ADK15 v Minister for Immigration

[2015] FCCA 1493

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ADK15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2015] FCCA 1493

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Refugee Review Tribunal – Protection (class XA) visa – whether the Tribunal applied the correct test in determining the question of well-founded fear – no jurisdictional error – applicant dismissed.

Legislation:  

Migration Act 1958 s.476

NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 29
Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473

Applicant: ADK15

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 602 of 2015

Judgment of: Judge Street

Hearing date: 1 June 2015

Date of Last Submission: 1 June 2015

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 1 June 2015

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Clarke

Solicitors for the Applicant: Fragomen

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Bevan

Solicitors for the Respondent: Minter Ellison

ORDERS

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $6825.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AT SYDNEY

SYG 602 of 2015

ADK15

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. This is an application for a Constitutional writ within the Court’s jurisdiction under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 in respect of a decision of the Tribunal made on 12 February 2015 affirming a decision of a delegate not to grant the applicant a Protection (class XA) visa.  The application identified the following grounds:

   1. The Tribunal engaged in jurisdictional error by failing to ask itself the right question.

   Particulars

   a. The Tribunal failed to ask itself whether, were the applicant to practise his agnosticism in the way he chose to do so, there was a real risk of him being persecuted.

   b. Further and in the alternative, the Tribunal failed to ask itself whether the choice of the applicant to keep his agnostic views private was a voluntary choice uninfluenced by the fear of harm.

   c. Further and in the alternative, the Tribunal failed to ask itself why the applicant would not engage in any overt demonstration of his agnostic views or lack of religious enthusiasm.

2. Counsel for the applicant conceded that the Tribunal had asked itself the proper question consistent with Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473 in the context of making a finding as to what the applicant would do in respect of his agnostic beliefs and his alleged claim of fear of persecution in respect of his agnostic beliefs. It is clear that the Tribunal did make a finding as to what the applicant would do, and that was a finding made in the context of serious adverse credit findings that were clearly taking it into account on all matters as identified by the Tribunal as follows:

   71. I do not accept that the applicant has given a truthful account of circumstances and his experiences in Iran. I do not view the applicant as a witness of credit and therefore approach his evidence on all matters relevant to my decision with caution and scepticism

3. Effectively the argument for the applicant was that the Tribunal must have failed to ask itself what it was that the applicant wanted to do and that it should be either inferred that this was not the subject of consideration or that there was some diversion to be inferred from inquiring about whether the fears of the applicant were well founded.  The Tribunal’s reasons must be read as a whole and without an eye to error.  There is nothing in the chain of reasoning of the Tribunal that supports the Tribunal being diverted from inquiring about whether the fears which the applicant had were well founded in the context of the adverse findings that the Tribunal made about what the applicant would do.  There is no basis to infer any failure by the Tribunal in the determination of what the applicant would do and whether her fear was well-founded.

4. It was suggested that the Tribunal has posed questions in the abstract about the concept of agnosticism as an independent belief or religion.  I find that is not what the Tribunal did, and it is clear that the Tribunal’s attention was focused on the applicant’s claims and his alleged agnostic beliefs as identified in para.20:

   20. I asked the applicant if his agnostic beliefs had ever caused any specific problems for him, noting that country information before me from DFAT suggested that many young Iranians are disillusioned with the Islamic state and do not publicly participate in religious activities. The applicant said that he wouldn’t dare to have publicly disclosed his agnosticism in Iran because doing so would be to sign one’s death warrant. I asked the applicant again if the inability to go into the street and declare his agnosticism had ever caused him any particular problems. I suggested to the applicant that having agnostic beliefs doesn’t require people with those beliefs to go out and can declare them publicly. The applicant agreed that such matters can be kept in one’s own heart. The applicant said he was like this before certain things happened to him in Iran.

