AID19 v Minister for Immigration & Anor
[2020] FCCA 1002
•22 April 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| AID19 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2020] FCCA 1002 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Un-particularised grounds for review – failure by applicant to file an amended application for review as ordered – no reasonable excuse for failure to comply with court order – duty of lawyers for the first respondent to regularise proceedings at an early time where applications for review have no particularity – where it is not possible for the Court to conduct a fair hearing in the absence of particulars – where applicant in default – application for review dismissed. |
| Legislation: Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act1999 (Cth), s.3(2)(a). |
| Cases cited: NAKX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1559. MZAKQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1392. Sali v SPC Limited (1993) 116 ALR 625. DUN16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor and DUO16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 2951. |
| Applicant: | AID19 |
First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | BRG 77 of 2019 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Egan |
| Hearing date: | 22 April 2020 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 22 April 2020 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 22 April 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicant: | In person |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Mr McLaren, Solicitor of Minter Ellison |
| Second Respondent: | Submitting appearance save as to costs |
ORDERS
The application for review filed on 25 January 2019 be dismissed pursuant to the provisions of r. 13.03B(1)(a) and (c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth).
The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application for review fixed in the amount of $7,467.00.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRG 77 of 2019
| AID19 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant in this matter filed an Originating Application for review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority handed down on 10 January 2019. That application for review was filed on 25 January 2019.
On 13 March 2019, the matter was first mentioned before Registrar Buckingham of the Brisbane Registry of this Court. On that day it was ordered, by Order 2:
“That the applicant shall file and serve any amended application upon which the applicant intends to rely, giving complete particulars of each ground of review.”
The ground for review as contained in the Originating Application for review was as follows:
“The Immigration Assessment Authority and the delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs erred in law in making his decision.”
The applicant failed to file any amended application for review consequent upon the making of the order of Registrar Buckingham.
This matter then came on for hearing before this Court on 12 November 2019. Registrar Buckingham had set the matter down for final hearing on 9 October 2019, but the matter was adjourned to 12 November 2019.
On 12 November 2019 the Court made an order as follows:
“The applicant is to file and serve an amended application for review, which application contains detailed particulars of the ground or grounds of review upon which the applicant intended to rely at the hearing of the proceeding, on or before 3 December 2019.”
Another order made on 12 November 2019 by this Court was that the further hearing of the proceeding was adjourned to 14 April 2020.
The applicant did not file any amended application for review, as so ordered, before 3 December 2019. Neither did the applicant file and serve any further submissions, on which the applicant intended to rely, on or before 10 December 2019.
At the time that the matter came before the Court on 12 November 2019, the applicant appeared in person. The Court then explained to the applicant, through an interpreter, the necessity for the applicant to obtain a copy of the order made on that day, to seek advice concerning the contents of the order, and to comply with the order by filing and serving an amended application setting out detailed particulars of the claim for review as per the order. It was further explained to the applicant that if he arrived at the hearing in April 2020 and made a submission that he did not understand the order, or the requirement that the order was to be complied with, then that submission would not be accepted by the Court as an excuse. A notation to the above effect was included at the end of the order.
On 14 April 2020, when the matter next came before the Court, it became clear that the applicant had failed to comply with the order of the Court made on 12 November 2019 for the filing of an amended application for review.
Notwithstanding that the applicant had failed to comply with a specific order of the Court, the Court granted to the applicant a further indulgence and adjourned the matter for 8 days so that he might comply with another court order requiring him to file and serve an amended application for review. The relevant order was as follows:
“2. The Applicant is to file and serve an amended application for review, with such amended application to include detailed particulars of the ground or grounds of review sought to be relied upon by the Applicant at the hearing of the application for review, by 4:00pm on 21 April 2020.”
As to the order made on 14 April 2020 a notation to that order appeared, as follows, at the end of the order:
“It is noted that:
A. the applicant appeared today with the assistance of an interpreter in the Punjabi language who interpreted to the applicant each of the orders made by the Court, and;
B. the applicant was put on notice during the course of today’s hearing in open Court, that in the event that the applicant failed to comply with order 2 relating to the filing of an amended application, the application before the Court for review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority had on 10 January 2019 was liable to be dismissed pursuant to the provisions of rule 13.03B(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules, a copy of which rule was to be provided to the applicant by the lawyers for the first respondent.”
