FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Abdul Raheem v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2001] FCA 940MIGRATION – application for review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal (“Tribunal”) – whether the Tribunal constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction or erred in law by failing to take relevant considerations into account – whether the Tribunal misdirecting itself in deciding whether to exercise its power to make further enquiries pursuant to s 427(1)(d) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal misinterpreted the meaning of the phrase “well-founded fear of persecution”
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 427(1)(d), s 476(1)(b), s 476(1)(c), s 476(1)(e)
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai [2001] FCA 274 followed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 followed
Kulwant Singh v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (North J, 21 November 1996, unreported) followed
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Cassim (2000) 175 ALR 209 followed
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 followed
Arumugam v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 251 followedMOHAMED KAPARKAN ABDUL RAHEEM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
V 956 OF 2000STONE J
MELBOURNE
20 JULY 2001
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 956 OF 2000
BETWEEN:
MOHAMED KAPARKAN ABDUL RAHEEM
APPLICANTAND:
THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
STONE J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 JULY 2001
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. the application be dismissed; and
2. the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 956 OF 2000
BETWEEN:
MOHAMED KAPARKAN ABDUL RAHEEM
APPLICANTAND:
THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
STONE J
DATE:
20 JULY 2001
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia on 7 June 1998 on a false Sri Lankan passport issued in another name. The applicant lodged his application for a protection (class AZ) visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Act”) on 19 June 1998. That application was refused by the respondent’s delegate (“Delegate”) and the Delegate’s decision was upheld by the Refugee Review Tribunal (“Tribunal”) on 30 October 2000 (the decision was handed down on 17 November 2000). On 14 December 2000, the applicant applied to this Court for a review of the Tribunal’s decision under Part 8 of the Act. An amended application was filed on 2 March 2001. At the hearing, the applicant was given leave to file a further amended application in Court.
THE APPLICANT’S CLAIMS AND THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION
The applicant claimed that he had a well founded fear of persecution because of his membership of the United National Party (“UNP”), a large political party in Sri Lanka. The applicant claimed to have been physically harmed both before and after the 1994 election.…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Abdul Raheem v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Af... and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2001] FCA 940
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issue was whether the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied the test of a well-founded fear of persecution. The Court examined the Tribunal’s duty to review and the potential for a failure to genuinely consider the application. The Court noted that while the Tribunal’s failure to give proper consideration to the materials before it does not necessarily lead to a ground of review, there are circumstances where the Tribunal might fail to genuinely review the application. The Court referenced Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai, where the Full Court considered the limited scope for arguing that the Tribunal had failed to properly review the application. The Court concluded that a failure to properly review the application could constitute a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, potentially falling within the grounds for review.
After considering the evidence and arguments, the Court found that the Tribunal had not incorrectly interpreted or applied the test of well-founded fear of persecution. The Court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. the application be dismissed; and
2. the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: STONE J
The final ground of review in the further amended application is that the Tribunal incorrectly interpreted, and applied, the test of well-founded fear of persecution.CONSIDERATIONThe Tribunal’s duty to review In Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai [2001] FCA 274 (“Anthonypillai”), the Full Court rejected the proposition that the Tribunal’s failure to give “proper, genuine and realistic consideration” to the materials before it will necessarily give rise to a ground of review in this Court under Pt 8 of the Act. In doing so, however, the Court emphasised the importance of the obligations that ss 65 and 414 respectively impose on the Minister and the Tribunal and made the following statement (at [78]-[80]):“Nonetheless, it seems to us that there is some scope, albeit limited, for the argument that the Tribunal may, in a particular case, have failed to “review” the decision of the Minister. In other words, although we consider the use of the formula “proper, genuine and realistic consideration” to be an unsuitable method of expressing the circumstances in which that contention can be maintained, we accept that there may be some cases where it can properly be said that the Tribunal has not in truth “considered” the application for a visa at all.It is often dangerous to seek to elucidate a principle by the use of examples, particularly when they are far removed from the facts before the Court. However, were the Tribunal to misconceive the nature of its statutory obligation, as for example by mistakenly believing that it was engaged in appellate review of the Minister’s decision (rather than a rehearing de novo), it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that it had failed to “review” the decision, in accordance with the requirements of the Act. Similarly, were the Tribunal to address the wrong question, rather than the question properly before it, there would be a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. Again, speaking hypothetically, were the Tribunal merely to pay lip service to its task, as for example by determining an application without reading the material filed before it, it would be difficult to conclude that it had “considered” the application. These examples are admittedly extreme. However, they serve to illustrate the principle. Where an applicant for review in this Court contends that there has been a failure on the part of the Tribunal to perform its statutory duty, that submission must be shown to fall within an existing ground of review contained in s 476(1). A failure of that type may well fall within the ambit of s 476(1)(e). The first two of the examples set out above would seem to do so. The third example is more problematic, though it might be said that the obligation which s 54 of the Act imposes upon the Minister “to have regard to all of the information in the application” is relevantly a “procedure required by the Act to be observed in connection with the making of the decision” for the purpose of s 476(1)(a). It should be remembered that a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction which does not fall within any of the grounds for review contained within s 476(1) may, nonetheless, give rise to a claim for relief in the High Court. It will not, however, form the basis for review of any decision in this Court.”