5. It is also clear that the role of the applicant’s agnostic beliefs were squarely identified in the applicant’s submissions, which the Tribunal carefully identified, taking into account in para.45.  The Tribunal properly identified the relevant law in relation to the determination of whether the applicant had a well-founded fear, and I reject the argument that it was necessary for the Tribunal to make an independent preliminary finding about what it was the applicant wants to do.  As counsel for the applicant conceded, the finding of what the applicant would do as made by the Tribunal consistent with its obligation was a finding that follows from having considered what it is that the applicant had identified he wanted to do. 

6. The applicant’s evidence in this regard was properly conceded to have been accurately summarised by the Tribunal, and no criticism was made of the Tribunal in respect of that summary.  The transcript was put into evidence and relevantly identifies the following questions:

   Member: Right, because what I wanted to ask you is using the term Agnosticism, has that of itself ever caused you any problem in Iran, or are you like all the other Iranian people who can hold those views privately provided they don’t cross the line?

   Interpreter: Meaning that we can say we are not Muslims in Iran?

   Member: Um no well I know you-you wouldn’t, but has that ever caused you any difficulty? Have you ever been motivated to go out in the street and declare that you’re not Muslim?

   Interpreter: I didn’t dare do such a thing, because if you do that of course you will sign your death penalty actually.

   Member: What what I’d suggest is that if you have Agnostic views that doesn’t compel you to go out and declare them publicly.

   Interpreter: They can keep it in their own heart and they will-they follow that uh kind of life you want.

   But I was like that before these things happen to me in Iran, I was born in this way actually.

   Member: In-in that regards, are you like many people in Iran?

   Applicant: Yes

   …

   Member: Okay, um I just want to return briefly to the issue about religion in Iran.

   And just I wanted to see if you wanted to make any comment about what the Delegate said.

   The Delegate and you know what I mean by the Delegate- the the Department of Immigration Officer who made the first decision to refuse your Protection Visa?

   Now they draw attention to information that I’ve also seen that says that um there is very low rates of attendance at mosques in Iran, particularly in Tehran.

   And in fact the Delegate noted information that suggests that many young Iranians, especially those under the age of twenty five, and I realise you’re older than that, um are quite cynical and as I said derisive about their religion.

   So-so in that context I’m I’m wondering what the consequences for you would be if you continued to have your Agnostic views that you-you’ve you’ve spoken about today.

   Interpreter: If you keep it in your-your ideas in-inside yourself of course nothing would happen to you but if you are involved in any conversation then talk about your ideas of course you will be in big trouble.

   …

   Member: Yes, no I understand. Why would being an Agnostic lead the Iranian authorities to view you as an Apostate?

   Interpreter: Yes that term in used when you are-you don’t believe to God, if your don’t believe to God you are out of Islam, if it-you come out of Islam it means that you are are you don’t believe in their God and so you will be against God.

   Member: Um, as I understand it it’s suggested that your tattoo might identify you as an Apostate can you explain why that would happen?

   Interpreter: Yeah they can uh they can have this other view where you have this tattoo it means you are out of Islam, you have to come to another religion and converted to another religion so it means the same thing.

   Member: If having that tattoo places you at risk of being viewed as an Apostate in an Islamic state why did you get that tattoo?

   Interpreter: They can’t exactly have a person tell you you are Apostate, because of this tattoo, but you can be in any trouble, for example you-you can be punished, you can get punished with a las-with a lashing actually, just uh they say God is equal [inaudible] and still you will be punished for that, and they te-can’t exactly tell you what for [inaudible].

7. I do not accept that the Tribunal failed to address what the applicant wanted to do.  The Court was taken to the statutory declaration of the applicant (CB 55):

   30. If I were forced to return to Iran, I would be mistreated/harmed because of my actual and perceived political opinion: as a dissenter of the present Iranian government because I distributed anti-Islamic and government texts.

   31. If I were forced to return to Iran, I would be mistreated/harmed because of my religious beliefs: I do not practice as a Muslim Shiite.  I would also be mistreated/harmed because I am agnostic and question other people’s religious beliefs.

