1911172 (Refugee)

[2024] AATA 1518

1911172 (Refugee) [2024] AATA 1518 (30 January 2024)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

REPRESENTATIVE:  Dr Sirous Ahmadi (MARN: 0854826)

CASE NUMBER:  1911172

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:            Iran

MEMBER:Senior Member G.A.F. Connolly

DATE:30 January 2024

PLACE OF DECISION:  Sydney

DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

Statement made on 30 January 2024 at 6:34pm

CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Iran – religion – Christian convert – threats from Iranian gangsters – prosecution by Iranian authorities – involvement in ‘party house’ events – paucity of evidence to support claims – credibility concerns – decision under review affirmed

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5AAA, 5H, 5J, 36, 65, 423A
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2

CASES
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependant.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

1. This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs (Minister’s Delegate) on 11 April 2019 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act).

2. This applicant is a citizen of Iran and is a [age]-year-old male from Isfahan.

3. The applicant’s movements from Iran and to Australia (and then back again, as well as to destinations elsewhere) are set out in the Protection Visa Decision Record that was made by the Minister’s Delegate[1] and which may be summarised as follows:

   [1] Protection Visa Decision Record of 11 April 2019 at page 13.

02 March 2015	Applicant (offshore) granted a Student – Higher Education Sector Visa (TU-573), expiring 13 September 2018
[Date] March 2015	Arrives in Australia
[Date] February 2016	Departs Australia for [Country 1]
[Date] February 2016	Arrives in Australia from [Country 1]
[Date] June 2016	Departs Australia for Iran
[Date] July 2016	Arrives in Australia from Iran (via [Country 2])
[Date] November 2016	Departs Australia for Iran
[Date] February 2017	Arrives in Australia from Iran (via [Country 3])
24 July 2018	Protection Visa Application (XA-866) lodged
30 August 2018	Application Invalid- personal identifier not provided
31 August 2018	Protection Visa Application (PVA) lodged
13 September 2018	Student visa expired
26 September 2018	Granted Bridging Visa A (WA-010) in association with PVA
11 February 2019	Protection Visa Interview (PVI)

1. Prior to his arrival in Australia, the applicant was already a very experienced traveller, having already travelled back to Iran, as well as to [Country 4], [Country 5], and [Country 6], in the period before his arrival in Australia in March 2015.[2]

   [2] Applicant’s evidence in the Hearing on 25 August 2023.

2. The applicant’s student visa was granted for the purposes of his studying for a Bachelor [degree] at [University 1].  The applicant has never completed his degree – and it is unclear from the materials before me what progress the applicant did make towards the degree’s completion. At the present time, the applicant says he is working as a [Occupation 1][3], albeit in the Hearing he said he operated a [specified business].[4]

   [3] Protection Visa Decision Record of 11 April 2019 at page 6,

   [4] Applicant’s evidence in the Hearing on 25 August 2023.

3. On 10 August 2023, the applicant’s representative sent a long and detailed written submission on behalf of the applicant to the Tribunal, which I have closely read and considered.[5]  In this submission, the representative, inter alia,  took issue with the findings of the Minister’s Delegate in relation to the application and asserted facts to the contrary.[6]  What complicated this lengthy submission by the representative was the complete absence of filed evidence (even in the form of the barest witness statement) from the applicant himself.

   [5] Applicant’s Submissions of 10 August 2023.

   [6] Applicant’s Submissions of 10 August 2023 at page 9, particularly at [32].

4. On 25 August 2023, the applicant appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments. The applicant was represented by Dr Sirous Ahmadi who provided helpful assistance to the Tribunal. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Persian and English languages.

5. When asked to make his opening arguments to the Tribunal, the applicant conceded that his answers to the Minister’s Delegate (over four years earlier) had been short and not detailed and that he was attending the Tribunal hearing to explain in more detail.  When asked why his answers were short and not detailed, the applicant said that he had been “stressed” when he was interviewed by the Minister’s Delegate.

6. During the hearing on 25 August 2023:

   A.the applicant explained how he had grown up in Iran as someone who was not religious and was an agnostic, albeit consider Zoroastrianism at 15. He said that between 2009 and 2012, he was studying [discipline] at [education provider] in Isfahan, but that he dropped out of the course. While living in Isfahan in 2012 or 2013, the applicant says he was friends with an Iranian gangster named [Mr A] (see [G] below).  At this time, the applicant was also running a business importing [goods] from [Country 3].

   B.the applicant mentioned that some time in the period 2010-2015, he had a girlfriend named [Ms B] who was an Armenian Christian. (While much emphasis had been placed on this relationship, it is simply not clear what the importance of this relationship was to the applicant’s claims in this case. The past and persistently vague role of [Ms B] has hovered around the applicant’s story without having any connection to the merits of the applicant’s protection claims in 2023-2024. I have therefore given [Ms B] – and all matters related to [Ms B] – absolutely no weight either as a matter that is adverse to or supportive of the applicant’s claims.) 