The Court was advised by Mr McLaren, who appeared on behalf of the first respondent, that a copy of the relevant Federal Circuit Court Rules was provided to the applicant in accordance with the Court’s order. It is also noted by the Court, that during both of the hearings on 12 November 2019 and 14 April 2020, the applicant appeared in Court assisted by a Punjabi interpreter.
On the afternoon of 21 April, the applicant caused to be sent to Judge’s Chambers a letter emailed by him. Exhibit 1 is a copy of that letter. Also sent by email with that letter was a copy of a discharge referral report from the Liverpool Health Service (South Western Sydney Local Health District) dated 28 November 2018. That medical report documented that the applicant had presented to the Health Service complaining of chest pain. The contents of that report do not suggest that the applicant would be unable or unfit to appear before the Court today for the purpose of the conduct of this hearing. The report is marked Exhibit 2 to this proceeding.
In the case of NAKX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1559 Lindgren J made the following comments in circumstances where medical certificates had been presented to the Registry in an attempt to have the hearing of a matter before Lindgren J adjourned:
“[3] The appellants notified the Registry two days ago, on 15 December 2003, that they wished to apply for an adjournment of the hearing today. A friend of theirs, Ms Irina Radionova, attended at the Registry and produced two medical certificates both dated Saturday 13 December 2003 and issued by Aristoff Medical Practice Pty Limited; one certificate in respect of each appellant. The solicitor for the Minister indicated that the Minister would oppose an adjournment. It was explained to Ms Radionova that, in these circumstances, an adjournment could not be granted unless the Minister had the opportunity to be heard on the application.
[4] Upon the matter being called on this afternoon, Ms Anna Volonski, a friend of the female appellant, was in attendance. She is not a lawyer and has attended Court, in substance, to observe and hear what happened on the application.
[5] The medical certificate dated 13 December 2003 in respect of the male applicant states as follows:
‘This is to certify that on 13/12/2003 I examined the above person. In my opinion he/she is suffering from Dermatitis atopic and will be unable to attend Court from 13/12/2003 to 01/01/2004 inclusive.’
The certificate of the same date in respect of the female appellant states:
‘This is to certify that on 13/12/2003 I examined the above named person. In my opinion he/she is suffering from Anxiety disorder/Depression and will be unable to attend Court from 13/12/2003 to 13/01/2004 inclusive.’
[6] The medical certificates are quite unsatisfactory. They do not address the critical question whether, and if so why, the medical condition would prevent the appellant from travelling to the Court and participating effectively in a Court hearing.
[7] I do not accept that either of the medical conditions referred to would make the sufferer ‘unable to attend Court’ – apparently each was able to attend upon the medical practitioner.
[8] If the certificates were meant to say that the medical condition would prevent the sufferer from participating effectively in a Court hearing, they do not in fact say that and do not explain why the medical condition would have that effect.”
That decision was referred to with approval by Logan J in MZAKQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1392. In that case, His Honour refused an application for an adjournment in similar circumstances to the request contained in Exhibit 1 today. His Honour, in that matter, considered whether he ought to exercise the Court's discretion to refuse the adjournment application based upon a consideration of what were referred to as:
“wider considerations which attended the question as to whether or not any adjournment should be granted."
