BGE17 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BGE17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2019] FCCA 1291
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for review of decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) – whether the IAA failed to consider a claim expressly made by the applicant – whether the IAA had regard to an irrelevant consideration or asked itself the wrong question or otherwise committed jurisdictional error – whether the IAA failed to consider all possible forms of statutorily defined significant harm when assessing the reasonableness of relocation – whether the IAA failed to consider the operation of s.5J(6) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in relation to the applicant’s conduct in Australia – none of the grounds made out – no jurisdictional error revealed – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5, 5J, 36, 476, 477

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.2.05, 2.07A

Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114;

(2013) 230 FCR 431; (2013) 136 ALD 547

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous

Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593; (2003) 75 ALR 630;

(2003) 75 ALD 630

AHG18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 410

NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2)

[2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1; (2004) 219 ALR 27

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

[2003] HCA 26; (2003) 214 CLR 496; (2003) 77 ALJR 1088;

(2003) 197 ALR 389; (2003) 73 ALD 321

SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 46;

(2009) 174 FCR 415

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34;

(2018) 92 ALJR 780; (2018) 359 ALR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA; CQZ15 v Minister

for Immigration and Border Protection; BEG15 v Minister for Immigration and

Border Protection [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 93 ALJR 252; (2019) 363 ALR 599

Applicant: BGE17
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
File Number: SYG 878 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Nicholls
Hearing date: 9 April 2019
Date of Last Submission: 9 April 2019
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 16 May 2019

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S. Tully
Solicitors for the Applicant: Ryburn Solicitors
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms N. Laing
Solicitors for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

  1. The application made on 22 March 2017 is dismissed.

  2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $7206.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 878 of 2017

BGE17

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 21 March 2017 the applicant electronically lodged with the Court’s registry an application made pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) seeking review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“IAA”) made on 14 February…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCCA 1291
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In BGE17 v Minister for Immigration, Judge Nicholls of the Federal Court of Australia considered an application for review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The applicant sought to challenge the IAA's assessment of their claims for protection, alleging that the IAA had failed to consider a specific claim made by the applicant, had regard to irrelevant considerations, asked itself the wrong question, and failed to consider all possible forms of statutorily defined significant harm when assessing the reasonableness of relocation. The applicant also contended that the IAA had not properly considered the operation of section 5J(6) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) in relation to their conduct in Australia.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether the IAA had committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider all relevant claims and considerations, and whether its assessment of the reasonableness of relocation was flawed. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the IAA was obliged to consider theoretical possibilities of harm beyond those advanced by the applicant, and whether the applicant's stated objections to relocation, including financial responsibilities, lack of education and employment experience, absence of social support networks, and potential lack of acceptance by the Hazara community, were adequately addressed.

Judge Nicholls, referencing *SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship*, held that the IAA was not obliged to consider all theoretical possibilities of harm, but rather was bound by the evidence and claims advanced by the applicant. The Court found that the IAA had considered the entirety of the applicant's claims and objections to relocation, including the applicant's statutory declaration detailing the poor security situation throughout Afghanistan and his inability to support himself and his family. The IAA's findings regarding significant harm were based on the same factual basis as its findings concerning serious harm, and it was not required to repeat all factual findings under different headings. The Court concluded that none of the grounds of review were made out, and no jurisdictional error was revealed.

Consequently, the application for review was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As was, with respect, made clear in SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 46 at [123]–[124] (per Tracy and Foster JJ):“123. The Tribunal considered relocation in a framework dictated by the evidence and claims advanced to it by the appellant. It was not obliged to consider all theoretical possibilities including the question of whether or not the appellant would continue to behave in a way which might attract persecution from different Islamic fundamentalists. Two, in that light regard must also be had to the entirety of the IAA’s consideration. For example, as set out above findings of fact made by the IAA under different headings in its decision record are available and may be “imported” into the consideration under the heading of “Real risk of significant harm” (CB 322.3). As the respondent’s counsel submitted in the current case there is no suggestion that the IAA was unaware of the “various means” by which a person may suffer significant harm (see the IAA’s references in [35], and see also [37]). In this regard also I note that the IAA found that the same factual basis for its finding that the applicant would suffer serious harm in his home or local area, applied to its finding that he would also suffer significant harm in his home or local area (see [36] – “[f]or the same reason”). There was no need in making this finding for the IAA to repeat all those findings of fact which it had set out earlier in its decision record which informed its finding as to the significant harm as it applied to the applicant’s home or local area. It is important therefore, to note exactly what the applicant claimed, and relevantly, what were his objections to relocation to Mazar–e–Sharif. In this regard, the applicant’s submissions before the Court were essentially focused on what the IAA did not consider in its decision record as compared with the items at s.36(2A), rather than what the IAA was obliged to consider as drawn from what had been put before it from the circumstances presented and arising. The applicant’s arguments as to why he could not relocate to another part of Afghanistan were set out at [27]–[29] of his Statutory Declaration:“27. I am unable to relocate to another part of Afghanistan as the security situation is poor throughout all areas of Afghanistan. His claimed inability to support himself can be understood in the context of “denied of an ability to subsist” (the Statutory Declaration at [22]). In submissions made on his behalf by his (first) migration agent the following “objections” to relocation were stated at [126] (CB 190):“126. It would not be reasonable for the Applicant to relocate to Kabul or elsewhere within Afghanistan as he is financially responsible for his wife, two children, mother and five siblings, has no formal education and has limited employment experience. Due to the Applicant’s, limited skill and work experience, being a farmer, stone worker and shop keeper, it is likely that he would be unable to re-establish himself, find employment and be unable to financially support himself or his family. The Applicant lacks familial and social support networks in another part of Afghanistan as his entire family resided in the Ghazni region. Furthermore, given the Applicant’s lack of family ties and years spent overseas, he will not be accepted as part of the Hazara community.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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