   C.in July 2013, the applicant said that he lived in a “party house” in Isfahan, which he had apparently lived in for some period of time, which was subsequently “raided” by the Iranian morality police.[7] The applicant claims he was arrested in July 2013 and his party house was searched by these police. The applicant said that he was held for three days in the Isfahan detention centre. The applicant says he was arrested for drinking alcohol, including foreign alcohol, gambling, and “throwing non Islamic parties”.[8]  The applicant said in the hearing that having a party house in Iran with residents coming and going, to use alcohol and drugs (including opium), was quite common among well-to-do young Iranians, and where the key to such party houses was passed around to members of the friendship group.  (There is in the materials filed with the Tribunal a document purporting to be an “unofficial translation” of an Iranian state document which is a [Date] July 2014 Indictment of the applicant by the [specified] Criminal Court which, without more, seems to be rather dubious and out of time for crimes allegedly occurring in July 2013. I have given this matter no weight due to its doubtful provenance.[9])  At some point in this 2013-2014 period, the applicant asserts he lost a mobile/cellular phone and has provided an “unofficial translation” of a [Date] July 2014 document to that effect from the “deputy of public prosecutor” of Isfahan.[10]  The applicant then left Iran to visit [Country 4], [Country 5], and [Country 6], to visit his girlfriend. He then returned to Iran (seemingly without incident).[11] The applicant made no protection claims while visiting these European Union countries.

   D.The applicant said that he arrived in Australia in 2015 to study at [University 1]. The applicant’s then girlfriend [Ms B] had previously studied at the [Country 3] campus of [University 1], and then she and her family migrated to [Country 7]. The applicant says that in 2014 he was in the process of applying for a visa to go to [Country 7]. However, he came to Australia instead to study. The applicant says he was “broke” while he was studying at [University 1] and living at [Suburb 1], and that he considered committing suicide on two occasions.[12]

   E.I asked the applicant what his plan was while studying at [University 1].  He said that he wanted to “get into the finance industry” and that he currently owns a [specified] business. He said he always wanted to live in Australia and he never had any intention to return to Iran. However, he said that he did not want to apply for a “refugee visa”, which he saw as having stigma, and saw himself instead as more of a “business migrant”, like a brother who was in [Country 7] and his other brother who lived in Perth. The applicant said that he wanted to get out of Iran and that applying for a student visa would be processed more quickly than an application for a skilled visa. The applicant said that while he was both homesick and that he had visited Iran twice (in 2016), he saw Australia as his home.

   F.In 2017, the applicant commenced [Occupation 1] work in 2017, which work he still performs. The applicant says that he dropped out of his studies at [University 1] in 2018. In March 2018, while the applicant says he was still a student at [University 1], he became a Christian.[13] There is also a narration of the applicant’s becoming a Christian in his letter to the Tribunal.[14]  On 13 September 2018, the applicant’s education visa was due to expire.

   G.In July 2018, the applicant, while living in Australia, he claims he received a threat from the Iranian ‘oligarch’ called [Mr A], who was apparently some sort of gangster in Isfahan, and who in or about 2013 or 2014 would invite the applicant to his parties.  It was very hard to follow the applicant’s evidence in relation to [Mr A]. The applicant claimed that [Mr A] had sent gangsters to threaten or harm him. (The applicant claimed in a letter filed with the Tribunal in October 2023 that [Mr A] had been a participant in illegal sales of oil in Afghanistan and Iraq and laundered money.)[15]  The applicant claims that [Mr A] – and his brothers [Mr C], [Mr D], and [Mr E] – are well known Iranian criminals[16] that threatened him in some form or another, and who amount to Iran’s oligarchs (spelt “Ollaguards” in the applicant’s letter to the Tribunal).[17] The applicant claims that [Mr A] was aware the applicant had converted to Christianity and that [Mr A] would use his conversion to compel the Iranian state to persecute the applicant.[18]

   This summary of the applicant’s case, stilted as it must appear to any reader, reflects just how hard it was for the applicant in the hearing (and in his subsequent letter) to state his case with anything approaching precision. The applicant’s verbal narrative of his life was replete with vagueness and chronological gaps.  It was the Tribunal’s repeated experience in the hearing to have to make clear to the applicant that he must make his case in terms of precise dates, times, and places, as he would descend otherwise into hyperbolic assertions and incoherence. I made clear to the applicant that he had made his original application for a protection visa in August 2018 and that the Tribunal’s expectation was that – some five years later – he should be able to make a detailed case for why his claims should be accepted by the Tribunal.  Unfortunately, even in August 2023 and then October 2023[19], the applicant was including new matters and raising new issues. 

   [7] Applicant’s Letter to the Tribunal, dated 11 October 2023, at paragraph 43.

   [8] Applicant’s Letter to the Tribunal, dated 11 October 2023, at paragraphs 44 to 49.

   [9] The asserted Indictment was included as an attachment to the Applicant’s Letter to the Tribunal, dated 11 October 2023.

   [10] The asserted statement by the “deputy of public prosecutor” of Isfahan was included as an attachment to the Applicant’s Letter to the Tribunal, dated 11 October 2023.