8. In addition, the Court was also taken to the submission developed on behalf of the applicant, (the 15 January submissions) relevantly at 73:

   73. Notwithstanding the above, the Applicant’ fear of harm on account of his religion is magnified when it is assessed in conjunction with his real/imputed political opinion. That is, although the Delegate noted that low levels of Mosque attendance in Iran are common and that non-practicing Muslims may be able to live in a society without coming to the attention of the authorities, the Applicant’s lack of religious conviction coming to the attention, the Applicant’s lack of religious conviction (and actions to the contrary of Islamic behaviour) will be used as additional grounds to persecute the Applicant on account of his political activities. Therefore upon return to Iran, the Applicant will have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his religion. 

9. It is clear that those matters were taken into account in the findings of the Tribunal relevantly as follows:

   59. I do not accept that the applicant was present at protests or riots surrounding the festivities in March 2011. I have formed this view on a cumulative basis. My concerns as to the reliability of the applicant’s evidence in this regard have accumulated due to the applicant’s evidence that he did not participate in the mass protests of 2009, the implausible timing of the applicant’s involvement in these protests after his return from Indonesia, implausibility of engaging in the dangerous conduct described by the applicant for the first time in the climate surrounding the protests, and the inconsistency of his account of his friend being taken and murdered by the police with country information available to me about the circumstances of the events of March 2011.

   …

   63. I have considered the applicant’s explanation to the effect that his interest in distributing the political material was in existence before his return to Iran. While I have taken that explanation into account the timing of the applicant’s involvement in the protest strikes me as implausible particularly when viewed in the context of the failure of the applicant’s asylum seeking attempt. I add this concern to the inconclusive concern mentioned above as to the inconsistency in the applicant’s practice of not being involved in the mass protests of 2009 but choosing to involve himself in the protests of 2011.

   …

   66. The issue for me in considering whether or not I accept the applicant’s account of his involvement in the protests surrounding [C] arises from the implausibility of the applicant choosing that event at that time to engage in the random distribution of anti-Islamic and anti-regime material for the first time.

   67. As mentioned at the hearing, I also find it difficult to accept that if the applicant’s friend had been arrested the distributing the material and subsequently murdered by the police that there would not be some report from some source to corroborate that events of that nature either took place or are suspected to have taken place. By contrast I have information before me regarding the death and disappearance of protestors during the 2009 protests, and I have information regarding the arrest of 467 people at the protest surrounding the [C] festivities but have no evidence from any source suggesting that protestors were murdered or disappeared in the aftermath of the events of 15 March 2011. I have taken into account the Wikipedia references provided on behalf of the applicant. The document refers to the death of death-row prisoners who protested on that day while in prison, and it refers to the arrest of people in East Tehran and their being treated in a humiliating way. I consider the source is unreliable in any event given the nature of Wikipedia, but note that it does not refer to the disappearance or deaths of any protest is in the events of March 2011.

   68. I consider that it is inherently implausible in any event that in such circumstance a person would choose a manner of protesting that involved distributing politically sensitive and anti-Islamic material to random strangers in the crowd. The applicant’s explanation as to why he engaged in such blatantly dangerous behaviour was not convincing in my view.

   69. I consider that my concerns about the credibility of the applicant’s account of these events were well ventilated at the hearing. The applicant with the assistance of his representative has addressed the concerns comprehensively in written submissions and I have considered the responses carefully. However, as a consequence of the accumulation of the concerns I have addressed above I have concluded that the applicant has not given a truthful account of his involvement in the protests of March 2011 and I reject his account of these events. I consider his account to be implausible as a consequence of the accumulation of the concerns I have identified.

   70. I do not accept that the applicant was present at protests or disturbances surrounding the [C] festivities in Tehran in March 2011. I do not accept that the applicant, with his friends, distributed politically sensitive or anti-Islamic material to random members of the crowd. I do not accept that the applicant’s friend was arrested. I do not accept that the applicant’s friend was subsequently murdered by the police. I do not accept that the applicant  subsequently escaped from the area to hide, and I reject the applicant’s evidence to the effect that he learned that the Basij went to his home to look for him. I do not accept the sequelae of the events recounted by the applicant, as I do not accept that the event which forms the premise of subsequent events took place. I reject the applicant’s evidence that he heard that the Iranian authorities attended at his house to look for him. I do not accept that the Iranian authorities broke his mother’s leg when she refused to open the door, detained his father or seized his laptop books or other belongings. I do not accept the applicant is the subject of an associated arrest warrant or is on any ‘list’.

