Adk15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ADK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2015] FCA 1187

Citation: ADK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1187
Appeal from: ADK15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor
[2015] FCCA 1493
Parties: ADK15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number(s): NSD 722 of 2015
Judge(s): BENNETT J
Date of judgment: 6 November 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appellant is a non-practising Muslim and agnostic – Tribunal rejected past claimed religious and political activism – Tribunal rejected future political and associated religious activism – Tribunal concluded that the appellant would not express his views publicly – whether the Tribunal failed to consider if there was a real risk of persecution if the appellant were to practise publicly and proselytise his agnosticism – whether the Tribunal failed to consider if the appellant’s choice to keep his agnostic views private was a voluntary choice uninfluenced by harm
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 65
Cases cited: Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473
Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 79 ALJR 1142
MZZJO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 80
Win v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 132
Date of hearing: 25 August 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 74
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Clark
Solicitor for the Appellant: Fragomen
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr HPT Bevan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 722 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

ADK15
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BENNETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 NOVEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders made on 1 June 2015 by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be set aside and, in lieu thereof, an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the second respondent made on 12 February 2015 in case number 1313226.

3.A writ of mandamus be issued, directed to the second respondent, requiring it hear and determine the application of the appellant for review of the decision of a delegate of the first respondent made on 8 August 2013 to refuse to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa according to law.

4.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 722 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

ADK15
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BENNETT J

DATE:

6 NOVEMBER 2015

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1187
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Adk15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a non-practising Muslim and self-identified agnostic, appealed a decision by the Tribunal which rejected his claim for a protection visa. The appellant argued that if returned to Iran, he would face persecution due to his agnostic beliefs and his past and potential future political activism. The Tribunal rejected the appellant's claims regarding his past political and religious activism, and his future potential political and religious activism. The Tribunal concluded that the appellant would not express his views publicly and, therefore, would not face persecution. The appellant's appeal focused on whether the Tribunal failed to consider the real risk of persecution if he were to practise his agnosticism publicly and proselytise his views, and whether the Tribunal overlooked whether his choice to keep his agnostic views private was influenced by the fear of harm.

The legal issues the court had to decide were whether the Tribunal erred by not considering if there was a real risk of persecution if the appellant were to practise and publicly express his agnostic beliefs, and whether the Tribunal failed to consider if the appellant's choice to keep his agnostic views private was a voluntary choice uninfluenced by the fear of harm. The court had to consider the principles set out in MZZJO, Appellant S395, and NABD, which address the evaluation of individual beliefs and the potential for subjective and objective fear of persecution. The court also had to examine the Tribunal's findings in light of the country information and the appellant's evidence.

The court found that the Tribunal did not err in its assessment of the appellant's future conduct in relation to his agnosticism. The Tribunal had considered the appellant's past and potential future conduct, and found that he would not engage in public demonstration or expression of his agnostic views. The court noted that the Tribunal had considered the appellant's evidence and the way in which his case was advanced, and found that his previous voluntary return to Iran indicated that he did not genuinely fear harm on account of his agnostic views. The court held that the Tribunal had correctly assessed the risk of harm based on the appellant's agnosticism and that it had not failed to consider the real risk of persecution if he were to practise his agnosticism publicly. The court also found that the Tribunal had not overlooked whether the appellant's choice to keep his agnostic views private was influenced by the fear of harm.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed. The orders made on 1 June 2015 by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia were set aside, and in lieu thereof, an order in the nature of certiorari was made to quash the decision of the second respondent made on 12 February 2015 in case number 1313226. A writ of mandamus was issued, directed to the second respondent, requiring it to hear and determine the application of the appellant for review of the decision of a delegate of the first respondent made on 8 August 2013 to refuse to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa according to law. The first respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made on 1 June 2015 by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be set aside and, in lieu thereof, an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the second respondent made on 12 February 2015 in case number 1313226.

3. A writ of mandamus be issued, directed to the second respondent, requiring it hear and determine the application of the appellant for review of the decision of a delegate of the first respondent made on 8 August 2013 to refuse to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa according to law.