   [11] Applicant’s evidence in the Hearing on 25 August 2023.

   [12] I note the letter dated 04 June 2018 from [University 1]’s registered psychologist in relation to treatment the applicant received while at the university.

   [13] Note that the Applicant’s formal certificate of Baptism is dated [in] November 2018 but, theologically, Christians can become so by desire even if not formally baptised: see, for example, Catechism of the Catholic Church at paragraphs 1257 to 1261. The date discrepancy should therefore be given no weight.

   [14] Applicant’s Letter to the Tribunal, dated 11 October 2023, at paragraphs 68 to 78.

   [15] Applicant’s Letter to the Tribunal, dated 11 October 2023, at paragraph 34.

   [16] Applicant’s Letter to the Tribunal, dated 11 October 2023, at paragraphs 28 to 32.

   [17] Google and other searches done by the Tribunal have not revealed anything to substantiate the existence or the criminal careers of any of the brothers named, regardless of search terms employed and even with some variations of spelling.

   [18] Applicant’s evidence in the Hearing on 25 August 2023.

   [19] Applicant’s Letter to the Tribunal, dated 11 October 2023, at paragraph 34.

7. At the hearing on 25 August 2023, notwithstanding the already elapsed five years, the applicant was given a further period of time to 22 September 2023 to file further evidence and materials with the Tribunal.

8. On 11 October 2023, the applicant sent a letter to the Tribunal, including several attachments in support of the contents of the letter.  I have read and considered the contents of that letter and all of its attachments, very closely.[20]  There are, in particular, two documents from the applicant’s two churches attesting to his membership of their congregations.[21] The letter also says that, notwithstanding what the applicant said previously in the Hearing about [Mr A], he said he had decided in coming to Australia “…to forget about what happened and I moved on.”[22]

   [20] Applicant’s Letter to the Tribunal, dated 11 October 2023.

   [21] [Church 1] (letter dated 07 February 2019) and [Church 2] (letter dated 08 October 2023). [Pastor F] of [Church 2] included a helpful summary of his work with the applicant.

   [22] Applicant’s Letter to the Tribunal, dated 11 October 2023, at paragraphs 62 to 63.

9. During the hearing, and in the materials subsequently filed with the Tribunal, the applicant made these two arguments to the Tribunal in support of his protection claims:

   A.he was a Christian and at risk of persecution in Iran; and

   B.he faced threats from both the Iranian gangster [Mr A] and the risk of prosecution by Iranian authorities (including at the instigation of [Mr A]) for the applicant’s alleged involvement in the “party house” events of 2013 and 2014, and, also, the applicant also faced threats from Iranian gangsters because of his exposure (in some entirely unclear capacity) to the criminal network of [Mr A] and because the applicant converted to Christianity.

   In these reasons, I deal with the applicant’s claims in (A) above to be a Christian who is at risk of persecution in Iran. 

10. Despite lengthy, verging on the exhausting if not torturous, efforts by the Tribunal to understand ground (B), the only possible finding in respect of (B) above - after trying to make sense of it and performing searches and reading materials to substantiate it – is that the applicant’s evidence is simply too bare, too weak, too dubious, and/or speculative, and, after a decade, unlikely to improve, and so this ground of claim should be dismissed.  There is just no evidence (at all) that supports any part of the applicant’s claim in (B) above.  The Tribunal cannot be sure that any person named [Mr A] (let alone his brothers) even exist. There is no possible finding on the scant evidence given by the applicant to the Tribunal (even on the most generous of considerations) that the applicant faces any relevant risk of harm or prosecution in Iran, especially in relation to the events of the 2013 “party house”, or its investigation, nor in respect of this individual named [Mr A], assuming he actually exists. Given the paucity of evidence provided by the applicant in relation to this ground (B) of his claim – a claim that was commenced on 31 August 2018 i.e., over five years ago – there is no reasonable course of action open to the Tribunal other than to dismiss this ground.  This is especially so given what I say in these reasons about the applicant’s complete lack of credibility.

11. The applicant’s case for protection in claimed ground [12](A) above has failed for the reasons set out in this decision.  Overall, as I set out here, I found the applicant’s case to be vague, confusing, and extraordinarily difficult to comprehend, and, in every sense, unsubstantiated by the evidence. I have also drawn adverse inferences against the applicant in relation to his credibility.

CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA

1. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of Migration Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

2. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.

3. A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).

4. Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

5. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (the complementary protection criterion). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.

6. Any application to this Tribunal, even where an applicant has not attended their own hearing, is a proceeding de novo and not an appeal, strictly speaking, at least not an appeal to any court. The case before the Tribunal is heard and determined afresh, on the material that is placed before the Tribunal, and the Tribunal is not bound by any previous decision of the executive government.

1. In this matter, the Tribunal stands, rather, in the place of the original decision maker, with the power to affirm, vary, or set aside, and decide in substitution or remit a decision under review with the Tribunal’s directions or recommendations: s 43(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) (AAT Act). The Federal Court said this of the Tribunal’s task[23]:

   The question for the determination of the Tribunal is not whether the decision which the decision-maker made was the correct or preferable one on the material before him. The question for the determination of the Tribunal is whether the decision was the correct or preferable one on the material before the Tribunal.

