JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
STREAM: HUMAN RIGHTS
ACT: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ACT 1984 (WA)
CITATION: ADI LIMITED & ORS and COMMISSIONER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY & ORS [2005] WASAT 259
MEMBER: JUDGE J ECKERT (DEPUTY PRESIDENT)
MS J TOOHEY (SENIOR MEMBER)
BRIG A WARNER (SENIOR SESSIONAL MEMBER)
HEARD: 6 AND 7 APRIL 2005
DELIVERED : 28 SEPTEMBER 2005
FILE NO/S: ET 31 of 2004
BETWEEN: ADI LIMITED
ADI MUNITIONS PTY LTD
ADI ADVANCED SYSTEMS PTY LTD
THALES UNDERWATER SYSTEMS PTY LTD
THALES TRAINING AND SIMULATION PTY LTD
ApplicantAND
COMMISSIONER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
TRADES AND LABOUR COUNCIL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIANS FOR RACIAL EQUALITY
ETHNIC COMMUNITIES COUNCIL WA INC
Respondent
Catchwords:
Exemption application Public interest Nature of discretion Scope and purpose Test for exercise of discretion in exemption application Decisions of other bodies and other States Nationality National origin Place of birth
Legislation:
AntiDiscrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s 8, s 51
AntiDiscrimination Regulations 2004 (NSW), s 5
Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), s 3, s 4, s 36, s 37, s 38, s 39, s 66L(3), s 66M(5), s 66N(3), s 66ZM, s 66ZN, s 66ZP, s 66ZQ, s 135
Equal Opportunity Bill 1984, cl 135
Equal Opportunity Regulations 1986 (WA), reg 24
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 18, s 19, s 51
New South Wales Regulations 2004, s 5
Privacy Act 1998 (Cth)
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), s 9, s 15, s 17
State Administrative Tribunal (Conferral of Jurisdiction) Amendment and Repeal Act 2004 (WA)
The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1990, s 109
United States Export Administration Regulations
United States International Traffic in Arms Regulations, reg127.12
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)
Result:
Application for exemption granted
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr A Power
First Respondent : Mr J Rosales-Castaneda
Second Respondent : Mr M Ritter SC
Third Respondent : Mr M Ritter SC
Fourth Respondent : Mr M Ritter SC
Solicitors:
Applicant: Allens Arthur Robinson
First Respondent : Equal Opportunity Commission
Second Respondent : Ms C Ozich
Third Respondent : Ms E Carbone
Fourth Respondent : Ms E Carbone
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
ADI Limited & Ors and Equal Opportunity Commission & Ors [2005] WASAT 49
ADI Limited & Ors and Equal Opportunity Commission & Ors [2005] WASAT 49
ADI Limited (Exemption)[2004] VCAT 1963
Boeing Australia Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [2003] QADT 21
Boeing Australia Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [2003] VCAT A362
City of Brunswick EOC 92‑450
Commonwealth of Australia v Stamatov [1999] FCA 105
Jupiter Holdings Pty Ltd and Commissioner for Equal Opportunity [2005] WASAT 202
Le v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 875
Macabenta v Minister of State for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 90 FCR 202
Minister for Education and Commissioner for Equal Opportunity & Ors (1987) EOC 92‑198
Minister for Education and Commissioner for Equal Opportunity & Ors (1993) EOC 92‑517
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- Case
- [2005] WASAT 259
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court is whether granting ADI's exemption application would result in conduct that breaches the Racial Discrimination Act 1975. The court also considers whether such a grant would contravene international conventions, specifically the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Additionally, the court must assess whether the exemption would effectively enable ADI to comply with the US regulations.
In addressing these issues, the court considered the arguments made by Mr Ritter, representing the objecting parties. Mr Ritter contended that granting the exemption would result in conduct that breaches the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 as it would involve discrimination based on national origin, which is not covered by the Act. He further argued that the exemption would contravene international conventions and that the purpose of the exemption, to comply with US regulations, is questionable as those regulations still require discriminatory conduct based on national origin. The court took into account the reasoning in Macabenta v Minister of State for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and the interpretation provided in Rosales-Castaneda, which distinguish between nationality and national origin.
The court concluded that granting the exemption would indeed lead to conduct that breaches the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 and potentially contravene international conventions. The exemption, as sought, does not adequately address the discriminatory nature of the US regulations. Therefore, the court denied the exemption application, finding that it would not achieve the intended purpose without breaching the Act and international obligations.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: JUDGE J
Mr Ritter relied on Macabenta v Minister of State for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 90 FCR 202 where the Federal Court held that there was a distinction between "national origin" and "nationality" and that conduct relating to the former could constitute a breach of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 but reliance on nationality was not a breach of either s 9 or s 15 of that Act. Mr Rosales‑Castaneda extended this interpretation to say that there could also be a possible breach of s 17 of that Act whereby a potential claimant could arguably hold the US government liable because it had caused ADI to breach the Racial Discrimination Act 1975. The intention to discriminate not solely on the basis of nationality was indicated, according to Mr Ritter, because of the retention in the application of details of place of birth and citizenship in so far as it affected the person's status as a national under the laws of the United States of America. Further, Macabenta v Minister of State for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (supra) was authority for the view that place of birth is an aspect of a person's national origin rather than their nationality. Therefore, on the basis that "place of birth" is an aspect of "national origin" and not "nationality", counsel for the objecting parties argued that the grant of an exemption would result in conduct by ADI which is in breach of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 which does not include provision for an exemption of the kind sought by ADI. Mr Ritter also argued that the granting of an exemption would lead to conduct which infringed international conventions, specifically the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, both of which are signed by the Australian government. The latter Convention is incorporated in the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 through the Schedule to that Act. Although Mr Ritter conceded that the existence of international obligations under international conventions does not give rise to a substantive obligation which conditions the exercise of statutory powers by a State body such as this Tribunal (unless incorporated by State Parliament into domestic legislation), he was of the view that the provisions of an international treaty to which Australia is a party is a relevant consideration in the exercise of statutory discretion by the Tribunal – Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade v Magno (1992) 37 FCR 298 at 304. Mr Ritter cautioned the Tribunal to be very careful about considering an exemption where "the reason for seeking the exemption is, in effect, the requirements of a foreign power, such as in this instance, the United States of America." (Submissions on behalf of various opposing parties [29]). Mr Ritter was also sceptical that an exemption would achieve the stated purpose of the application. According to Mr Ritter, the stated purpose is to enable ADI to lawfully comply with the US regulations, which require ADI to discriminate on the basis of both nationality and national origin (T77). Mr Ritter was doubtful that the exemption would ensure compliance by ADI with the US regulations if it is sought solely on the basis of nationality, as he is of the view that the ITARs nonetheless require discriminatory conduct by ADI based on national origin. He drew this conclusion from cl 10.2 of the ITAR Guidelines for preparing agreements. Clause 10.2 provides:"The US Government does not need each third country foreign national employed by a foreign signatory identified in the agreement. Approval of these individuals is contingent on their country of origin."