AIY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AIY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1180

Citation: AIY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1180
Appeal from: AIY15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1571
Parties: AIY15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 749 of 2015
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 4 November 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION - appeal against Federal Circuit Court decision refusing application for judicial review of decision by Refugee Review Tribunal – whether primary judge failed to find that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in failing to consider whether there was a real risk that the appellant would suffer degrading treatment or punishment constituting “significant harm” by reason of the enactment of the Sri Lankan Immigrants and Emigrants Act – where argument was not articulated by appellant before the Tribunal or delegate – where no obligation upon Tribunal to consider whether the Immigrants and Emigrants Act amounts to an “act” for the purposes of s 36(2A)(e) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) – where primary judge erred in conflating criteria under ss 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Act but no equivalent error was made by the Tribunal
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5(1), 36, 414, 476

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137, [1954] ATS 5 (entered into force 22 April 1954)
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267, [1973] ATS 37 (entered into force 4 October 1967)

Cases cited: AGH15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1181
AIY15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1571
Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 194 ALR 244
SZTDY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 303
Date of hearing: 20 August 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 45
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J Mack
Solicitor for the Appellant: Westside Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Francois
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent entered a submitting appearance, save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 749 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

AIY15
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 NOVEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 749 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1180
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of AIY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, a Sri Lankan national, sought judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) that had refused his application for a protection visa. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had failed to consider whether there was a real risk that he would suffer degrading treatment or punishment, constituting "significant harm," by reason of the enactment of the Sri Lankan Immigrants and Emigrants Act. The Federal Circuit Court had dismissed the applicant's appeal against the Tribunal's decision. The applicant then appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court, arguing that the primary judge had erred in not finding that the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error in failing to consider the implications of the Immigrants and Emigrants Act.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge had erred in finding that the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error by failing to consider whether the applicant would suffer degrading treatment or punishment under the Immigrants and Emigrants Act, and whether the primary judge had conflated the criteria under ss 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court held that the primary judge had erred in conflating the criteria under ss 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Act, but that this error did not provide a basis for allowing the appeal. The court found that the Tribunal was not required to consider whether the Immigrants and Emigrants Act amounted to an "act" for the purposes of s 36(2A)(e) of the Act, and that the Tribunal's decision did not fall into jurisdictional error. The appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Finally, s 36(2B) limits the circumstances in which there is taken to be a real risk that a non-citizen, if removed, will suffer significant harm for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa), exempting among other things cases where the Minister is satisfied that the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non-citizen personally.3. BACKGROUND3.1 The appellant’s application for a protection visa The appellant is a 41 year old citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived at Christmas Island on 7 July 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival without his Sri Lankan passport. On 15 November 2012 the appellant applied for the protection visa. In his statement in support of the application, the appellant claimed to fear serious harm from the Sri Lankan authorities by reason of an imputed pro-LTTE political opinion and from the Tamil paramilitary groups. In addition he claimed that he was at a high risk of being harmed if returned to Sri Lanka because he fled Sri Lanka illegally and claimed asylum in Australia. At the interview for the appellant’s protection visa application on 18 February 2013, the appellant’s migration agent submitted that there is a real chance that the appellant would suffer persecution for Refugee Convention reasons by reason of his Tamil race, his imputed political opinion in support of the LTTE and his membership of particular social groups. Relevantly for present purposes, he fears that he would be tortured, imprisoned and killed as a member of the social group described as “failed asylum seekers returning from a Western country”. The appellant’s migration agent also submitted that there is a real risk that the appellant will suffer significant harm for the same reasons under the complementary protection provisions. On 7 August 2013 the delegate refused the application in relation to s 36(2)(a) of the Act on the basis of adverse credit findings and relevant country information. 3.2 The decision of the Tribunal The appellant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision on 13 August 2013. Written submissions prepared by the appellant’s migration agent were provided to the Tribunal on 19 March 2014. In those submissions, the appellant’s representative submitted that:On his illegal departure from Sri Lanka, available information supports the proposition that [the appellant] will be charged on his return for a criminal offence under Sri Lanka’s Immigrants and Emigrants Act (I&EA) relating to his illegal departure. The provisions of the I&EA carry penalties of imprisonment for 1 to 5 years and a fine (note a maximum of 5 year jail sentence for fleeing any country illegally is harsh in comparison to domestic law – the Migration Act states that a Serious Australian Offence could be punishable by imprisonment for a maximum term of not less than three years). That is, imprisonment and fines are not alternative sanctions – those convicted can anticipate at least one year in prison. We submit it is not open on the available evidence for the Tribunal to conclude the applicant will not be jailed if convicted. In light of the known facts regarding his illegal departure, we further submit he will inevitably be convicted. It is also possible that claimant would be released on bail and therefore is at risk of harm as per Sri Lankan statue [sic] law.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 7 August 2013 the delegate refused the application in relation to s 36(2)(a) of the Act on the basis of adverse credit findings and relevant country information. 3.2 The decision of the Tribunal The appellant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision on 13 August 2013. Written submissions prepared by the appellant’s migration agent were provided to the Tribunal on 19 March 2014. In those submissions, the appellant’s representative submitted that:On his illegal departure from Sri Lanka, available information supports the proposition that [the appellant] will be charged on his return for a criminal offence under Sri Lanka’s Immigrants and Emigrants Act (I&EA) relating to his illegal departure. The provisions of the I&EA carry penalties of imprisonment for 1 to 5 years and a fine (note a maximum of 5 year jail sentence for fleeing any country illegally is harsh in comparison to domestic law – the Migration Act states that a Serious Australian Offence could be punishable by imprisonment for a maximum term of not less than three years). That is, imprisonment and fines are not alternative sanctions – those convicted can anticipate at least one year in prison. We submit it is not open on the available evidence for the Tribunal to conclude the applicant will not be jailed if convicted. In light of the known facts regarding his illegal departure, we further submit he will inevitably be convicted. It is also possible that claimant would be released on bail and therefore is at risk of harm as per Sri Lankan statue [sic] law. With respect to his claim for complementary protection, the written submission also claimed that there is a real risk that the appellant if returned would be subjected to “significant harm”, specifically, torture, cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment, degrading treatment or punishment, or arbitrary deprivation of his life. In support of the submission that there were substantial grounds for believing that the appellant would be in danger of harm from the Sri Lankan authorities, the appellant referred among other things to “the issue of [the appellant’s] illegal departure from Sri Lanka which could result in a prison sentence, as discussed above.” Further in a statement emailed to the Tribunal on 11 December 2014, the appellant contended that: I left Sri Lanka illegally and committed a crime under the Sri Lankan immigration laws. I committed two crimes under that law. Firstly, I left Sri Lanka not through recognized places from which a person is allowed to leave Sri Lanka. Secondly, I left Sri Lanka without a passport. As a result of violating the above laws, I fear if I returned to Sri Lanka, I will be detained, interrogated at the airport and imprisoned. I understand that the law is a general application of law but in my case the Sri Lankan law will be applied discriminately and selectively towards me because I am a Tamil and a Tamil Christian. This is the particular situation, I fear the law will be applied simply because of my ethnicity and minority religious group and will face harm. The Sri Lankan prisons are horrible places to live and I fear I will be not only attacked by the Sri Lanka security forces in the prison but also will be attacked by the Sinhala inmate due to my ethnicity and suspected LTTE issues.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