   It goes without saying that no two cases are the same and that each case must be judged according to its own facts and on its own merits. In view of what was said in Drake, set out above, it is important to repeat that the Tribunal here takes on the role of determining what was the correct or preferable decision on the whole of the material that has been filed with or presented to this Tribunal in this case.

   Mandatory Considerations

   In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of Migration Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

   [23] Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577 at 589 per Bowen CJ and Deane J.

THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS TRIBUNAL

1. It is important at the outset of these reasons to explain the nature of this Tribunal and its task in cases such as this one. This Tribunal was created by the AAT Act to be an enduring executive body that conducted merits review of applications made by persons dissatisfied with a reviewable decision made under federal law. Some of the impetus for this Tribunal’s creation arose from thinking across the common law world after World War II[24], like that of the Franks Committee[25] that inquired into British administrative law bodies, that sought to provide accessible and affordable non-curial mechanisms for citizens to challenge the administrative decisions of an ever larger and more bureaucratic state. The Franks Committee noted, for its part, that, “… statutory tribunals are an integral part of the machinery of justice in the state and not merely administrative devices for the disposing of claims and arguments conveniently”, adding the need for tribunals to be “open, impartial, and fair”.[26]

   [24] See the speech, “Overview of Tribunals Scene Australia”, given by Justice Garry Downes AM, then President of this Tribunal, on 05 April 2006.

   [25] The Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries chaired by Sir Oliver Franks OM GCMG and which reported in 1957 (Franks Committee) on aspects of British administrative law.

   [26] Cited by Hillaire Barnett, Constitutional and Administrative Law (12th Edition) (London, UK: Routledge, 2017) at 707.

2. With this in mind, it is important to note that this Tribunal, as I have explained in other reasons, operates as an executive body under Chapter II of the Constitution – and is not a Court, which operates under Chapter III of the Constitution. That is, the proceedings before this Tribunal are inquisitorial of an applicant’s case – not adversarial as between plaintiff and defendant parties – and the Tribunal does not, in protection cases such as this one, anyway, operate in the mode of a contradictor. So, in practice, in the matters before this Tribunal, it was and is the responsibility of every applicant to make their own case. It is not for the Tribunal to try and guess at the case that an applicant may be making. That is, it is up to the applicant to advance whatever evidence or argument they wish to advance in support of their particular case. In these sorts of protection cases, an applicant’s contention will be that Australia owes them protection obligations. This Tribunal must then decide whether the applicant has on all of the evidence before and materials available to the Tribunal, made good their claim.[27]

   [27] See Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 576 [187] per Gummow and Hayne JJ

3. With specificity, and to emphasise this crucial aspect of the Tribunal’s operation, it is important to note that there are specific statutory requirements that impose upon applicants the obligation to make their own case in as much detail as possible – and to do so at their first reasonable opportunity: ss. 5AAA and 423A of the Migration Act.  Otherwise, an applicant risks the making of adverse inferences against them where they make a case made later in time, and, especially, where this later case, or some new claims, are made after what amounts to a significant delay. Claims that are ‘improved’ and/or ‘renovated’ will always arouse scepticism and require explanation, particularly as to why these claims were not raised earlier. A delay, in itself, may not always be fatal to an applicant’s case but an applicant’s delay will always need to be explained. I will now discuss these two sections in more detail:

   A.section 5AAA of the Migration Act makes clear that it is the responsibility of an applicant to specify all particulars of their claim to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and to provide sufficient evidence to establish the claim. The Tribunal does not have any responsibility or obligation to specify or assist in specifying particulars of the claim or to in fact establish or assist in establishing the claim. This is consistent with the well-settled proposition that it is for an applicant to make their own case. Further, and critically, applicants are expected to present their case in full before the primary decision-maker and not to wait until after the primary decision has been made. In this respect, two obligations are particularly relevant: the ongoing requirement under s.104 of the Migration Act for an applicant to ensure their relevant details are correct and up to date, and, also, for them to amend any incorrect information at the first reasonable opportunity.

   B.section 423A of the Migration Act requires the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference about the credibility of an applicant’s claims or evidence where the applicant raises a claim or presents evidence that was not put forward before the primary decision was made. In such a case, if the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant does not have a reasonable explanation about why the claim was not first raised or the evidence was not first presented before the primary decision, the Tribunal is required to draw an inference unfavourable to the credibility of the applicant’s claim or evidence. Applicants, therefore, who do not present all of their claims and evidence to the primary decision-maker must have a reasonable explanation for their not doing so.

   While the Tribunal is conducting a ‘de novo’ review, it cannot close its eyes to delay and to ‘recent invention’ of old evidence or new claims.  These are less matters of any strict rules of evidence than the proper application of common sense.  This said, there may be good reasons for a failure by an applicant to immediately recall all aspects of an applicant’s experience that may soundly ground a protection claim – and an applicant here may well be able to explain such a failure or delay.  It is crucial for this Tribunal to always keep an open mind and to be “open, impartial, and fair”  in its evaluation of all the circumstances of an applicant’s claim.  Yet, ultimately, it is always the applicant’s case to make.

