AHN17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AHN17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1598

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal:  AHN17 v Minister for Immigration and Anor (No.2) [2017] FCCA 1516
File number: NSD 1152 of 2017
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 24 October 2018
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia refusing to reinstate an application for judicial review dismissed for non-appearance – whether leave to appeal should be granted – whether the primary judge’s exercise of discretion under r 16.05 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) miscarried due to the primacy given to the merits of the substantive application and a failure to consider delay and prejudice – whether the new grounds sought to be raised on appeal before this Court have sufficient merit to warrant leave

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – non-appearance by an applicant – application dismissed pursuant to r 13.03C(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules – nature of the discretion afforded under r 16.05 to set aside orders made in the absence of a party

Held:  application dismissed

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H(1), 5J(1)(a), 5J(1)(c), 36(2B)(c)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 13.03C(1)(c), 16.05

Cases cited:

AAI15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1110

ACK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1554

BAL17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 792

Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424

CLL16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 348

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Gallo v Dawson (No 2) (1992) 109 ALR 319

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 92 ALJR 780

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 244

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 (2017) 253 FCR 475

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220

MZKAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1066

MZYEZv Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530

Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513

SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18

SZUFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No. 2) [2015] FCCA 545

Date of hearing: 23 August 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 49
Counsel for the Applicant:  Mr I Neil SC with Mr T Liu (Pro Bono)
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr P Knowles
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to the question of costs
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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1598
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of AHN17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which had dismissed an application for judicial review due to the applicant's non-appearance. The applicant argued that the Federal Circuit Court judge had misapplied the relevant principles in exercising discretion under r 16.05 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). Specifically, the applicant claimed that the judge placed undue emphasis on the merits of the substantive application and failed to adequately consider delay and prejudice to the Minister. Additionally, the applicant sought to raise new grounds before the court, arguing that they had sufficient merit to warrant leave.

The court was required to decide whether the primary judge's exercise of discretion was flawed and whether the new grounds had sufficient merit. The applicant argued that the primary judge should have considered the principles outlined in Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc, which include assessing the reason for non-appearance, the delay in applying to set aside the order, the potential prejudice to the Minister, and the arguable case on the merits. The applicant claimed that the judge did not properly weigh these factors and thus misapplied the discretion. The court also needed to determine if the new grounds had sufficient merit to warrant an appeal.

The court found that the new ground raised by the applicant was without merit, and thus it would be futile to allow the appeal. The court held that it would be inappropriate to set aside the orders dismissing the application. The applicant's contention that the primary judge misapplied the principles by overstating the primacy of the merits without considering delay and prejudice was rejected. The court concluded that the primary judge's approach was not erroneous, as the principles were considered in context and not in isolation. The court also found that the new grounds did not have sufficient merit to warrant an appeal.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent. This decision underscores the importance of correctly applying the principles relevant to setting aside orders made in the absence of a party and highlights the stringent criteria required for granting leave to appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For those reasons I consider the new ground raised by the applicant is without merit. It would, accordingly, be futile to allow the appeal and set aside the orders dismissing the application. CONCLUSION The application must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Relying upon Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 (at 398-399), the applicant contends a grant of leave to appeal is warranted as the Federal Circuit Court’s decision is attended with sufficient doubt because the primary judge erred by incorrectly applying the principles relevant to that Court’s discretion to set aside an order made in the absence of a party. In particular, it is said his Honour overstated the primacy of the merits of the substantive application for judicial review without referring to or weighing the issue of delay (or lack thereof) in bringing the application and the issue of prejudice to the Minister if the orders made were set aside. Further, substantial injustice is said would result if leave to appeal is refused because the applicant has an arguable case on the merits of his application for judicial review. The applicant relies on SZUFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No. 2) [2015] FCCA 545, where Judge Driver (at [14]) restated the principles applicable to the Federal Circuit Court’s power to set aside an order made in the absence of a party as follows:(a)whether there is an adequate reason for the non-appearance;(b)whether there is no delay in making the application to set aside;(c)whether the party, in whose favour orders have been made, would be prejudiced by a new hearing in any respect which could not be adequately compensated for by a suitable award of costs or by the giving of security for costs; and(d)whether there is an arguable case on the merits of the substantive application. The applicant contends that the primary judge in this case misstated the applicable principles by omitting any reference to delay in bringing the application and prejudice to the Minister. His Honour stated that, aside from the applicant’s excuse for non-appearance, ‘the more important issue in the present case are the merits’. The applicant contends that although the merits were undoubtedly important in determining how the Federal Circuit Court should have exercised its discretion, it was one factor that needed to be weighed against the other three identified in the authorities. By not identifying the relevant principles and by not weighing the relevant considerations against each other as required, it is said the primary judge erred. The applicant then deals with the merits, referring to the IAA’s finding (at [34]) of its decision that it had ‘considerable doubt’ about the applicant’s claims concerning an ongoing risk of harm to the applicant from his fiancée’s family in relation to the acid attack. However, the balance of the IAA’s reasoning (at [34]), the applicant says, indicates that it could not express its findings ‘without any real doubt about the risk of harm’. Therefore, the applicant says, as required by the principle in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam(1999) 93 FCR 220 per Sackville J (at [63]), the IAA engaged in the ‘reasonable speculation’ required of it by considering the counter-factual of the applicant’s claim on the basis that it did accept a risk of harm from the fiancée’s family. The IAA (at [34]) said that:… even if I were to accept that the applicant faces a risk of being harmed by the family of his fiancée in his home area, I am not satisfied that the risk of harm relates to the whole of Egypt and I consider that it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to another area, such as Cairo, where he lived for over twelve months before coming to Australia.