Samuel v Jarrah Timber and Wood Paving Corp Ltd

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    May 16.

    EARL OF HALSBURY L.C.

    (read by Lord Macnaghten ). My Lords, I regret that the state of the authorities leaves me no alternative other than to affirm the judgment of Kekewich J. and the Court of Appeal. A perfectly fair bargain made between two parties to it, each of whom was quite sensible of what they were doing, is not to be performed because at the same time a mortgage arrangement was made between them. If a day had intervened between the two parts of the arrangement, the part of the bargain which the appellant claims to be performed would have been perfectly good and capable of being enforced; but a line of authorities going back for more than a century has decided that such an arrangement as that which was here arrived at is contrary to a principle of equity, the sense or reason of which I am not able to appreciate, and very reluctantly I am compelled to acquiesce in the judgments appealed from.

    LORD MACNAGHTEN . My Lords, both Kekewich J. and the Court of Appeal decided in favour of the company. Having regard to the state of the authorities binding on the Court of Appeal if not on this House, it seems to me that they could not have come to any other conclusion, although the transaction was a fair bargain between men of business without any trace or suspicion of oppression, surprise, or circumvention.

    It is, I think, unnecessary to consider what the true construction of the agreement between Mr. Samuel and the company may be. The result would have been precisely the same if the agreement had in terms declared that the option was not to continue after repayment. The law undoubtedly is that a condition such as that in question, if legal and binding at all, must come to an end on repayment of the loan.

    In the Court of Appeal the question was treated as governed by the principle, of which Noakes v. Rice(1) is a recent example, that on redemption the mortgagor is entitled to have the thing mortgaged restored to him unaffected by any condition or stipulation which formed part of the mortgage transaction.

    That principle, I think, is perfectly sound. But, in my opinion, the question here depends rather upon the rule that a mortgagee is not allowed at the time of the loan to enter into a contract for the purchase of the mortgaged property.

    This latter rule, I think, is founded on sentiment rather than on principle. It seems to have had its origin in the desire of the Court of Chancery to protect embarrassed landowners from imposition and oppression. And it was invented, I should suppose, in order to obviate the necessity of inquiry and investigation in cases where suspicion may be probable and proof difficult. I gather from some general observations made by Lord Hardwicke in Mellor v. Lees(2) that he would have been disposed to confine the rule to cases…

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[1904] UKHL 2
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