4. In this case, I have considered all the material afresh and made my own assessment and determination as to whether the applicant meets the criteria for the grant of a protection visa.  While as noted above, the Tribunal is inquisitorial and can seek out the evidence it requires in order to reach a determination, the Tribunal is not required to actively seek out evidence to support an applicant’s claim.[28] It is, rather, the responsibility of each applicant to specify all the particulars of their claim to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and to provide sufficient evidence to establish such a claim: s 5AAA of the Migration Act.

   CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

   [28] see ABT16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 836 (05 June 2019) at [28] per Perram J.

   Applicant’s Claims

5. The applicant’s claims as made in the hearing and set out in the documentation are that the Minister’s Delegate erred in rejecting his claim to fear harm owing to his religious beliefs, should he return to Iran.

6. The Minister’s Delegate refused the applicant’s original claims, saying of his claims that he was a Christian convert[29]:

   As discussed in the Findings of fact in this decision record, I accepted that the applicant had a Christian girlfriend called [Ms B]. I found that the applicant converted to and continued practising Christianity in Australia for the sole purpose of his protection visa application.

   Therefore, I consider he would not continue to pursue Christianity in Iran. Based on this assessment, I find the likelihood of the applicant pursuing his Christian practice in Iran to be remote and far-fetched. Furthermore, there is no information before the Department to suggest that the applicant’s involvement in Christianity in Australia has become known to the Iranian authorities. The applicant has not indicated that his family has been contacted or harassed by the Iranian authorities since he left Iran.

   I consider there not to be a real chance of the applicant facing serious harm for having made Christianity-related social media postings in Australia, particularly as the applicant has not made any Christian-related posts from his personal Facebook account. I note the applicant’s claimed postings on Instagram were deleted after twenty-four hours. I therefore consider that the applicant has no permanent nor traceable evidence of his Christian practice emanating from his personal social media profiles that could come to the attention of the Iranian authorities. The following country information is also pertinent to the applicant’s circumstances.

   Declaring conversion on social media

   Declaring evidence of conversion on social media (either in Iran or whilst abroad) will not usually in and of itself lead to prosecution, though will often lead to monitoring; authorities will determine if the individual’s ongoing actions constitute a threat to be prosecuted.

   [29] Protection Visa Decision Record of 11 April 2019 at page 13.

7. As stated above, I consider the issue of the alleged Christian girlfriend, [Ms B], to be irrelevant for the purposes of this application.

8. Instead, taking the most generous view of the applicant’s case, here is what the applicant said in his post-hearing letter to the Tribunal of 11 October 2023, some five years after the applicant had first made his protection claim:[30]

   [30] Applicant’s Letter to the Tribunal, dated 11 October 2023, at paragraphs 85 to 92.

   85. I contacted my parents who knew about my new religion and told them about what
   [Mr E] has told me. My father who is well aware of how the regime in Iran works told
   me not to return to Iran for any reason as such threats are serious. After talking to some
   immigration agents in Australia, they all told me that if I fear a real danger because of
   my faith, I should apply for Australia’s protection.
   86. I therefore requested the Australian government to give me protection.
   87. I must say that since the day that I have believed in Jesus, everything has changed in
   my life. I found the answers to many of my questions through him. I feel empowered,
   calm and enlightened. Now I am completely certain that I have set foot in the truthful
   path. I am thankful of my God who has put his son, Jesus, on my way to show me the
   light of guidance.
   88. While I was a member of [Church 1], I had different responsibilities in the church including
   reading Bible and welcoming people into the church. I have also held free sessions of
   exercising for the members of the church two times a week and I have been successful
   in encouraging my previous roommate with the nickname of [Mr G] to have faith
   in Christianity.
   89. After I dropped out from [University 1], I moved to Sydney in Aug
   2019. From October of the same year until the Covid-19 lockdown I was attending to
   [Church 2]. During lockdown I was attending to the
   online church in both [Church 2] and [Church 1]. After Lockdown I was attending
   to [Church 3] for less than two years with my ex-girlfriend until march 2023 that
   I decided to not getting involved with [Church 3] anymore.
   90. After that for a few month I visited different Churches around my house such as [Church 4]. From May 2023 returned to [Church 2]. Overall, I would call myself a churchless person
   because for someone like me who has just converted to Christianity, understanding the
   difference between the branches of Christianity is not easy and it takes time. However,
   I am proudly believing in Jesus Christ and Holy Father unlike my past. I strongly
   believe in both Old Testament and the new testament during the era that most people
   deny that. I am loudly encouraging people to do so and I will continue to do so.
   Regardless of what life throws at me, I have Jesus Christ on my side and I don’t afraid
   of anything except for the God himself.
   91. I strongly believe that I return to Iran, my life will be in danger. In addition, I will not
   be able to openly practice my religion and evangelise others.
   92. I, therefore, humbly request from the tribunal to remit the decision to refuse my visa
   application and grant me the opportunity to live in this free country that I know as my
   home for the past few years.

