Akbari v State of Queensland

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Akbari v State of Queensland & Anor [2022] QCA 74

PARTIES:

BABAK AKBARI
(applicant/appellant)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND (MACKAY HOSPITAL AND HEALTH SERVICES)
(first respondent)
PAUL HENDERSON
(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 7175 of 2021
Appeal No 7696 of 2021
DC No 2538 of 2020

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Extension of Time/General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


District Court at Brisbane – [2021] QDC 87 (Muir DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

10 May 2022

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

17 November 2021

JUDGES:

McMurdo and Mullins JJA and Callaghan J

ORDERS:

1.   Grant leave to appeal.

2.   Allow the appeal.

3.   Set aside the orders made in the District Court on 26 May 2021 and 19 July 2021.

4. Order that pursuant to s 32A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974(Qld), the limitation period in respect of the appellant’s cause of action for defamation against the respondents be extended, so as to expire on 8 September 2020.

5.   Dismiss the cross-application for leave to appeal filed on 7 July 2021.

6.   Order the respondents to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings in this Court.

7.   Order that there be no order as to costs of the application in the District Court.

CATCHWORDS:

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS – OTHER CAUSES OF ACTIONS AND MATTERS – where the second respondent made a notification about the appellant to the Office of the Health Ombudsman under s 141 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Qld) (“the National Law”) – where the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (“AHPRA”) commenced an investigation into the appellant as a result of the notification – where the appellant discussed commencing defamation proceedings against the first and second respondents with his then solicitor – where the appellant understood that solicitor’s advice to be that he should wait to commence defamation proceedings until after the finalisation of the AHPRA investigation – where, after the finalisation of the AHPRA investigation, the appellant sought to commence defamation proceedings – where the appellant was time-barred from commencing defamation proceedings by the operation of s 10AA of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), which provides that an action for defamation must not be brought after the end of one year from the date of publication of the material complained of – where the appellant applied under s 32A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) to extend the limitation period – whether in the terms of s 32A(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) it was reasonable in the circumstances for the appellant to have commenced an action in defamation within one year from the date of publication – whether the limitation period should be extended

DEFAMATION – PRIVILEGE – ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE – STATEMENTS MADE IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS – where the second respondent made a notification about the appellant to the Office of the Health Ombudsman under s 141 of the National Law – where…

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Details
Case
[2022] QCA 74
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Akbari v State of Queensland, the appellant sought to commence defamation proceedings against the first and second respondents after the conclusion of an investigation by the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA) into his conduct. The appellant had been notified to the Office of the Health Ombudsman, which led to the AHPRA investigation. He was time-barred from commencing defamation proceedings under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), which stipulates a one-year period from the date of publication of the defamatory material. The appellant applied to extend the limitation period under s 32A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld). The primary legal issues were whether it was reasonable for the appellant to have commenced an action within the original one-year period and whether the limitation period should be extended.

The court examined whether the notification to the Office of the Health Ombudsman was protected by an absolute privilege. Section 237 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Qld) provided a qualified privilege to a person making a notification in good faith. The court concluded that this did not indicate an intention for absolute privilege to attach. The court held that it was reasonable for the appellant to have delayed commencing the defamation action until after the AHPRA investigation was completed. Therefore, the limitation period should be extended under s 32A(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the District Court's orders, and ordered that the limitation period for the appellant's defamation action be extended to expire on 8 September 2020. The Court also dismissed the cross-appeal and ordered the respondents to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal. The Court declined to make an order as to costs in the District Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Grant leave to appeal.

2. Allow the appeal.

3. Set aside the orders made in the District Court on 26 May 2021 and 19 July 2021.

4. Order that pursuant to s 32A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), the limitation period in respect of the appellant’s cause of action for defamation against the respondents be extended, so as to expire on 8 September 2020.

5. Dismiss the cross-application for leave to appeal filed on 7 July 2021.

6. Order the respondents to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings in this Court.

7. Order that there be no order as to costs of the application in the District Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Her Honour did note s 237. But in her view s 237 tended to show “a parliamentary intention that this is the type of proceeding to which absolute privilege would attach.”[69] As should appear, in my view that cannot be accepted.[69]Judgment [81].Conclusions and orders The judge was correct to conclude that the limitation period had to be extended under s 32A(2). The judge was incorrect to conclude that it should be extended to a date which was before the date of the commencement of this proceeding. Her Honour did so only because she considered that the proceeding was bound to fail by the respondents having an absolute privilege at common law. I would order as follows:1.Grant leave to appeal.2.Allow the appeal.3.Set aside the orders made in the District Court on 26 May 2021 and 19 July 2021.4.Order that pursuant to s 32A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), the limitation period in respect of the appellant’s cause of action for defamation against the respondents be extended, so as to expire on 8 September 2020.5.Dismiss the cross-application for leave to appeal filed on 7 July 2021.6.Order the respondents to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings in this Court.7.Order that there be no order as to costs of the application in the District Court.[70][70]That being the outcome on costs sought by the appellant in the District Court. MULLINS JA: I agree with McMurdo JA. CALLAGHAN J: I agree with the reasons of and orders proposed by McMurdo JA. His Honour has explained the form of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Qld) (the National Law) and points[71] to the inclusion in it of a qualified privilege. That tells against the existence of absolute privilege which, if it existed, would mean that s 237(3)(b) of the National Law was otiose. It follows that the appellant should succeed, so long as it was reasonable in the circumstances for him not to have commenced an action.[71]At [57] – [60] of his Honour’s reasons. The learned trial judge reached that conclusion, but this has been challenged by way of a cross-appeal. This Court should, however, reach the same conclusion as her Honour. It was, with respect, the correct determination in circumstances where the appellant had in fact taken steps to vindicate his rights and engaged legal representatives to do that for him.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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