FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AHG18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 410
Appeal from: AHG18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2018] FCCA 1630 File number: NSD 1232 of 2018 Judge: WHEELAHAN J Date of judgment: 26 March 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority failed to give proper consideration to information contained in country reports – whether inconsistency between the country information and the Authority’s findings – whether information was so significant as to require separate consideration by the Authority – no inconsistency on a fair reading of the information – appeal dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act1958 (Cth) s 36(2) Cases cited: BIL17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 6
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRK (2013) 212 FCR 99
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588
Date of hearing: 22 February 2019 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 22 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr D J McDonald-Norman Solicitor for the Appellant: Westside Legal Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms N Laing Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley Lawyers Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance ORDERS
NSD 1232 of 2018 BETWEEN: AHG18
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
WHEELAHAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 MARCH 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appellant have leave to rely upon the amended ground of appeal in the draft amended notice of appeal.
2.The appeal is dismissed.
3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed in default of agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
WHEELAHAN J:
Introduction
The appellant brings this appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia given on 20 June 2018 by which the Court dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) dated 30 November 2017. The Authority had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse the appellant’s application for a protection visa as he failed to meet the requirements in s 36(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
Background
The appellant arrived in Australia in October 2012, and claimed to be a stateless Bidoon who was born in Kuwait. The Authority identified that in support of his application for a protection visa the appellant claimed that his parents were born in Kuwait and were stateless, and that his father had served in the Kuwaiti army and had been imprisoned in Iraq during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The appellant claimed that he and his family…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 410
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the IAA had failed to give proper consideration to the information in the country reports concerning the 'makremiayah' process and whether the appellant's acquisition of Iraqi citizenship through this process was legally unreasonable. The appellant's counsel argued that the IAA had not adequately considered the declaration requirement for Bidoons to renounce association with Kuwait, as outlined in the DFAT reports, and that this failure led to an inconsistency in the IAA's findings. The court also had to consider whether the appellant's citizenship through the 'makremiayah' process was legally unreasonable in the absence of evidence that the declaration requirement did not exclude him from becoming a citizen of Iraq.
The court dismissed the appeal, finding that there was no inconsistency between the country information and the IAA's findings on a fair reading of the information. The court held that the DFAT reports referred to a process prior to 2003 whereby Bidoons, including those born in Kuwait, could become Iraqi citizens if they renounced, or at least did not declare Kuwait as their place of birth. The court found that the IAA had reasonably inferred that the appellant and his family had become Iraqi citizens through the 'makremiayah' process based on circumstantial evidence. The court also noted that the declaration requirement was not so significant as to require separate consideration by the IAA, as it was implicit in the primary inference that the necessary steps had been taken. Consequently, the court found that the IAA's decision was not legally unreasonable.
The final orders of the court were that the appellant be granted leave to rely upon the amended ground of appeal in the draft amended notice of appeal, that the appeal be dismissed, and that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal, to be assessed in default of agreement. The entry of orders was governed by Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appellant have leave to rely upon the amended ground of appeal in the draft amended notice of appeal.
2. The appeal is dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed in default of agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Third, and alternatively, counsel for the appellant submitted that the Authority’s decision was legally unreasonable because no rational or logical decision-maker would have reached the conclusion that the appellant had become a citizen of Iraq as part of the ‘makremiayah’ process without evidence to suggest that the declaration requirement did not exclude the appellant from becoming a citizen of Iraq. Consideration of any such evidence should have been disclosed by the Authority’s reasons, and there was no consideration of the declaration requirement disclosed by the Authority’s reasons. During the course of argument counsel for the appellant clarified that if the Court were to infer that the declaration requirement had been taken into account, then the appellant did not submit that the result was legally unreasonable.ConsiderationLeave to raise new arguments on appeal Leave is required to raise a new argument on appeal: VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588 at [46]-[48]. In view of the fact that the Minister did not oppose leave, the fact that the appellant was unrepresented before the Federal Circuit Court, that the arguments advanced in support of the proposed ground appeared to have some merit, and because of the potential substantial injustice to the appellant should leave not be given, I gave leave to the appellant at the hearing of the appeal to raise the new arguments captured by the amended ground of appeal.The ground of appeal I am not persuaded that the Authority erred by overlooking or failing to give proper consideration to the information in the Country reports concerning the ‘makremiayah’ process. The requirement referred to in the DFAT reports that Bidoons had to declare that Kuwait was not their place of birth, was explained in paragraph [3.84] of the 2015 DFAT report as a requirement that they had to renounce association with Kuwait, and at paragraph [3.85] of the 2015 DFAT report and paragraph [3.58] of the 2017 DFAT report as a requirement that they do not declare “Kuwait” as a place of birth. I do not consider that these requirements are to be equated with birth in Kuwait as disqualifying Bidoons born in Kuwait from becoming Iraqi citizens. Rather, I consider that fairly understood, the DFAT reports refer to a process that existed prior to 2003 whereby Bidoons, including those born in Kuwait, could become Iraqi citizens if they renounced, or at least did not declare Kuwait as their place of birth. For these reasons, I do not accept the appellant’s submission that there was an inconsistency between the Authority’s acceptance that Kuwait was the appellant’s place of birth, and the requirements to attain Iraqi citizenship under the ‘makremiayah’ process that were described in the DFAT reports. It follows that I do not accept that any reconciliation of these features of the material before the Authority was required. The Authority inferred that the appellant and his family had become Iraqi citizens by reference to the combination of a number of circumstantial facts, the principal ones being those referred to in paragraphs [5]-[6] above. The Authority’s conclusion that it was highly likely that the appellant and his family were granted Iraqi citizenship prior to 2003 as part of the ‘makremiayah’ process carried with it a subsidiary finding that the appellant and his family had taken the steps that were required to avail themselves of this process. Those steps were not so significant that the Authority was required to give them detailed consideration beyond inferring that the steps were necessarily taken, which was implicit in the primary inference that the Authority drew. In the circumstances, it was not necessary for the Authority to make separate findings about such detail: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593 at [46]-[47].