30.    So far as I could tell in the Hearing, though, it was not clear that the applicant wanted to do more than just practice his new Christian religion.  Now, in his October 2023 letter, he also wishes to “evangelise others”.[31] The applicant’s case, here ‘improved’ and ‘renovated’, even in this letter he finally submitted to the Tribunal, is a reflection of the rambling nature of this application.

[31] Applicant’s Letter to the Tribunal, dated 11 October 2023, at paragraph 91.

Evidence in support of the Applicant’s Claims

1. The paucity of evidence before the Tribunal in support of the applicant’s claim was a recurring subject of the hearing. It is important to note that the applicant’s protection claim was originally begun in August 2018 and the hearing of the applicant’s claim was in August 2023. In the intervening five years, the applicant added very little evidence to his bare claim, only doing so very recently, and even then, improving upon and renovating the case he first made to the Minister’s Delegate.  Indeed. all that was filed in support of the applicant’s protection claim, after almost five years, was his representative’s submissions of 10 August 2023 and the applicant’s letter of 11 October 2023.

   Assessing the Applicant’s case

2. To reiterate what I have said in other cases: where an applicant makes a claim of a fear of harm, the mere fact that a person claims this fear for a particular reason does not establish either the genuineness of the asserted fear, or that the fear is well-founded, or that it is for the reason claimed. A fear of persecution is not well-founded if it is merely assumed, or merely asserted, or if its basis is mere speculation. An assertion, however, passionately and/or repeatedly it is made, is not proof of its truth.

3. Although the concept of onus of proof is inappropriate to administrative inquiries and decision-making of the kind done by this Tribunal, the relevant facts of the individual case will have to be supplied by the applicant in as much detail as is necessary to enable the decision-maker to establish the relevant facts. A decision-maker is not required to make the applicant's case for them. Nor is this Tribunal required to accept uncritically any and all of the claims and allegations made by an applicant.[32] As a general rule, this Tribunal grants the benefit of the doubt to applicants who are generally credible even if unable to substantiate all of their claims.  At the same time, an applicant who is not credible will, almost always, have their case rejected.

   [32] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596, Nagalingam (1992) 38 FCR 191, Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155.

4. This applicant claims, in so far as his quite muddled case can be assembled into some fit state, to have a well-founded fear of persecution within the scope of the Convention by reason of his being baptised in Australia as a Christian.  It goes without saying that a person may be categorised as a refugee where they have participated in groups or in actions that would cause them to have a well-founded fear of persecution in their home country.

5. As set out above, any applicant bears the responsibility to satisfy the Tribunal that their conduct, in this case a religious conversion, was genuine rather than was some device or activity that strengthened their protection claim. The Tribunal is not, here, acting as any sort of religious inquisitor, but is trying to verify the applicant’s claimed conversion to Christianity. The Tribunal must engage in this examination of a religious conversion before it can advance to the next stage of examining the consequences for the applicant that may result from his conversion.[33]

   [33]  SZOZT v MIAC [2011] FCA 1245

   Problems with the Applicant’s case

   Christian Convert?

6. As the Minister’s Delegate noted, rightly, there were and are significant problems with accepting the bases of the applicant’s claims of Christian conversion. These problems were repeated rather than remedied in the applicant’s appeal to this Tribunal.  Both in the Hearing and in his subsequent provision of documentation to this Tribunal, there was a deficiency of evidence that the applicant had ever truly converted to the Christian faith.  It was unclear in the Hearing and even now it remains unclear whether the applicant understands the basic tenets of Christianity. The applicant’s claimed conversion was in 2017-2018 and his hearing before the Tribunal was in August 2023.  Despite the intervening six or so years, the applicant seemed not to have spent any of that time in improving his Christian knowledge.  I deal more with this matter below.

   Dubious Protection History

7. Further, the applicant in the Tribunal hearing said that he went to [Country 4], [Country 5], and [Country 6], from September-December 2014 to visit his then girlfriend. This foreign travel by the applicant to Europe occurring  only months after what he says were his July 2014 “party house” related troubles with Iranian authorities and the Esfahan gangster, [Mr A] (assuming he exists). 

8. It was put to the applicant in the hearing, more than once, that it was and is jarring that the applicant had travelled as an Iranian citizen through all these European countries – with what he says was a threat of Iranian state prosecution hanging over him, as well as the threats of [Mr A] – and not once did the applicant consider applying for protection in any of these countries. It was as if the applicant’s travails, which were of no importance even only weeks or months after they occurred in 2014, suddenly in 2018 took on a newly critical importance – and this occurred at the same time as the applicant’s education visa was due to expire on 13 September 2018.

