Kassa and Bitmead and Anor

Case

[2006] WASAT 298

29 SEPTEMBER 2006

No judgment structure available for this case.

KASSA and BITMEAD & ANOR [2006] WASAT 298



STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALCitation No:[2006] WASAT 298
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ACT 1984 (WA)
Case No:EOA:14/20064 AUGUST 2006
Coram:JUDGE J ECKERT (DEPUTY PRESIDENT)
MS J TOOHEY (SENIOR MEMBER)
29/09/06
17Judgment Part:1 of 1
Result: Application for production of psychiatric, medical and telephone records granted
Applications for Family Court and Magistrates Court records dismissed
B
PDF Version
Parties:RIBKA KASSA
LINDSAY BITMEAD
INGHAMS ENTERPRISES PTY LIMITED

Catchwords:

Order for production of documents ­ Inspection of documents ­ Legitimate forensic purpose ­ Relevance ­ Section 35 State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) ­ Tribunal objectives

Legislation:

Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), s 161
Magistrates Court (General) Rules 2005 (WA), r 37, r 38, r 39, r 40
Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA), s 33
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 9, s 35, s 35(1), s 35(3)

Case References:

ADI Limited & Ors and Commissioner for Equal Opportunity & Ors [2005] WASAT 259
Apache Northwest Pty Ltd and Ors v Western Power Corporation (1998) 19 WAR 350
Attorney-General v Northern Metro Tramway Co [1892] 3 CH 70
Hadid v Lenfest Communications Inc (1996) 70 FCR 403
Harman v Home Office [1983] 1 AC 280
Hillston v Bar-Mordecai [2002] NSWSC 973
Science Research Council v Nasse [1980] AC 1028
Stanley & Anor v Layne Christensen Company & Ors [2004] WASCA 50
Travel Compensation Fund v Blair [2004] NSWSC 501

Nil

JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL STREAM : HUMAN RIGHTS ACT : EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ACT 1984 (WA) CITATION : KASSA and BITMEAD & ANOR [2006] WASAT 298 MEMBER : JUDGE J ECKERT (DEPUTY PRESIDENT)
    MS J TOOHEY (SENIOR MEMBER)
HEARD : 4 AUGUST 2006 DELIVERED : 29 SEPTEMBER 2006 FILE NO/S : EOA 14 of 2006 BETWEEN : RIBKA KASSA
    Applicant

    AND

    LINDSAY BITMEAD
    First Respondent

    INGHAMS ENTERPRISES PTY LIMITED
    Second Respondent

Catchwords:

Order for production of documents ­ Inspection of documents ­ Legitimate forensic purpose ­ Relevance ­ Section 35 State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) ­ Tribunal objectives

Legislation:

Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), s 161



(Page 2)

Magistrates Court (General) Rules 2005 (WA), r 37, r 38, r 39, r 40
Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA), s 33
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 9, s 35, s 35(1), s 35(3)

Result:

Application for production of psychiatric, medical and telephone records granted


Applications for Family Court and Magistrates Court records dismissed

Category: B


Representation:

Counsel:


    Applicant : Ms J McLean
    First Respondent : Ms P Giles
    Second Respondent : Ms P Giles

Solicitors:

    Applicant : Women's Law Centre of WA
    First Respondent : Downings Legal
    Second Respondent : Jones Ross Pty Ltd



Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

ADI Limited & Ors and Commissioner for Equal Opportunity & Ors [2005] WASAT 259
Apache Northwest Pty Ltd and Ors v Western Power Corporation (1998) 19 WAR 350
Attorney-General v Northern Metro Tramway Co [1892] 3 CH 70
Hadid v Lenfest Communications Inc (1996) 70 FCR 403
Harman v Home Office [1983] 1 AC 280
Hillston v Bar-Mordecai [2002] NSWSC 973
Science Research Council v Nasse [1980] AC 1028
Stanley & Anor v Layne Christensen Company & Ors [2004] WASCA 50
Travel Compensation Fund v Blair [2004] NSWSC 501



(Page 3)

Case(s) also cited:

Nil

(Page 4)
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Summary of Tribunal's decision

1 This was an interlocutory application by the respondents for production of medical, telephone and court documents under s 35 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA). The respondents contended they required the documents so as to cross-examine the applicant as to her credibility and also for the assessment of damages.