4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appeal fundamentally relates to the finding by the Tribunal that, if he were returned to Iran, the appellant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution because of his agnosticism. The Tribunal found that the appellant would not publicly demonstrate or manifest his views and that merely failing to attend religious ceremonies would not mark him as an apostate. The appellant contends that, in considering his prior conduct in Iran, the Tribunal did not consider whether that conduct was shaped by the very persecution that he claimed to fear (cf Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473). Further, the appellant contends that the Tribunal failed to consider what his particular beliefs would motivate him to do and instead considered what agnosticism generally requires, contrary to the approach in Applicant NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 79 ALJR 1142 and MZZJO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 80.THE APPLICATION FOR A PROTECTION VISA AND THE DELEGATE’S DECISION In his application for a Protection visa, the appellant had relevantly stated: ·He was born a Muslim Shia but does not practise his religion. When he was growing up, he often questioned practices of Muslims and the meaning of the Koran.·In or around 2007, he had been arrested for being drunk and lashed by the police. The number of lashes were increased when the police saw that the appellant’s tattoo of a Zoroastrian symbol on his back.·He often searched for books with different theories regarding his religion and, in 2009, found some CDs which contained the text of prohibited books. The penalty for keeping such books is death.·In December 2010, he used his passport and travelled to Indonesia as a tourist. He stayed in Indonesia for about three months and then returned voluntarily to Iran in early 2011.·If he returns to Iran, he will be mistreated or harmed because of his actual and perceived political opinion as a dissenter of the present Iranian Government. This is because he distributed anti-Islamic and government texts.·In a separate assertion, if he returned to Iran, he would be mistreated or harmed because of his religious beliefs, as he does not practise as a Muslim Shiite. He would, also, be mistreated or harmed because he is agnostic and will question other peoples’ religious beliefs. The Delegate accepted that the appellant may be a non-practising Muslim and that he considers himself agnostic. The Delegate accepted that the appellant received a State-issued punishment for drinking alcohol and having a Zoroastrian tattoo but noted that there are no claims that these events continue to give him a profile of interest. In that regard, the Delegate noted that the appellant had been able to exit and enter Iran with no further adverse attention. The Delegate concluded that, given country information, non-practising Muslims are able to live in Iranian society without coming to the attention of the authorities and that nothing that the appellant has said, nor his previous actions, have indicated that he would come to the attention of authorities in the future. The Delegate concluded that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear on the basis of his non-practising of Islam.WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL HEARING

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submits that this is not a case in which the Tribunal found that the appellant will live discreetly in order to reduce a risk that would otherwise have been well-founded. Rather, he says, the Tribunal considered what the appellant would do if he were to return to Iran in so far as his agnosticism was concerned. It found that he would not engage in Mosque attendance or Islamic ritual, or in any overt demonstration of his agnostic views or lack of religious enthusiasm. Such a finding was consistent with the appellant’s evidence and the way in which his case was advanced. It was consistent with the fact that the appellant did not give any other evidence that, if he were to return to Iran, he would engage in any conduct that could be characterised as the promotion or promulgation of his agnostic beliefs publicly apart from his claimed, and rejected, political activities. It was also consistent with the evidence, as noted by the Tribunal, that the appellant’s previous voluntary return to Iran indicated that he does not genuinely fear harm on account of his long held agnostic views and lack of religious enthusiasm. That is, the Minister submits, the Tribunal did not err by failing to ask the correct question. It considered whether the appellant faced a real chance of serious harm based on his agnosticism if he were to return to Iran. Having regard to its findings as to the appellant’s future conduct in the light of the country information, the Tribunal found that he could not face any such risk of harm. CONSIDERATION Relevant principles have been set out in MZZJO, Appellant S395 and NABD.MZZJO In MZZJO, the Full Court pointed out that where the Tribunal is obliged to determine whether there is a subjective fear of persecution and that is rejected, it is not necessarily obliged to proceed to consider whether there is an objective fear in the absence of an ‘immutable attribute’ such as race or skin colour. That case, as here, included claimed agnosticism. The Full Court stated at [40] – [41]:One of the principal tasks in any review is for the Tribunal to determine as a matter of fact what it considered was likely to happen to an applicant on return to his or her country of nationality or habitual residence, irrespective of whether it believed her or his account of what had happened in the past. (citations omitted)In contrast, where a person’s fear of persecution on a Convention ground is claimed to arise out of factual circumstances particular to that person, which are said to have occurred in the past, or is based on a Convention attribute which is not immutable, a determination by the decision-maker as to the veracity of those claims may provide sufficient foundation for the necessary predictive and speculative exercise about what will happen to that person upon return to her or his country of nationality. The Full Court proceeded to examine the appellant’s agnosticism. It pointed out (at [47]) that the character of a religious belief, or adherence to a particular religion, is no different in character, for the purposes of the Convention, from holding a particular political opinion. It is an attribute held internally and manifested (or not) depending on choice, culture and custom. An evaluation for the purposes of Art 1A of the Convention, as implemented in s 36 of the Act, ‘is likely to involve questions about how the individual understands that belief, what it means to that individual, how she or he manifests that belief’. The questioning is of that particular individual’s belief rather than the standard of some standardised or assumed level of knowledge.