9. Despite everything the applicant alleged had happened to him in Iran in 2013-2014, it was only in 2018, when the applicant lived in Australia and his education visa was expiring, that the applicant say he considered applying for a protection visa. The applicant said that at no time in late 2014 - when he was in various European Union countries – did he consider making a protection claim.  This very odd chronology was put to the applicant and the applicant was unable to provide any sort of satisfactory explanation for his behaviour.  Even when given further time to put on evidence and submissions, the applicant failed to explain this quite bizarre chronology, which went both to the truth of what he had asserted and to his credit as an applicant for protection.

   Applicant’s credibility issues

1. The applicant’s case had several issues with his credit, in addition to those credit issues set out above, whereby he failed in 2014 to avail himself of the making of protection claims in Europe when he had freely travelled to [Country 4], [Country 5], and [Country 6].

2. Overall, the applicant was not credible and I found the applicant’s evidence, and his manner, in the hearing to be vague and unpersuasive.  The applicant’s inability to simply answer questions with precision, as well as his inability to recall obvious facts that were necessary to understand his case (were this case to ever be made properly), made his case nothing short of puzzling. 

3. It was very strange that the applicant had almost five years to gather materials to make his case and, yet, before the hearing, there was no filed statements, even of the unsworn kind, and no other evidence from the applicant. While this behaviour ultimately meant that the applicant’s case had no evidentiary support, it was, also, hard not to conclude that the applicant had engaged with the Tribunal in bad faith.  Throughout this case’s passage through this Tribunal, it was as if the applicant was trying to assiduously avoid any obligation to particularise and make plain his case. Instead, the applicant made extraordinarily claims, which were supported by no evidence, with the applicant’s intent to be, seemingly, to take refuge in ‘a fog of his own confusion’.[34]

   [34] Saying attributed to the Hon. T.E.F. Hughes QC, former Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia and Chairman of Blackstone Chambers.

4. If forced to summarise the applicant’s presentation of his own case, I would describe it as, at best, intentionally incoherent, and, otherwise, bordering on a deliberate vagueness that was some attempt to gain a favourable result by what I would describe as ‘befogging’ the Tribunal.  I am not sure what is actually true of anything that this applicant has told the Tribunal of the life that he said he lived, especially considering his prior ease of travel to and from Iran, with his now claimed fear of having to return.  Additionally, the applicant’s claimed conversion to Christianity, as I set out below, seemed less believable the more the applicant spoke in the Hearing.

5. An applicant’s case will, unfortunately, sometimes undergo ‘improvement’ and ‘renovation’ since it was first made to the Minister’s Delegate and even when it was made to this Tribunal. In this case, it has been a bizarre journey into matters that may or may not be true and others that seem to be creatures of fantasy, such as whether the applicant is a target of the Iranian state, or whether the figure of [Mr A] actually exists, and the only evidence for these claims comes from the applicant.

6. The applicant destroyed his own credit in the Hearing, notwithstanding how many opportunities he was given over the past five-plus years to tell the truth and to explain his story in a clear and coherent manner.

   Applicant’s claimed Christian beliefs

7. Finally, this applicant’s claims to be a convert to Christianity must be treated with the greatest of scepticism. 

8. When pressed in the Hearing, the applicant’s expression of his Christian beliefs was vague, to the degree that these beliefs cannot really be said to exist, and no reasonable decision-maker who questioned the applicant on his Christian beliefs could possibly be satisfied that they were or are honestly held by the applicant.

9. Indeed, during the Hearing it quickly became apparent that the applicant had a complete and chronic lack of basic Christian religious knowledge for a person who says he has been a Christian for over five years. The history of the applicant’s church membership, for example, reflects the vagabond nature of the applicant’s evidence.  The applicant has claimed to be a Christian – and now one who wants to evangelise others.[35] Yet the applicant said, in the Hearing, that he, first, went to a Greek Orthodox church, then to Hillsong Church, and now he said he was “churchless” – but also in the Hearing he said he an attender of what seemed an Anglican and then a Baptist church.  It was simply impossible to understand what the applicant was saying about which denomination he claimed to belong to and what church he claimed to attend.  Given the obligation upon all Christians of whatever denomination to attend worship services, even if they are ‘submarine Christians’ (who only ‘surface’ at Christmas and Easter at their church), it is passing strange that the applicant could not state what his church membership was, nor explain why he was ‘churchless’.

   [35] Applicant’s Letter to the Tribunal, dated 11 October 2023, at paragraph 91.

10. It was the applicant’s claim that he had been a Christian since 2018.  While it is obvious that Christians will find differing views on what it is to be a Christian, the applicant could only explain Christianity in the most basic, vague terms.  When asked what his favourite Bible passage was from the Old Testament, the applicant said he “loved them all”, and later related a vague allusion to the Prophet Samuel and talked of a biblical lesson about gambling, that the applicant, when pressed to identify this biblical lesson, then said he could not find in the Bible. Repeated questions to the applicant about his biblical knowledge yielded nothing except what may best be described as filibustering. This was behaviour that was entirely strange for a claimed Christian believer, who, even with the shallowest understanding of the Bible, should be able to readily nominate one or two Bible passages that have a special meaning, or indeed any meaning, for them as Christians.