In addressing those questions, Logan J, at [9] – [13] inclusive of His Honour’s reasons, said as follows:
“[9] In respect of this particular medical certificate, I make the following observations. Firstly, and again inferentially, the appellant was sufficiently healthy both physically and mentally to attend upon Dr Haroun yesterday. Secondly, the particular medical condition from which the appellant suffers is quite unknown. The certificate is noteworthy for its generality. Yet further, whatever medical condition it is would seem, more likely than not, to be the most transient of conditions. I make that observation because the unfitness attested is only from yesterday until today. Yet further, whatever medical condition it may be, it is one which, in the opinion of Dr Haroun, renders the appellant unfit for work, not, notably, to attend at Court, at least for the purpose of voicing personally an adjournment application, if not, also, for the purpose of making submissions in respect of his appeal on the merits. It is, of course, possible to envisage circumstances where someone might suffer from an overwhelming, yet transient, condition which does, albeit temporarily, render them unfit to appear at Court so as to prosecute their appeal. But one should not be left to speculate on such subjects. Finally, it must be said also, that the medical certificate concerned is not the subject of sworn or affirmed evidence. All in all, the medical evidence is, in my view, quite unsatisfactory as a basis for the support of an adjournment application.
[10] Whether or not to adjourn the hearing of the appeal calls for the exercise of a discretion. It is not only the medical evidence, such as it is, which is relevant in that regard. The Full Court’s judgment in Luck at [43] – [46] offers a reminder of this in the references by the Full Court to wider considerations which attend the question of whether or not any adjournment should be granted. These are no new subjects but they are worth repeating.
[11] Any adjournment will necessarily result in an opportunity cost in terms of the public resources invested in the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth in the hearing of a proceeding. By that I mean, were the case to be adjourned, it would then fall for listing on a day to the exclusion of some other case, which might otherwise have been heard on that day. That such a consideration is relevant was highlighted in Luck in the reference to Sali v SPC Limited (1993) 116 ALR 625 at 629, where Brennan, Deane and McHugh JJ observed that a Court is entitled to be conscious of:
… the effect of an adjournment on Court resources and the competing claims by litigants in other cases awaiting hearing in the Court, as well as the interests of the parties.
[12] Luck also offers a reminder in the reference at [44], [45] and [46] to Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 that, quite apart from having to the consumption of public resources, a costs order is not necessarily palliative.
[13] The result then is one where there is not, in my view, any sufficient foundation for a conclusion that the appellant is unable because of some particularised medical condition to attend at Court today to prosecute his appeal. It is just a case where he is not present to prosecute that appeal. That being so, there is a want in the prosecution of the appeal. That is, an event which entitles the Minister to apply for its dismissal. I dismiss the appeal accordingly, with costs.”
Of particular note is the quoted part of the Judgement of Brennan, Deane and McHugh JJ in Sali v SPC Limited (1993) 116 ALR 625 at 629, relating to the effect that any adjournment would have upon Court resources, and the need for the claims of other parties in proceedings waiting to be heard to be taken into account, as well as the interests of the applicant for the adjournment.
The Court acknowledges that the appellant in the proceeding before Logan J was not present before the Court, whereas the applicant does appear by telephone for the purpose of today’s Court hearing. The presence of the applicant, however, does not ameliorate the fact that both the Court, and the first respondent, have been put in a position where the fair conduct of the hearing is unable to occur because the applicant has twice failed to comply with orders of the Court requiring the applicant to file a duly particularised amended application for review.
The conduct of a fair hearing is fundamental to the Court performing its judicial functions. In DUN16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor and DUO16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 2951 at paragraphs 4-9 inclusive, this Court referred to the difficulties of carrying out its judicial functions in circumstances where a filed application for review was wholly unparticularised. The judgement of the Court in DUN16 and DUO16 relevantly provided as follows:
“[4] Notwithstanding, with the greatest of respect, that this Court doubted whether it was a fulfilment of its judicial role, or the performance of a judicial function, for the Court to enter upon the endeavour of attempting to elicit from the applicant particulars of the applicant’s case, and then, of necessity, recording such particulars in a coherent form and for the applicant’s benefit, the Court nevertheless attempted to do so, so as to enable the matter to proceed to a final hearing. The Court, in that regard, was concerned that it could be the subject of adverse later criticism, perhaps, for:
a) erroneously appreciating the import of anything said by an applicant in response to the Court’s request for particulars;
b) failing to so formulate, in writing, what was said by the applicant in a way most advantageous to such applicant;
c) not accurately recording some of, or what the Court might have considered an irrelevant part of, the particulars orally provided to the Court by the applicant.