   71. I do not accept that the applicant has given a truthful account of circumstances and his experiences in Iran. I do not view the applicant as a witness of credit and therefore approach his evidence on all matters relevant to my decision with caution and scepticism

   72. Having reached this finding as to the critical events giving rise to the applicant’s claim, and formed an adverse view of the applicant’s reliability as a witness of his experiences in Iran, I turn to consider each of the applicant’s claims as they have been presented to the Tribunal.

   74. I accept that the applicant holds agnostic views, but do not accept that the applicant holding such views expose him to a real chance of being harmed, and nor do I consider that there is real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm because he holds such views. I do not accept that there is a real chance that the applicant will be identified as, or imputed to be, an apostate on account of his personal agnostic views.

   75. At the hearing, I explored with the applicant how his agnostic views might be publicly demonstrated or otherwise place him at risk of harm. The applicant did not identify any circumstances in which he had or would make a public display of his agnostic views or how a lack of religious enthusiasm might result in him facing harm in the reasonably foreseeable future. The applicant did not describe any circumstances beyond an extension to his compulsory military service, and having a tattoo if he was arrested for another matter, as examples where his agnostic views or lack of religious enthusiasm had placed him in harm’s way. The applicant himself conceded that if he keeps his agnostic views in his heart, he would not face any trouble.

   76. I do not accept that if the applicant were to return to Iran he would publicly demonstrate his agnostic views, or publicly demonstrate a lack of religious enthusiasm such as to place him at risk of harm. I find there is no real chance that the applicant would be imputed to be an apostate. I rely on the country information referred to by the delegate to the effect that there are very low levels of mosque attendance among the general population, and provided that private matters remain private and Islamic rules and values are not challenged or violated in a visible manner, Iranian authorities will not ordinarily interfere in the private sphere of citizens.4 I consider this description of the situation in Iran applies to the applicant’s circumstances, and I find that the applicant does not face a real chance of being harmed, and nor do I have substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Iran, there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm in relation to his religious views.

   77. I have also considered that the submission to the effect that the applicant would be required or expected to suppress his agnostic views in order to avoid persecution, referring to the authority of Applicant S395. I recognise that asylum seekers are not required, and cannot be expected, to take reasonable steps to avoid persecutory harm, or to live ‘discretely’ to avoid such harm. I recognise also that where reference is made to the principle in S395, I am to make a finding as to whether the applicant will in fact engage in the activity in question.

   78. In terms of the applicant’s agnostic views and lack of religious enthusiasm, I have difficulty identifying any activity that is positively required by the applicant’s beliefs or is amenable to suppression. The applicant’s concern relates to a lack of religious enthusiasm, and I accept that the applicant would not engage in Mosque attendance or Islamic ritual. I make that finding in answer to what the applicant would do if he were to return to Iran. However, I do not accept that the applicant’s non-attendance at the Mosque or non-involvement in Islamic rituals would place him at risk of harm in light of the country information referred to regarding the very low rate of Mosque attendance in Iran.

   79. I do not accept that the applicant would engage in any overt demonstration of his agnostic views or lack of religious enthusiasm should he return to Iran in the reasonably foreseeable future. I am reinforced in this finding by noting that the applicant has held his agnostic views for a long time, and yet returned to Iran from Indonesia in 2011 with the assistance of the Iranian authorities. This indicates to me that the applicant does not genuinely fear harm in Iran on account of his long-held agnostic views and lack of religious enthusiasm.