11. At the conclusion of the hearing, the applicant made vague claims about his Biblical understanding, saying he could not be expected by the Tribunal to know from his memory what were his favourite parts of the Bible, as he said, “I am not good at memorising numbers”.  This assertion sat very oddly for a man who claimed to work in finance and, yet, in all the circumstances of this case, this quite strange ending also summarised the contradictions and superficiality of the applicant’s claimed conversion to Christianity.

12. Accordingly, I find that the applicant did not convert, in any genuine sense, to Christianity and I do not believe that he genuinely practices any form of Christianity. I find that the only purpose of the applicant’s attendance upon any Christian service in Australia was to further his claim for protection by Australia.

    Concluding Remarks

13. These proceedings were always the applicant’s case to make and he made no real, remotely serious, good faith, attempt to make a case for protection in this Tribunal.  The applicant had five years between the lodging of his protection claim in 2018 and his case’s hearing in this Tribunal in 2023, and, at no point in those five did he prepare any sort of argument nor did he obtain the evidence that would be needed to support his protection claim.

14. As a matter of common sense, it was always the task of any applicant whose protection visa application was made within weeks of his student visa expiring, to explain, in some detail, what was the chronology that would give rise to treating his application for protection as being based on an honest and prima facie plausible set of facts. One does not need to be Sherlock Holmes or Hercules Poirot to deduce that reality. 

15. It was and remains hard to look at this case as other than a last gasp effort by the applicant to obtain some visa foothold in Australia as his education visa was expiring.  The applicant’s case was nothing more or less than a wild collage of asserted happenings, rather any attempt by him at making a case for protection, and, overall, the applicant’s conduct of his case only raised more questions for any curious decision-maker.  The applicant, moreover, shredded his own credibility, with his claims to have converted to Christianity, when he had not a skerrick of the most basic elements of Christian knowledge.

16. It was always the applicant’s obligation to make his case in as much detail as possible – and to do so at the first reasonable opportunity: ss. 5AAA and 423A of the Migration Act.   Over five years later, the applicant’s case remains this vague melange of assertions and implausible stories of his life in Iran and elsewhere, which always seemed to be undergoing renovations and improvements, and like any structure that is under permanent renovation, the applicant’s case amounts to a public danger and is best dismissed.

FINDINGS

1. For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision under review should be affirmed.  I have looked at this case entirely afresh and yet I cannot come to any conclusion other than to affirm the decision made by the Minister’s Delegate.

2. For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).

3. Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(aa). The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa).

4. There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s 36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s 36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s 36(2).

DECISION

1. The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

   Statement made on 30 January 2024 at 6:34pm

   Graham Alfred Frederick Connolly
   Senior Member
   Administrative Appeals Tribunal

   ATTACHMENT  -  Extract from Migration Act 1958

   5 (1)    Interpretation

   …

   cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:

   (a)  severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or

   (b)  pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;

   but does not include an act or omission:

   (c)  that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

   (d)  arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

   …

   degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:

   (a)  that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or

   (b)  that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

   …

   torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:

   (a)  for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or

   (b)  for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or

   (c)  for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or

   (d)  for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or

   (e)  for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;

   but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.

   …

   receiving country,  in relation to a non-citizen, means:

   (a)  a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or

   (b)  if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.

   …

   5H  Meaning of refugee

   (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:

   (a)  in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or

   (b)  in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.

   Note: For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.

   …

   5J   Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution

   (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:

   (a)  the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and

   (b)  there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and

   (c)  the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.

   Note: For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.

   (2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.

   Note: For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.

   (3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:

   (a)  conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or

   (b)  conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or

   (c)  without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:

   (i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;

   (ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;

   (iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;

   (iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;

   (v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;

   (vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.

   (4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):

   (a)  that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and

   (b)  the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and

   (c)  the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.

   (5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:

   (a)  a threat to the person’s life or liberty;

   (b)  significant physical harassment of the person;

   (c)  significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;

   (d)  significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

   (e)  denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;

   (f)   denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.

   (6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.

   5K  Membership of a particular social group consisting of family

   For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:

   (a)  disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and

   (b)  disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:

   (i)the first person has ever experienced; or

   (ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;

   where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.

   Note: Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.

   5L  Membership of a particular social group other than family

   For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:

   (a)  a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and

   (b)  the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and

   (c)  any of the following apply:

   (i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;

   (ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;

   (iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and

   (d)  the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.

   5LA    Effective protection measures

   (1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:

   (a)  protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:

   (i)the relevant State; or

   (ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and

   (b)  the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.

   (2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:

   (a)  the person can access the protection; and

   (b)  the protection is durable; and

   (c)  in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.

   …

   36   Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act

   …

   (2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:

   (a)  a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or

   (aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or

   (b)  a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

   (i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and

   (ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or

   (c)  a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:

   (i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and

   (ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.

   (2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:

   (a)  the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or

   (b)  the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or

   (c)  the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or

   (d)  the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or

   (e)  the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

   (2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:

   (a)  it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

   (b)  the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or

   (c)  the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.

   …