FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ACK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1554
Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal: ACK16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 3067 File number: VID 98 of 2018
VID 639 of 2018Judge: MCKERRACHER J Date of judgment: 17 October 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – proceedings commenced by way of an application for extension of time and leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia refusing to set aside an order dismissing an application for non-appearance and, subsequently, by way of an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) – where the applicant received no hearing – consideration of the discretion afforded under r 16.05 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) – consideration of MZYEZ – where reinstatement was appropriate applying the ‘fundamental principle’ identified by Rich J in Cameron v Cole
Held: appeal allowed; and
s 39B application dismissedLegislation: Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 16.05
Cases cited: Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SZFDE (2006) 154 FCR 365
MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530
Date of hearing: 9 May 2018 and 17 August 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 40 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Aleksov Solicitor for the Applicant: WLW Migration Lawyers Counsel for the Minister on 9 May 2018: Ms N Campbell Counsel for the Minister on 17 August 2018: Mr C McDermott Solicitor for the Minister: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Federal Circuit Court: The Federal Circuit Court submits to any order of the Court, save as to the question of costs Counsel for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal: The Administrative Appeals Tribunal did not appear ORDERS
VID 98 of 2018 BETWEEN: ACK16
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MCKERRACHER J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 OCTOBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.An extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal is allowed.
2.The applicant have leave to appeal.
3.The appeal be allowed.
4.The initial application for an extension of time for judicial review be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for hearing.
5.Unless there is a consent minute on costs,
(a)the applicant file written submissions on costs not exceeding two pages within seven days;
(b)the first respondent file written submissions on costs not exceeding two pages within a further seven days;
(c)the applicant file written submissions in reply within a further seven days; and
(d)costs be determined on the papers.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
VID 639 of 2018 BETWEEN: ACK16
Applicant
AND: FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
First RespondentMINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1554
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Federal Circuit Court had not misapplied its discretion. The primary judge considered the three factors outlined in MZYEZ, and the court found that the Federal Circuit Court's decision was not unreasonable or plainly unjust. The court also noted that even if there was a reasonable excuse for the absence, the Court will not exercise its discretion in the party's favour if there is little or no prospect of that party's succeeding on the substantive claim. The court concluded that the Federal Circuit Court's decision was correct and dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The court further noted that the principles controlling a discretion whether or not to reinstate a proceeding are not identical to the principles going to whether leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment ought to be granted. However, the court did not perceive that the application of those requirements would result in any different outcome in this case.
The court allowed the appeal and dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The court ordered that the application be dismissed on the basis only that the application in VID 98 of 2018 was allowed. The court further ordered that unless there is a consent minute on costs, the applicant file written submissions on costs not exceeding two pages within seven days, the first respondent file written submissions on costs not exceeding two pages within a further seven days, the applicant file written submissions in reply within a further seven days, and costs be determined on the papers.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed on the basis only that the application in VID 98 of 2018 was allowed.
2. Unless there is a consent minute on costs,
(a) the applicant file written submissions on costs not exceeding two pages within seven days;
(b) the first respondent file written submissions on costs not exceeding two pages within a further seven days;
(c) the applicant file written submissions in reply within a further seven days; and
(d) costs be determined on the papers.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant sought that the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal be heard concurrently with the substantive grounds of appeal. That course was pursued. CONSIDERATION This was and is a most unusual case. Rule 16.05 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) relevantly provides:16.05 Setting aside or varying judgments or orders (1)The Court or a Registrar may vary or set aside a judgment or order before it has been entered. (2)The Court or a Registrar may vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered if: (a)it was made in the absence of a party; or …(3)This rule does not affect the power of the Court or a Registrar to vary or terminate the operation of an order by a further order. (Emphasis added.) The primary judge’s analysis accord with the steps outlined by Ryan J in MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530. Ryan J said (at [7]-[10]):Principles governing an application for reinstatement7In circumstances where, as in the present case, a proceeding has been dismissed in a party’s absence and reinstatement is sought, a discretion falls to be exercised by the court before which the application for reinstatement is returnable. That discretion requires the consideration of three factors, and whether, on balance, they tend for or against the reinstatement. Those factors are:(a)whether there was a reasonable excuse for the party’s absence from the hearing in which the proceeding was struck out; (b)the existence and nature of any prejudice which might flow to the other party from the reinstatement, and the extent, if any, to which that prejudice can be assuaged by an adjournment, an order for costs or other relief which the court is empowered to grant; (c)whether the applicant has a reasonably arguable prospect of success on the substantive application. As North J said in MZKAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multi-Cultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) FCA 1066 at [18]:The decision whether to reinstate the appeal depends, however, not only on the existence of a reasonable explanation for the need to adjourn the appeal, but also whether the appeal, if reinstated, has a reasonable chance of success. If not, there is no purpose in reinstatement[.](emphasis added [in original])8In this connection, a party’s absence is analogous to a party’s failure to file an originating document or notice of appeal, in that, even where a reasonable excuse for that delay or failure exists, the Court will not exercise its discretion in the party’s favour where there is little or no prospect of that party’s succeeding on the substantive claim: see Gallo v Dawson (No 2) (1992) 109 ALR 319 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ, at 319- 320. 9It should also be observed that the principles controlling a discretion whether or not to reinstate a proceeding are not identical to the principles going to whether leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment ought to be granted. However, I do not perceive that the application of those requirements – first, that the decision in question be attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration, and, secondly, that substantial injustice would flow were leave not granted (see Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397, per Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ, at 398) – would result in any different outcome in this case. Whether the learned Federal Magistrate’s discretion miscarried10It follows from what I have said that the decision whether or not to reinstate a proceeding is essentially discretionary, and so attracts the application of the principles stated as follows by Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, at 504 to 505, where their Honours said:But the judgment complained of, namely, sentence to a term of imprisonment depends upon the exercise of a judicial discretion by the court imposing it. The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but if, upon the facts, it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that, in some way, there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court at first instance.