpoena. However, it stood the subpoena over to allow Lewis to reassess whether he could assert the privilege correctly. The court concluded that if the informant's identity had been revealed or was ascertainable, Lewis would be required to produce the document. The court’s decision hinged on the interpretation of the statutory language and the understanding that the privilege is designed to protect the confidentiality of the informant only when such confidentiality still exists.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the interlocutory application by Steve Lewis and to stand over the subpoena until a later date, giving Lewis the opportunity to reassess the applicability of the journalist’s privilege.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory application filed by Steve Lewis on 2 July 2012 be dismissed.

2. The subpoena issued to Steve Lewis on 18 June 2012 stand over until 9:30 am on 20 July 2012.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

After I made that ruling, Mr Lewis’ Senior Counsel read an affidavit by his solicitor, that identified him as a journalist for News Limited newspapers, including The Daily Telegraph, The Australian and The Courier Mail. Mr Lewis informed his solicitor that he had received a telephone call from a person whom he described as the “confidential source” within the period specified in the subpoena. Mr Lewis said that his source had stated that the source had highly confidential information and wanted to know if Mr Lewis would be prepared to talk with that source about the information on a confidential basis. Mr Lewis said that he agreed to do so. He said that he had enquired of the confidential source, when they met, why the source had sought him out. Mr Lewis said that the source stated that he or she had been informed that Mr Lewis was a journalist who could be trusted. Mr Lewis said that he had conducted his meetings with the confidential source in the normal course of his work as a journalist, and for the purpose of possibly publishing a story in one or more of the News Limited newspapers for which he worked. Mr Lewis said one document fell within the scope of the subpoena and that this would disclose the identity of the confidential source as his confidential source, or enable the source’s identity to be ascertained. This was, he asserted, because the document, first, was a communication from the confidential source to Mr Lewis; secondly, contained the source’s name; thirdly, specified a contact point for the source, and; last, contained material that established the bona fides of the source in relation to the information supplied to Mr Lewis during detailed discussions that they had. THE EVIDENTIARY BACKGROUND In a radio interview, soon after these proceedings began, between Mr Lewis and a broadcaster, Chris Smith, on 2GB radio, Mr Smith described Mr Lewis as the man who broke the “story” in The Daily Telegraph. Mr Lewis told Mr Smith that he had been reporting on Mr Slipper and allegations concerning his conduct for two years, and that the Court documents had been filed the previous Friday. Mr Smith asked him whether he had gone to Mr Ashby or Mr Ashby had gone to him. Mr Lewis responded that he did not want to go into detail about that matter adding: “Let’s just say that we’ve been in contact for some time”. During the course of the interview, Mr Lewis went on to suggest that the Court documents were but the tip of an iceberg, that there were other matters that could be investigated by the authorities and that he would be very happy to help them. When Mr Ashby filed his initial originating application he concluded it by stating that a sworn or affirmed “independent forensic Information Technology assessment and report” supported the pleading of text messages he alleged had passed between him and Mr Slipper: see Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] FCA 640 at [3]-[4]. That report had been prepared by Rodney McKemmish and was provided to Mr Slipper’s lawyers pursuant to an order made at the first directions hearing on 18 May 2012.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The ordinary and natural meeting of “disclosed” as used in both ss 126H(1) and 131A(1) is not unqualified. That meaning is part of a cognate expression for protection of the journalist from being compellable to answer questions or produce documents that “would disclose the identity of the informant or enable that identity to be ascertained”. Section 126H(1) assumes that the identity of the informant, as the source of the particular information that the journalist published, is not already known at the time that the privilege is claimed. That is, there is still a secret or confidence to protect. Thus, s 126H(1) deliberately uses the conditional “would” to indicate that the privilege is limited to a disclosure or act that changes the position of the informant from his or her then current state of being unknown as the source of the particular information. Once the informant has been revealed as the source of that information, the source’s identity as such is no longer confidential. Thus, there is no point in protecting his or her identity or permitting the journalist to assert that the identity is confidential to the journalist, so