2 The Tribunal considered relevant authorities which establish that an application for production and inspection must be for a legitimate forensic purpose. It also considered the personal nature of the documents sought, and the applicant's need for confidentiality. It decided that, on balance, medical and telephone records as requested should be produced in the interests of justice. It dismissed the application for production of the court documents. To protect the applicant's confidentiality, it made orders restricting access.




Background

3 This matter concerns an allegation by Ms Ribka Kassa of sexual harassment by the first respondent Mr Lindsay Bitmead. Ms Kassa claims the second respondent who was her employer and who also employed Mr Bitmead at the relevant times, is vicariously liable for his conduct under s 161 of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) (the Act).

4 Ms Kassa seeks compensation, an apology and orders that Mr Bitmead not supervise her in the workplace, that staff of the second respondent be given sexual harassment awareness and equal opportunity training and that the second respondent implement policies and procedures to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace. Ms Kassa is still employed by the second respondent, although she is on long term sick leave for post traumatic stress disorder as diagnosed by her psychiatrist, Dr Rebecca Adams.

5 The respondents deny the claim of sexual harassment and maintain that there was a mutual relationship between Ms Kassa and Mr Bitmead; further, that the first respondent has in any event apologised for any hurt and humiliation he might have caused Ms Kassa. Ms Kassa denies that any relationship was mutual. She alleges she received numerous telephone calls and SMS messages from Mr Bitmead. In turn, he alleges she left numerous voice messages on his phone and sent him SMS messages suggesting that they meet.

(Page 5)



6 These interlocutory proceedings relate to a request by both respondents under s 35 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) for production to the Tribunal by various third parties of a range of documents. On 26 July 2006 then counsel for the respondents alerted the Tribunal to a proposal to make application under s 35 for production of documents. That application was subsequently made at a directions hearing on 4 August 2006 before Judge Eckert and Senior Member Ms Toohey. Counsel for the respondents handed up a draft minute of consent orders at that hearing and made oral submissions. However, the applicant had not received prior notice of the draft orders and accordingly she was given time to file written submissions with respect to the respondents' request, which she filed on 16 August 2006. The respondents were also permitted time to file responsive submissions.

7 On 4 August 2006, we advised we would deliver an oral decision on 31 August 2006, after receipt of the written submissions. However, in the interim the first and second respondents each instructed separate counsel and leave was sought to extend the timeframe in the orders made on 4 August to allow the respondents additional time to file their response to the applicant's Statement of Issues, Facts and Contentions in the substantive matter and responsive submissions to the s 35 application. The second respondent filed its responsive submissions to the s 35 application on 22 August 2006 (being the required date); however, the first respondent was not able to instruct counsel until later in August and the Tribunal was advised details of that counsel on 28 August 2006. Counsel for the first respondent advised at the hearing on 31 August 2006 that he would not be filing responsive submissions to the s 35 application. Accordingly, we were unable to deliver our oral decision on 31 August 2006 and now deliver our decision and reasons regarding the s 35 application for the production of documents.

8 The application under s 35 of the SAT Act was put to the Tribunal in the form of a draft minute of orders as follows:


    "Pursuant to s 35 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 the Tribunal orders that by no later than 4.30pm on 18 August 2006:

    1. Dr Rebecca Adams of 24 Colin Street West Perth, produce all documents in her possession, including but not limited to notes, letters, referrals, certificates and other material, which relate to the Applicant, RIBKA KASSA.


(Page 6)
    2. Dr Tajinderpal Singh of Princess Medical Centre, 91 Princess Road Balga produce all documents in his possession, including but not limited to notes, letters, referrals, certificates and other material, which relate to the Applicant, RIBKA KASSA.

    3. To the extent that any documents are not covered by Order No. 2, the Managing Partner, Practice Manager or other Proper Officer of Princess Medical Centre, 91 Princess Road Balga, produce all documents in possession of the medical centre, including but not limited to notes, letters, referrals, certificates and other material, which relate to the Applicant, RIBKA KASSA.

    4. The Principal Registrar, Family Court of Australia, (Western Australian Registry) produce all documents relating to any application which has been or is currently before the Court, in which RIBKA KASSA has been a party.

    5. The Principal Registrar, Family Court of Western Australia, produce all documents relating to any application which has been or is currently before the Court, in which RIBKA KASSA is or has been a party.

    6. The Clerk, Perth Magistrate Court, produce all documents in the possession of that Court relating to any proceedings in that Court in which RIBKA KASSA has been or is a party.