   80. I have considered the applicant’s account of his military service being arbitrarily extended because of his lack of religious enthusiasm. I note at the hearing however that the applicant elaborated on these circumstances by explaining that he was late in performing religious observations. I have concerns as to the applicant’s credibility about circumstances and experiences in Iran, and in light of the applicant’s elaboration I do not accept that the applicant’s military service was extended solely because he was perceived to lack religious enthusiasm. Even if I am wrong in this finding, I note that the applicant identified no subsequent incidents of harm arising from his perceived lack of religious enthusiasm during military service beyond the extension of his service. Turning to the reasonably foreseeable future, I find that there is no real chance that the applicant will face harm arising from his behaviour or experiences during military service, and nor do I have substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Iran, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm arising out of those circumstances.

   …

   84. I have also considered the submission advanced on the applicant’s behalf to the effect that his breach of Iranian law in relation to consumption of alcohol may also identify him as an apostate. I do not accept that contention. On the applicant’s evidence, he was punished for a breach of Iranian law regarding the consumption of alcohol many years ago. The applicant did not identify any further monitoring or harassment arising out of any further imputation to be made from this conduct. The applicant sought the assistance from the Iranian authorities to return to Iran in March of 2011, despite having come to their attention previously in the context of breaching laws regarding the consumption of alcohol. I do not accept that the applicant’s conduct in breaching Iranian law regarding consumption of alcohol carries any imputation regarding religious or political matters, or that the applicant genuinely fears harm in the future for this reason.

   85. As mentioned above, I reject the applicant’s account of his involvement in the protests surrounding [C] festival in March of 2011, and have rejected his account of distributing politically sensitive and anti-Islamic material, and the sequelae to this incident. This finding inevitably affects my perception of the applicant’s other evidence regarding his political profile in Iran and his fear of harm for that reason should he return.

   86. As I mentioned to the applicant at the hearing, his preparedness to return to Iran in March 2011 with the assistance of the Iranian authorities is not consistent with him genuinely fearing harm on account of his political opinion, or imputed political opinion at that point in time. I have rejected the applicant’s evidence pertaining to political activities that took place after that date. In light of this consideration and in light of my concerns generally as to the applicant’s credibility, I do not accept that the applicant engaged in activities that would give rise to an adverse profile due to political opinion in Iran prior to his departure.

   87. I have taken into account the evidence provided after the hearing showing that from May 2011 the applicant would send various political and religious works to his friends from the identified email account. I am not satisfied that the applicant’s distribution of politically sensitive material to his friends by private email from May of 2011 is motivated by genuine political conviction, or in any event would become known to the Iranian authorities. This evidence does not outweigh the credibility concerns I have as to the applicant’s evidence regarding his fears in returning to Iran, and my finding that the applicant did not genuinely fear harm in Iran when he chose to return to Iran in March of 2011. Furthermore, the emails do not persuade me that the applicant’s evidence that he participated in the protests surrounding [C] is plausible.

   88. I find that the applicant’s fear of harm for political reasons, imputed or otherwise, is not genuine and not well-founded. For the same reasons, I find that I do not have substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Iran there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm. The applicant’s claims pertaining to harm as a result of being a member of a particular social group of failed asylum seekers.

   89. I do not accept the applicant’s account of his departure from Iran. The applicant had returned to Iran with the assistance of the Iranian authorities in March of 2011, and departed again through Imam Khomeini airport the following month.

   …

   92. I accept it is possible that the applicant may be suspected of being a failed asylum seeker, regardless of whether he returns on his own passport or a travel document issued by the Iranian Embassy in Canberra or the Australian Government. However, I do not accept that there is a real chance the applicant will face harm by reason of being identified as a failed asylum seeker.

   …

   94. Noting other sources have suggested that the risk of ill treatment as a returnee is proportionate to an individual’s political profile in Iran or engagement in political activity abroad, I find for the reasons already expressed that the applicant has no adverse political or religious profile. I find the ordinary situation described by DFAT to be applicable to the applicant, and find there is no real chance the applicant will be harmed because he may be perceived to be a member of a particular social group of failed asylum seekers. For the same reasons, I find I do not have substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Iran , there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm. Specifically, I do not accept that the applicant will face any form of detention in the process of entering Iran, as I find he did not depart Iran illegally. The reasoning of North J in WZAPN is not applicable to the applicant’s circumstances on my findings.