[5] The Court was concerned that, in effect, it was being required to become the applicant’s advocate or adviser, at the risk of assuming all of the attendant responsibilities which that entailed. The Court was also concerned that the exercise would, in a practical sense, leave the Court open to having any subsequent decision it might make in the matter overturned on any number of grounds associated with the process of the Court:
a) advising the applicant as to the inadequacy of the particulars of their grounds for review;
b) asking the applicant to explain what her complaints were concerning the adverse decision she was seeking to review;
c) recording the answers of the applicant to the Court’s questions;
d) evaluating such of the applicant's answers for the purpose of identifying what were or were not legitimate grounds of review;
e) recording, in writing, what the Court considered were the applicant’s legitimate grounds for review.
[6] In the case of Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375 at [309] – [316] inclusive, Beazley JA (with whom Giles and Whealy JJA agreed) said as follows:
“[309] Courts have an overriding duty to ensure that a trial is fair: Dietrich v R [1992] HCA 57; 177 CLR 292. This entails ensuring that the trial is conducted fairly and in accordance with law: MacPherson v The Queen [1981] HCA 46; 147 CLR 512 per Gibbs CJ and Wilson J at [16] 525. The duty reposes in the individual judicial officer hearing a case. In the context of an unrepresented litigant, the duty requires that a person does not suffer a disadvantage from exercising the recognised right of a litigant to be self-represented: R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91 at 94-95. In MacPherson Mason J, at [31] 534, noted that:
"A trial in which a judge allows an accused to remain in ignorance of a fundamental procedure which, if invoked, may prove to be advantageous to him, can hardly be labelled as 'fair'."
[310] However, the Court's duty is not solely to the unrepresented litigant. The obligation is to ensure a fair trial for all parties. For this reason, the duty is usually stated in terms that require that the impartial function of the judge is preserved, whilst also requiring the judge to intervene where necessary to ensure the trial is fair and just: Tomasevic v Travaglini [2007] VSC 337; 17 VR 100 at [95]; Barghouthi v Transfield Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 666; 122 FCR 19, 23; NAGA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 944, [11]; Nagy v Ryan [2003] SASC 37, [52]-[53].
[311] Insofar as the duty relates specifically to an unrepresented party, it has been said that a trial judge has an obligation to take appropriate steps to ensure that the unrepresented litigant has sufficient information about the practice and procedure of the Court, so far as is reasonably practicable for the purpose of ensuring a fair trial. The application of that principle will vary depending upon the circumstances of the case: Jae Kyung Lee v Bob Chae-Sang Cha per Basten JA at [48]. See also Abram v Bank of New Zealand (1996) ATPR 41-507, 43,341, 43,347; Microsoft Corporation v Ezy Loans Pty Ltd (2004) 63 IPR 54; Pezos v Police (2005) 94 SASR 154.
[312] Although the duty of a trial judge to assist an unrepresented litigant is cast in active terms, it does not extend to advising the accused as to how his or her rights should be exercised: R v Gidley (1984) 3 NSWLR 168. Rather, the judge has to put the unrepresented litigant in the position of being able to make an effective choice, a duty which applies notwithstanding the adversarial character of a criminal trial: McPherson per Mason J at 534. The duty is the same in a civil proceeding, with such modifications as are called for to take account of civil procedures. However, it is not the function of the Court to give judicial advice to, or conduct the case on behalf of, the unrepresented litigant: Bhagwanani v Martin (1999) 204 LSJS 449; [1999] SASC 406 ; Clark v State of New South Wales (No 2) [ 2006] NSWSC 914.
[313] The touchstone at all times remains that of fairness. In Rajski v Scitec Corporation Pty Ltd (Court of Appeal, 16 June 1986, unreported) Samuels JA, at 14, stated:
"But the Court should be astute to see that it does not extend its auxiliary role so as to confer upon a litigant in person a positive advantage over the represented opponent ... At all events, the absence of legal representation on one side ought not to induce a Court to deprive the other side of one jot of its lawful entitlement ... An unrepresented party is as much subject to the rules as any other litigant."
