Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions

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HOUSE OF LORDS SESSION 2003–04
[2004] UKHL 43

on appeal from: [2003] EWCA Crim 762

and [2003] EWHC 273 (Admin)

OPINIONS

OF THE LORDS OF APPEAL

FOR JUDGMENT IN THE CAUSE

Attorney General’s Reference No 4 of 2002 (On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)) Sheldrake (Respondent) v. Director of Public Prosecutions (Appellant) (Criminal Appeal from Her Majesty’s High Court of Justice) (Conjoined Appeals) ON THURSDAY 14 OCTOBER 2004 The Appellate Committee comprised: Lord Bingham of Cornhill Lord Steyn Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers Lord Rodger of Earlsferry Lord Carswell HOUSE OF LORDS OPINIONS OF THE LORDS OF APPEAL FOR JUDGMENT IN THE CAUSE Attorney General’s Reference No 4 of 2002 (On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division))

Sheldrake (Respondent) v. Director of Public Prosecutions

(Appellant) (Criminal Appeal from Her Majesty’s High Court of

Justice)

(Conjoined Appeals)

[2004] UKHL 43

LORD BINGHAM OF CORNHILL

My Lords,

1. Sections 5(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and 11(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000, conventionally interpreted, impose a legal or persuasive burden on a defendant in criminal proceedings to prove the matters respectively specified in those subsections if he is to be exonerated from liability on the grounds there provided. That means that he must, to be exonerated, establish those matters on the balance of probabilities. If he fails to discharge that burden he will be convicted. In this appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions and this reference by the Attorney General these reverse burdens (“reverse” because the burden is placed on the defendant and not, as ordinarily in criminal proceedings, on the prosecutor) are challenged as incompatible with the presumption of innocence guaranteed by article 6(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953) (Cmd 8969). Thus the first question for consideration in each case is whether the provision in question does, unjustifiably, infringe the presumption of innocence. If it does the further question arises whether the provision can and should be read down in accordance with the courts’ interpretative obligation under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 so as to impose an evidential and not a legal burden on the defendant. An evidential burden is not a burden of proof. It is a burden of raising, on the evidence in the case, an issue as to the matter in question fit for consideration by the tribunal of fact. If an issue is properly raised, it is for the prosecutor to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that that ground of exoneration does not avail the defendant.

2. Before turning to the facts of these two cases it is necessary to place them in their legal context. To this end I shall briefly review the pre-Convention law of England and Wales, the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it has so far developed and some of the leading cases decided in the United Kingdom since the Convention was incorporated into our domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998.

The pre-Convention law of…

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Details
Case
[2004] UKHL 43
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The House of Lords, in a consolidated appeal and reference, considered the compatibility of reverse burdens of proof in two criminal statutes with the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The first concerned Section 5(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, which required a defendant to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that there was no likelihood of driving a vehicle while over the prescribed alcohol limit. The second concerned Section 11(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000, which required a defendant to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they were not a member of a proscribed organisation or that they did not participate in its activities after it was proscribed. The House ruled that both provisions did infringe the presumption of innocence but were justified and proportionate, thus remaining valid. The reasoning emphasised the importance of the presumption of innocence and the balance that must be struck between individual rights and societal interests, while acknowledging the interpretative obligation under the Human Rights Act 1998 to reconcile statutory provisions with Convention rights as far as possible.

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