    7. The Proper Officer, Optus Pty Limited of 50 William Street in Perth, produce all records of calls made from and to mobile telephone number [deleted], account holder HASSAN FATAH of [deleted], between the dates 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2005.

    8. The Proper Officer, Vodaphone Pty Limited of 76 Kings Park Road West Perth produce all records of calls made from and to mobile telephone number [deleted], account holder RIBKA KASSA of [deleted], between the dates 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2005."


9 The applicant objects to the granting of the orders for production except with respect to the request in par 8 of the draft minute of consent
(Page 7)
    orders, that the mobile phone records from the applicant's mobile phone be made available.




The issue

10 The issue before us for resolution is whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion under s 35 of the SAT Act and order production and inspection of the requested documents.




The legislation

11 Relevantly, s 35 of the SAT Act provides:


    "35.Obtaining information from third parties

      (1) On the application of a party to a proceeding, the Tribunal may order that a person ¾

        (a) who is not a party to the proceeding; and

        (b) who has, or is likely to have, in the person's possession or under the person's control a document or other material that is relevant to the proceeding,

        produce the document or material to the Tribunal or the party within the time specified in the order.


      (2) The Tribunal may order a person to produce a document or other material despite any rule of law relating to privilege (other than legal professional privilege) or the public interest in relation to the production of documents.

      (3) However if the Tribunal considers that any document is or contains protected matter, the Tribunal cannot order a person to produce it to a party."

12 Section 9 of the SAT Act sets out the objectives of this Tribunal that we must take it into account in all proceedings before us.

    "9. Main objectives of the Tribunal

      The main objectives of the Tribunal in dealing with matters within its jurisdiction are ¾
(Page 8)
    (a) to achieve the resolution of questions, complaints or disputes, and make or review decisions, fairly and according to the substantial merits of the case;

    (b) to act as speedily and with as little formality and technicality as is practicable, and minimise the costs to parties; and

    (c) to make appropriate use of the knowledge and experience of Tribunal members."





Applicable law

13 The legal principles to be applied when deciding whether to compel third persons (unrelated to the proceedings) to produce documents to a court or tribunal and then to allow inspection by parties to the proceedings is well settled.

14 The Tribunal has a discretion to order production of documents under s 35 of the SAT Act. In exercising that discretion, the Tribunal must look to the relevance of the documents to the substantive issues before it. However, in exercising its discretion, the Tribunal should not embark on a preliminary enquiry into the evidence (Apache Northwest Pty Ltd and Ors v Western Power Corporation (1998) 19 WAR 350).

15 A party seeking production is not entitled to go on a fishing expedition whereby it endeavours to find out whether it has an arguable case – a request for production must be for the purpose of obtaining evidence to support the party's case, not to discover it. It is inappropriate to order production of the documents when they are required for a collateral purpose.

16 It would be appropriate for us to refuse an order for production of documents when to grant it would be unnecessary and oppressive (Attorney-General v Northern Metro Tramway Co [1892] 3 CH 70 at 74).

17 The primary question we must ask is whether the respondents have a "legitimate forensic purpose" in seeking the production of the documents or material in question (Apache Northwest). In Stanley & Anor v Layne Christensen Company & Ors [2004] WASCA 50, an appeal from an interlocutory decision of Master Sanderson, Justices Miller and Heenan at [9] confirmed the four principles identified by Master Sanderson and


(Page 9)
    which regulated the decision on whether or not to compel production, as follows:

      "(1) A legitimate forensic purpose will be established if a document gives rise to a line of enquiry which is relevant to the issues before the trier of fact, including for the purpose of meeting the opposing case by way of cross-examination: see Apache Northwest Pty Ltd & Ors v Western Power Corporation (1998) 19 WAR 350 at 374; National Employers' Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd v Waind & Anor [1978] 1 NSWLR 372 at 385; Maronis Holdings Ltd & Ors v Nippon Credit Australia Ltd & Ors (2000) 18 ACLC 609 at 613 – 614.