[314] Thus, a trial judge is entitled to reprimand an unrepresented litigant if the judge believes that the litigant is trifling with the Court: see Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263 at 283 per Meagher JA; Michael v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 100 at [64] per Steytler P (McLure JA and Miller AJA agreeing); Jae Kyung Lee v Bob Chae-Sang Cha at [84] per Basten JA.
[315] There may be a fine tension in striking the balance between providing assistance to an unrepresented litigant and ensuring a fair trial for all parties. However, it is the task of the judge to strike that balance. In Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 84 FCR 438 at 446 the Full Federal Court dealt with the tension between the duty of the trial judge to ensure a fair trial and the requirement of impartiality:
"A trial judge often faces something of a dilemma. While he or she may be bound to provide some advice and assistance to an unrepresented litigant, the authorities make it clear that the Judge should not intervene to such an extent that he or she cannot maintain a position of neutrality in the litigation: Burwood Municipal Council v Harvey (1995) 86 LGERA 389 at 397 (NSW CA), per Kirby P. However, the boundaries of legitimate intervention are flexible and will be influenced by the need for intervention to ensure a fair and just trial: Panagopoulos v Southern Healthcare Network (unreported, Supreme Court, Vic, Smith J, 15 September 1997) at 6."
[316] The position can be stated no more clearly than reiterating that the judge must remain at all times the impartial adjudicator of the matter, measured against the touchstone of fairness.”
[7] In DEZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 240, Flick J, sitting on appeal, was there dealing with a contention that a Federal Circuit Court judge had, in that matter, failed to ensure that the hearing was fair, and that the appellant (applicant) did not “suffer a disadvantage from exercising his or her right to be self-represented”. It was further contended that the primary judge “failed to take appropriate steps to ensure that an unrepresented litigant has sufficient information about the practice and procedure of the Court”. The contention was that it was a requirement imposed upon the primary judge to “explain in plain terms to unrepresented litigants that they must identify why the Tribunal’s decision was not made lawfully and by a fair process” and that it is “not enough to merely say that they must demonstrate jurisdictional error”.
[8] When considering the above contentions, Flick J at [37] noted the undesirability of a judge imposing himself upon the proceedings, as an advisor or advocate for an unrepresented party, when His Honour said:
“[37] Although each case must inevitably depend upon its own facts and circumstances, it is to be doubted that a primary Judge is required to explain to an unrepresented party “why the Tribunal’s decision was not made lawfully.” The task imposed upon a Judge at first instance is not to act as an advisor or advocate for the unrepresented party. That contention of the Appellant, expressed in such unqualified terms, is rejected.”
[9] For a judge to not only elicit information from an applicant orally for the purpose of particularising the applicant’s grounds for review, but to then necessarily have to formulate and record the judge’s assessment of what was said orally by the applicant, goes far beyond providing advice to the applicant as to matters of practice and procedure. It blurs the lines between the judge’s duty to remain impartial, and the judge’s duty to ensure a fair hearing. It is this Court’s view that it is not in the interests of justice for a judge to be so integrally involved in the formulation of one party’s case.
The Court is also mindful of the judgement in Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 at 111-113 inclusive where their Honours Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ said:
“[111] An application for leave to amend a pleading should not be approached on the basis that a party is entitled to raise an arguable claim, subject to payment of costs by way of compensation. There is no such entitlement. All matters relevant to the exercise of the power to permit amendment should be weighed. The fact of substantial delay and wasted costs, the concerns of case management, will assume importance on an application for leave to amend. Statements in J L Holdings which suggest only a limited application for case management do not rest upon a principle which has been carefully worked out in a significant succession of cases. On the contrary, the statements are not consonant with this Court's earlier recognition of the effects of delay, not only upon the parties to the proceedings in question, but upon the Court and other litigants. Such statements should not be applied in the future.