For the reasons set out below, ground 1 cannot be sustained. While I consider that ground 2 is made out, it challenges only an additional basis for the primary judge’s decision and does not provide a basis for allowing the appeal. It follows that the appeal must be dismissed. 2. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE MIGRATION ACT 1958 The statutory provisions relevant to the resolution of this appeal are the same as those explained in AGH15 at [4]-[11]. In short, a protection visa may be granted where the criteria in s 36(2)(a) are met, that is, where the Minister is satisfied that the person is a person to whom protection obligations are owed under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 1967 (the Refugee Convention). Article 1A (2) of the Refugee Convention provides, in turn, that a refugee is a person who, relevantly, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [or her] nationality and unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to available himself [or herself] of the protection of that country…”. In common with the appeal in AGH15, the appellant’s complaint here relates solely to the Tribunal’s rejection of his claim under the alternative criteria for a protection visa in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. As I explained in AGH15:5. …Section 36(2)(aa) recognises that a non-citizen who is not entitled to a protection visa because she or he is not a refugee may nonetheless be entitled to protection because of other obligations owed by Australia to afford protection under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984, done at New York on 10 December 1984 (CAT), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, done at New York on 16 December 1966 (ICCPR): Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; (2013) 210 FCR 505 (SZQRB) at 522 [70] and 526 [100] (Lander and Gordon JJ), and 558 [300] and 560 [313] (Besanko and Jagot JJ). Specifically, under s 36(2)(aa) and subject to certain exceptions, the Minister must grant a protection visa to a non-citizen in Australia:…in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm…6. The proper test is the same as that in s 36(2)(a), namely, whether there is a “real chance” that an applicant will suffer significant harm (as defined) if returned to her or his country of origin: SZQRB at 551 [242]-[246] (Lander and Gordon JJ) (with whom Besanko and Jagot JJ at 557-558 [297] and Flick J at 565 [342] relevantly agreed).7. Section 36(2A) defines the circumstances in which a non-citizen will suffer significant harm: A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:(a) the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or(b) the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or(c) the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or(d) the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or(e) the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.8. This section recognises the type of harm from which the CAT and ICCPR seek to protect protection seekers: SZQRB at 526 [98] (Lander and Gordon JJ); see also the definitions of “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment”, “degrading treatment or punishment” and “torture” in s 5(1) of the Act.