      (2) In assessing whether a legitimate forensic purpose exists in relation to documents sought on an early return of subpoena, it must be borne in mind that the necessity for having a document to fairly dispose of the issues at trial might well not become apparent before trial. It may, for example, become apparent when a document is used in cross-examination to refute unforseen evidence-in-chief. Thus, whether a document is 'necessary' to fairly dispose of proceedings is to be understood in the broad sense of embracing any document which has value, in the sense of at least apparent relevance, and fairly disposing of proceedings, even if it might not readily be seen, at the pre-inspection stage, necessarily to be admissible in evidence: see Apache Northwest (supra) at 376. Cases will be rare in which, prior to production of documents, a subpoena will be set aside as an abuse of process on the ground the documents by description are manifestly irrelevant to the subject proceedings, or are incapable of bearing upon matters of credit pertinent to the proceedings: see Brand v Digi-Tech [2001] NSWSC 425.

      (3) At least one object of the rule permitting early return of subpoenas is to appraise the parties of the strengths and weaknesses of their case at an early stage. Hence, no narrow view as to the legitimate purposes of a subpoena ought to be taken: see Khanna v Lovell White Durrant [1995] 1 WLR 121 at 123.

(Page 10)
    (4) There is no requirement that to avoid the stigma of fishing, a party must already by in possession of some evidence before issuing a subpoena. Historically the concept of fishing was not concerned with the prior possession of evidence, but rather the prior pleading of issues for which the evidence sought would be relevant: see Bailey & Ors v Beagle Management Pty Ltd & Ors (2001) 105 FCR 136 at 143 – 144; Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1580 at [48]. In the interests of a fair trial, litigation should be conducted on the footing that all relevant documentary evidence is available: see Bailey (supra) at 143."

18 In Stanley, the documents the subject of the subpoena for production were affidavits in Family Court proceedings held by a third party to the Supreme Court proceedings. This application can be distinguished from those proceedings because the respondents here ask us to compel the Family Court itself to produce the documents to this Tribunal. Nonetheless the principles have relevance in our view to the application for production of the psychiatric and other medical evidence and the telephone records.

19 We deal with each request in turn.




Psychiatric records

20 The applicant argues that these records should not be produced as they are subject to doctor/patient confidentiality. Confidentiality is a matter we are entitled to take into account in exercising our discretion. However, the public interest in justice being done between the parties generally outweighs both the private and public interest in preserving confidentiality (Harman v Home Office [1983] 1 AC 280 at 308 cited at page 406 in Hadid v Lenfest Communications Inc (1996) 70 FCR 403).

21 The confidentiality of a document does not afford privilege from production, but in the exercise of our discretion to order production we may have regard to the fact that a document is confidential and that to order its production would involve a breach of confidence, such as that between doctor and patient (Science Research Council v Nasse [1980] AC 1028 at 1065). When a document is shown to be confidential, we must balance the effect of its disclosure and of its being withheld from a party to litigation. In that respect we need to look at what is necessary for the parties to establish?

(Page 11)



22 For the applicant to rely on preserving confidentiality of documents, she needs to establish the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality (Apache Northwest). Whilst the applicant submits that disclosure of medical records is not relevant and to rely on them to discredit her is in direct conflict with the doctor/patient relationship, we do not think that in these proceedings preservation of that confidentiality is critical. The applicant has not adequately established the public interest in maintaining confidentiality of her psychiatric and medical records that are relevant to the substantive proceedings.

23 We must take into account the policy that we must ensure open and public justice.

24 Section 9 of the SAT Act requires us to achieve the resolution of questions "fairly and according to the substantial merits of the case" whilst acting speedily and with as little technicality as possible. We must also seek to minimise costs.

25 The psychiatrist's file is to be relied on by the respondents to cross-examine the applicant on her claim for damages and with respect to her credibility. The second respondent argues that the psychiatrist's notes might reveal that the applicant gave different information to the psychiatrist than appears in her Statement of Issues, Facts and Contentions and that in assessing her psychiatric state, the psychiatrist may have taken into account matters other than her alleged sexual harassment by Mr Bitmead. Whilst it would be inappropriate for us to order production of the psychiatric records where the respondent intended to rely on them merely to prove credibility of the applicant, there is merit in allowing the production and inspection of the psychiatrist's file with respect to cross-examination on the applicant's claim for damages. In this regard, we note that the applicant has filed a report from the psychiatrist.

26 Applying the principles in Stanley, the psychiatrist's file relates to the applicant's contention that she suffered stress (diagnosed by the psychiatrist in her report as post-traumatic stress disorder) and is therefore relevant to the issues of fact before us in the substantive proceedings. Its production and inspection, if confined in time and to the stress related diagnosis would not result in a fishing expedition but would give rise to a legitimate forensic purpose.