[112] A party has the right to bring proceedings. Parties have choices as to what claims are to be made and how they are to be framed. But limits will be placed upon their ability to effect changes to their pleadings, particularly if litigation is advanced. That is why, in seeking the just resolution of the dispute, reference is made to parties having a sufficient opportunity to identify the issues they seek to agitate.
[113] In the past it has been left largely to the parties to prepare for trial and to seek the Court's assistance as required. Those times are long gone. The allocation of power, between litigants and the Courts arises from tradition and from principle and policy. It is recognised by the Courts that the resolution of disputes serves the public as a whole, not merely the parties to the proceedings.”
For the reasons set out in DUN16 and DUO16, this Court considers that it is not possible to properly carry out its judicial functions in a fair manner in the absence of a properly particularised application for review being before the Court.
In that regard, the Court is mindful of the provisions of s. 3(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act1999 (Cth) which provided as follows:
3 Objects
(1)The main object of this Act is to continue in existence the Federal Magistrates Court created under Chapter III of the Constitution as the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.
(2) The other objects of this Act are:
(a)to enable the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to operate as informally as possible in the exercise of judicial power; and
(b)to enable the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to use streamlined procedures; and
(c)to encourage the use of a range of appropriate dispute resolution processes.
(emphasis added)
For the reasons set out in DUN16, it is not possible, in the exercise of this Court’s judicial power, for the Court to effectively act as the applicant’s advocate in both formulating, and then recording, and then adjudicating upon, what the Court might consider to be grounds of review open to the applicant, and which might appropriately be the subject of judicial consideration. That is particularly so in circumstances where, having done so, the Court would necessarily be so conflicted that it would be prevented from hearing and determining the applications of the applicant, simply because it would be seeking to determine a case advanced on behalf of the applicant which has been formulated by the Court itself.
At the outset of the hearing today, Mr McLaren indicated to the Court that his instructions were to seek that the matter be determined based upon the substantive issues raised in the application. For the very reasons set out above, the Court cannot determine what the substantive issues might be, in the absence of adequate particularisation of the grounds of the originating application for review.
As was noted by the Court in DUN16, and as has on numerous occasions been brought to the attention of lawyers who act for the first respondent in matters such as the present, this Court considers it the responsibility of the lawyers who appear on behalf of the first respondent to take such steps, as early as possible, so as to regularise the question of the provision of particularised grounds of review where, in a proceeding such as the present, an un-particularised application for review has been filed. In that regard, the Court notes that the application for review in this matter was filed approximately one year and three months ago. No attempt to appropriately regularise the proceedings has been undertaken by the lawyers for the first respondent.
In the light of the above, the Court finds that the applicant was in default of both the order of the Court made on 12 November 2019 and, more recently, the order of the Court made on 14 April 2020. The Court does not accede to the applicant’s request that a further adjournment of the hearing be granted.
The Court recognises that the applicant is a self-represented litigant who required the assistance of an interpreter during the course of Court hearings. The Court also recognises, however, that the Court extended particular latitude to the applicant, subsequent to his non-compliance with two Court orders, when the matter was last mentioned before the Court. The Court gave to the applicant even further time to comply with the orders of the Court. There is a limit to which Courts are able to indulge applicants in proceedings such as this without interfering with the due administration of justice. This is one such case.
The Court further notes that during the course of the whole hearing today, the dialogue between the parties and the Court, as well as the reasons for the Court, were all contemporaneously translated by the interpreter to the applicant.
That was done in circumstances where Exhibit 1 constituted a concession on the part of the applicant that he had failed to comply with the Court's orders, and further, that at the end of the letter, the applicant wrote:
But it is totally depending on honourable Court what decision will make about me. I will accept it.
It is clear that the applicant knew of his responsibility to comply with the orders of the Court, but that he had not done so in circumstances where no adequate explanation for his failure to comply with such orders has been advanced.
In those circumstances, and for the above reasons, the Court dismisses the originating application for review filed on 25 January 2019 pursuant to the provisions of rule 13.03B(1)(a) and (c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules.
I certify that the preceding thirty-two (32) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Egan
Associate:
Date: 29 April 2020
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