that he or she is not compellable to produce a document or give evidence that merely confirms that identity.CONCLUSION For these reasons I am satisfied that the construction of s 126H(1) posited by each party is incorrect. Ultimately, the question whether Mr Lewis is compellable, in the first instance, must be addressed by him in answering the subpoena by applying the correct understanding of the nature and extent of the privilege created by s 126H(1). He has not done so yet. If it be the case that the identity of his informant as the source of the information in the document has already been revealed in the public domain or is ascertainable as having come from the informant, Mr Lewis must answer the subpoena by producing the document. On the other hand, Mr Slipper’s mere speculation that it may be that Mr Ashby is the source cannot be the basis on which the Court would require the subpoena to be answered. Accordingly, it is appropriate to dismiss Mr Lewis’ interlocutory application, but to stand the subpoena over for one week to be answered so that Mr Lewis can readdress the question of whether he can assert the privilege.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Slipper also contended that substantial material existed in the public domain, including the radio interview with Mr Lewis, and in documents that had been obtained in the course of these proceedings, to suggest that Mr Ashby had been publicly identified as an informant of Mr Lewis in a series of newspaper articles that began appearing shortly before these proceedings were commenced on 20 April 2012. Mr Slipper argued that this material demonstrated that if Mr Ashby were Mr Lewis’ confidential source, then production of the document in accordance with the command of the subpoena will not disclose Mr Ashby’s identity or enable his identity to be ascertained for the purposes of s 126H(1). This is because, so Mr Slipper contended, Mr Ashby has already been revealed as an informant of Mr Lewis for the purposes of Mr Lewis’s publications and that the privilege created by s 126H(1) will not prevent Mr Lewis being compellable to produce the document.CONSIDERATION Despite it being the only relevant relief sought in his interlocutory application, Mr Lewis does not now seek to set aside the narrowed subpoena. The question is whether or not his asserted construction of s 126H(1) is erroneous; if it is, then it is common ground that Mr Lewis must reassess whether he is required to produce the document. Depending on the conclusion he reaches on a proper understanding of the legislation, he will then be in a position to assess if he is compellable to produce the document. The amendments to the Act have created a statutory right of journalists, as defined in s 126G, to assert a privilege from disclosure of their sources which has greater force than the common law rule of practice known as the “newspaper rule”: McGuiness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73 particularly at 104-105 per Dixon J. In John Fairfax & Sons Limited v Cojuangco (1988) 165 CLR 346 at 351-352 Mason CJ, Wilson, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ described the precise area of operation of the newspaper rule as being “shrouded in uncertainty”. Their Honours explained (165 CLR at 354-355) that the courts had refused to accord absolute protection on the confidentiality of a journalist’s source of information while at the same time imposing some restraints on the entitlement of litigants to compel disclosure of the identity of the source. They said:“In effect, the courts have acted according to the principle that disclosure of the source will not be required unless it is necessary in the interests of justice. So generally speaking, disclosure will not be compelled in an interlocutory stage of a defamation or related action and even at the trial the court will not compel disclosure unless it is necessary to do justice between the parties.” Some of those concepts are repeated in s 126H. However, this provision replaced the common law uncertainty with a prima facie entitlement of the journalist to assert a privilege against disclosing his or her informant or source. How can the privilege be asserted? First, s 126G defines the informant as being the person who gives information to a journalist in the ordinary course of the journalist’s work in the expectation that that information may be published in a news medium. Secondly, the section defines the “journalist” as being the person who, in the practice of his or her profession, may be given information by an informant in the expectation that that information may be published in a news medium. Thus, the statutory definitions of “informant” and “journalist” in s 126G create a relationship that must exist between the particular information conveyed and the persons between whom it is communicated. The privilege in s 126H(1) relates to an anterior promise made by the journalist not to disclose the informant as the journalist’s source of that particular information: i.e. the journalist’s promise of confidentiality referred to in s 126H(1) is not to disclose the informant’s identity, or to enable that identity to be ascertained, in respect of that person as being the source of the particular information.