   95. I have considered all the applicant’s claims cumulatively. I am of the view that the applicant does not face a real chance of being harmed by reason of his religion or membership of a particular social group. It follows that the applicant’s fears in this regard are not wellfounded. I find that the applicant’s fear of harm by reason of his political opinion is not genuine, and in that sense not well-founded.

   96. As I find that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugees Convention reason, I find that the applicant does not satisfy the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a) of the Act.

   97. I have considered the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa) in the course of my deliberations and reached the findings against this criterion on the claims before me set out in the reasons above. For those reasons, I am not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(aa).

1. Contrary to paragraph (a) of the alleged grounds, it is clear in my position that the Tribunal took into account the applicant's claims and evidence in respect of his agnostic beliefs, and correctly made a finding that was open on the material before the Tribunal as to what the applicant would do in determining whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution and there was no jurisdictional error of the kind identified, in particular, (a). 

2. In relation to paragraph (b) I do not accept that the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s agnostic views and I do not accept that the applicant expounded to the Tribunal a belief that he had to proselytize his agnosticism or that he had to make public declarations about his agnosticism.  It was in the context of the applicant having identifying his agnosticism effectively from the time of his birth and his return to Iran in 2011 that it was clearly open to the Tribunal to come to the adverse findings in respect of whether the applicant had a well-founded fear in respect of his agnostic beliefs.

3. This is a case in which there is no error of the kind identified in Appellant S395/2002 and no departure is to be inferred. I find that there was no departure from the chain of reasoning about whether the fears of the applicant were well-founded, consistent with NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 29 at [168]. Further there is no substance in relation to particular (c) as it is clear that the Tribunal took into account the applicant’s evidence and claims as to what would occur if there was a public declaration of his agnosticism in determining whether or not the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution in respect of his agnostic beliefs.

4. It was in this context that the Tribunal relevantly found, as identified in para.75 above:

   75. …The applicant himself conceded that if he keeps his agnostic views in his heart, he would not face any trouble…

5. The Tribunal continued in para.76:

   76. I do not accept that if the applicant were to return to Iran he would publicly demonstrate his agnostic views, or publicly demonstrate a lack of religious enthusiasm such as to place him at risk of harm. I find there is no real chance that the applicant would be imputed to be an apostate. … I find that the applicant does not face a real chance of being harmed, and nor do I have substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Iran, there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm in relation to his religious views.

6. The Tribunal went on to consider the submission in relation to Appellant S395/2002 and that:

   77. I have also considered that the submission to the effect that the applicant would be required or expected to suppress his agnostic views in order to avoid persecution, referring to the authority of Applicant S395. I recognise that asylum seekers are not required, and cannot be expected, to take reasonable steps to avoid persecutory harm, or to live ‘discretely’ to avoid such harm. I recognise also that where reference is made to the principle in S395, I am to make a finding as to whether the applicant will in fact engage in the activity in question.

7. The Tribunal was correct in identifying what was required was the lacking of a finding as to whether the applicant will engage in the activity in question in the context of determining whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution in which the Tribunal concluded, para.79:

   79. … This indicates to me that the applicant does not genuinely fear harm in Iran on account of his long-held agnostic views and lack of religious enthusiasm.

8. This reasoning lead to the critical finding:

   96. As I find that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugees Convention reason, I find that the applicant does not satisfy the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a) of the Act.

9. To the extent that the applicant’s submissions suggested that the Tribunal failed to deal with the entirety of the applicant’s claims, I reject that submission.  It is clear that the Tribunal carefully dealt with the applicant’s claims and carefully dealt with the claims in respect of his agnostic belief.  There was no jurisdictional error of the kind identified in the application.  The application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding eighteen (18) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Street

Associate: 

Date:  4 June 2015