27 The order as sought by the respondent would be oppressive in that it is potentially very broad as to time and illness. To grant it in the


(Page 12)
    requested terms may also not result in minimising costs or simplifying the proceedings.

28 On balance, we are of the view that production of the relevant file would be in the interests of justice and fairness in accordance with the objectives of this Tribunal and accordingly we order the production of all documents, including notes, letters, referrals, certificates and other material in the possession of Dr Rebecca Adams which relate to the applicant, from 1 May 2006 to the date of production and which relate to the psychiatric assessment by Dr Adams of Ms Kassa resulting in her diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder.


General Practitioner Records

29 For the same reasons we find that part of the records of Ms Kassa's GP, Dr Singh, is relevant to issues before the Tribunal (damages and credibility) and should therefore be produced and inspection permitted. However, as it would be unfairly prejudicial and oppressive to the applicant to require the production of her entire medical history held by her GP, our order is restricted to notes, letters, referrals, certificates and other materials from 1 September 2005 to the date of production held by Dr Tajinderpal Singh of Princess Medical Centre relating to the applicant's psychiatric or psychological symptoms, including potentially contributing factors such as stresses or traumatic events reported by the applicant or considered by Dr Singh, and the applicant's account of those matters to Dr Singh.

30 This order also relates to any documents held by the practice manager (or other proper officer) of Princess Medical Centre where there are documents held by them that are not covered by the order with respect to Dr Singh.




Telephone accounts

31 The respondents seek access to the mobile telephone account of Mr Hassan Fatah and of the applicant. With respect to Mr Fatah, the respondents allege that he lent his telephone to the applicant for a period of time. As mentioned, the applicant does not object to the production and inspection of her mobile phone accounts.

32 It is material to this case whether or not certain text messages were sent and received and whether telephone calls were made. It goes to the heart of Ms Kassa's claim and the respondents' defence. Accordingly we order the production of all records of calls and SMS texts made from and


(Page 13)
    to the mobile telephone accounts of Mr Fatah and Ms Kassa. We do not believe it necessary to publish the phone numbers or addresses of Mr Fatah and Ms Kassa and therefore those details will be deleted from these published reasons. Any costs incurred in producing the mobile phone records will be borne for the time being by the respondents.




Family Court records

33 The respondent seeks production by the Principal Registrar of both the Family Court of Australia and the Family Court of Western Australia of all documents relating to any application which has been, or is currently before, the Court in which Ms Kassa has been a party. The respondents seek access for the purposes of undermining the credibility of the applicant. The respondents also claim that if Ms Kassa was involved in acrimonious divorce and child custody proceedings at the time of the alleged sexual harassment, it would have contributed substantially to her stress conditions.

34 We find this claim tenuous and are not satisfied there is a legitimate forensic purpose for the production and inspection of these records. To allow this request would in our view complicate and extend the substantive proceedings before us. It would give rise to the exploration of tangential and collateral issues that are of little direct relevance to the substantive issues before us; the effect of their production would be disproportionate to the issues they seek to prove.

35 To make this order could potentially involve large amounts of evidence of marginal weight and relevance. It would not be in furtherance of our s 9 objectives to order production and inspection.

36 By necessity, Family Court proceedings involve Ms Kassa's ex-husband and her children. These people are not a part of these proceedings and the nature of the Family Court proceedings require that their personal information be kept confidential. We can see no relevance for their personal details to be exposed in these proceedings; there is neither a necessity nor a public interest for it.

37 If all that the respondents require is an indication that there are acrimonious Family Court proceedings on foot, or were at the time of the alleged harassment, then they are entitled to put that contention in cross-examination of the applicant.

38 In any event, it is not appropriate for this Tribunal to order production by the Family Court of Australia of its records. It is beyond


(Page 14)
    the reach of the Tribunal to require compulsory production by the Family Court of Australia in an order under s 35. That Court is a federal body established by the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. It "stands altogether outside the exercise of any power" by this Tribunal (Hillston v Bar-Mordecai [2002] NSWSC 973 at [4]). In that case, the Court also commented, (at [8]) that:

      "Family Court files could readily become a treasure house on issues of credit for cross-examiners if they had ready access to them, but I do not think they should be treated in that way; the confidentially of material in them should be given a relatively high value in evaluation of the claim of the plaintiff in this case for inspection."
39 We dismiss the application for orders with respect to both Courts for the reasons given above.


Magistrates Courts

40 The respondents seek access to any Magistrates Court proceedings in which the applicant is involved. This application was extremely broad but in their oral submissions the respondents indicated that they are seeking information regarding two violence restraining orders alleged to be taken out by the applicant in the Magistrates Court.

41 We dismiss this application as s 33 of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA), when read with rules 37-40 of the Magistrates Court (General) Rules 2005 (WA),prohibit access to records held by the Magistrates Court with respect to civil proceedings, except for access by the parties to those proceedings. An application for a violence restraining order is a civil proceeding. The respondents do not claim to be a party to any of those civil proceedings with the applicant in the Magistrates Court. Accordingly we dismiss the application for the Magistrates Court to produce documents relating to any proceedings in that Court.




Confidentiality

42 We are concerned to protect the medical information that we have ordered be produced and inspected. It is not information which should be in the public arena as it is very personal to the applicant. It will include information given by the applicant in confidence to her medical advisors. It might include deliberations by those medical advisors with respect to the applicant.

(Page 15)



43 It is common where confidential information is ordered to be produced, to restrict access to that information to the parties and their representatives (Travel Compensation Fund v Blair [2004] NSWSC 501; see also ADI Limited & Ors and Commissioner for Equal Opportunity & Ors [2005] WASAT 259). We therefore limit access to the psychiatric and medical records we have ordered be produced to the parties, their legal representatives and the respondents' medical expert or intended medical expert. Further, the documents and any information gathered from them must be used by the parties only for the purposes of these proceedings.

44 How this evidence might be dealt with at the substantive hearing will be dealt with at that time.




Third party objections

45 If any person ordered to produce documents to the Tribunal by these orders objects to that production, then we will hear from them only if new evidence or grounds are put before us.




Orders


    1. Dr Rebecca Adams of 24 Colin Street, West Perth produce all documents in her possession from 1 May 2006 to the date of production, including but not limited to notes, letters, referrals, certificates and other material which relate to Ms Ribka Kassa's post traumatic stress disorder symptoms and diagnosis.

    2. Dr Tajinderpal Singh of Princess Medical Centre, 91 Princess Road, Balga produce to the Tribunal all documents in his possession, from 1 September 2005 until the date of production, including but not limited to notes, letters, referrals, certificates and other material which relate to Ms Ribka Kassa's post traumatic stress disorder symptoms and diagnosis, including details of any potentially contributing factors such as stress, illness or traumatic events reported by the applicant or considered by Dr Singh and the applicant's account of those matters to Dr Singh.

    3. This order also relates to any documents held by the practice manager (or other proper officer) of Princess Medical Centre where there are documents held by them that are not covered by the order with respect to Dr Singh.


(Page 16)
    4. Inspection of and access to the documents in orders 1, 2 and 3 be restricted to the parties' legal representatives and the respondents' intended expert witness and the documents and information derived from them must not be used for any purpose other than the purposes of these proceedings.

    5. The proper officer of Optus Pty Ltd of 50 William Street, Perth produce all records of calls and SMS texts made from and to mobile number [deleted] in the account name of Hassan Fatah of [deleted] between 1 January 2004 and 31 December 2005.

    6. The proper officer of Vodaphone Pty Ltd of 76 Kings Park Road, West Perth produce all records of calls and SMS texts made from and to mobile number [deleted] in the account name of Ribka Kassa of [deleted] between 1 January 2004 and 31 December 2005.

    7. The telephone numbers referred to in orders 5 and 6 must not be disclosed to any person other than the parties to these proceedings and the appropriate officers of Optus Pty Ltd and Vodaphone Pty Ltd and must not be published by any means.

    8. The documents required to be produced pursuant to the above orders must be produced to the Tribunal at Level 4, 12 St Georges Terrace, Perth no later than 4.30 pm on Tuesday 3 October 2006 and the parties may make arrangements to inspect those documents at the Tribunal from 9.00 am on Wednesday 4 October 2006.

    9. The respondent's application for production of documents from the Principal Registrar of the Family Court of Australia is dismissed.

    10. The respondent's application for production of documents from the Principal Registrar of the Family Court of Western Australia is dismissed.

    11. The respondent's application for production of documents by the Clerk of the Perth Magistrates Court is dismissed.



(Page 17)
    I certify that this and the preceding [45] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

    ___________________________________

    JUDGE J ECKERT, DEPUTY PRESIDENT


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