R v Taylor (Appellant) - [2016] UKSC 5

Hilary Term

[2016] UKSC 5

On appeal from: [2014] EWCA Crim 829

JUDGMENT

R v Taylor (Appellant)

before

Lord Neuberger, President

Lady Hale, Deputy President
Lord Mance
Lord Sumption
Lord Carnwath
Lord Hughes
Lord Toulson

JUDGMENT GIVEN ON

3 February 2016

Heard on 15 December 2015

Appellant Respondent

Andrew McGee Steven Kovats QC
Duncan Atkinson

(Instructed by Trinity

(Instructed by Crown

Advocates) Prosecution Service

Appeals and Review Unit)

LORD SUMPTION: (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance,
Lord Carnwath, Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson agree)

1. This is an appeal by leave of the Court of Appeal on a point of law arising in

the course of the trial of the appellant, Jack Taylor, in the Crown Court at Exeter for
aggravated vehicle taking, contrary to section 12A of the Theft Act 1968.

The facts

2. The facts can be shortly stated. On the evening of 23 June 2012, the appellant, who was in Exmouth, took a Ford Transit Tipper truck from a friend, David Marriott,

in order to collect another friend from Exeter. The truck belonged to Marriott’s employer, and the Crown alleges that it was taken without the owner’s consent.

Having picked up the friend, the appellant was driving back to Exmouth when he collided on a bend in a narrow country lane with a scooter driven by Steven Davidson-Hackett. The scooter slid under the wheels of the truck, and Davidson- Hackett was killed. The appellant was later found to be over the drink drive limit. He was also uninsured. But the Crown, after a careful investigation of the accident, accepts that there was no evidence on which a jury could be sure that the manner of his driving was at fault or open to criticism.

The statutory framework

3. Section 12 of the Theft Act provides that a person shall be guilty of an offence

“without having the consent of the owner or other lawful
authority, he takes any conveyance for his own or another’s use
or, knowing that any conveyance has been taken without such
authority, drives it or allows himself to be carried in or on it.”

This a summary offence carrying a maximum sentence of six months imprisonment.

4. There are a number of offences of varying degrees of gravity which may be committed by drivers whose manner of driving causes death, injury or damage. At the relevant time, they included manslaughter, causing death by dangerous driving, causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving, dangerous driving, careless or inconsiderate driving, causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs, and various other offences involving drink or drugs. All of these offences require mens rea, generally provided by the absence of due care. The appellant was not charged with any of them, and in the light of the agreed facts about the manner of his driving, he could not have been convicted of any of them. Instead, he was charged with aggravated vehicle taking contrary to section 12A of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Taylor (Appellant)

Details

AGLC: R v Taylor (Appellant) [2016] UKSC 5
Case: [2016] UKSC 5
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This appeal concerns the interpretation of section 12A of the Theft Act 1968, which creates the offence of aggravated vehicle taking. The appellant, Jack Taylor, took a Ford Transit Tipper truck from a friend, David Marriott, without Marriott's consent, intending to collect another friend from Exeter. While driving back to Exmouth, the appellant collided with a scooter driven by Steven Davidson-Hackett, resulting in Davidson-Hackett's death. The Crown accepted that there was no evidence to suggest that the manner of the appellant's driving was at fault. The appellant was charged with aggravated vehicle taking contrary to section 12A of the Theft Act 1968.

The legal issue before the Court was whether the Crown needed to prove that the defendant's driving was at fault for the offence under section 12A(2)(b) to be committed. The Crown contended that only the unauthorised taking of the vehicle was required, while the appellant argued that some element of fault in the defendant's control of the vehicle was necessary, which contributed in a more than minimal way to the victim's death.

The Court found that the decision in Hughes was binding and that it applied equally to the offence under section 12A. The Court emphasised that there must be "at least some act or omission in the control of the car, which involves some element of fault, whether amounting to careless/inconsiderate driving or not, and which contributes in some more than minimal way to the death." Since there was no fault in the manner of the appellant's driving, he could not be convicted of aggravated vehicle taking.

The Court allowed the appeal and answered the certified question "No", meaning that an offence under section 12A(2)(b) of the Theft Act 1968 is not committed when, following the basic offence and before recovery of the vehicle, the defendant drove the vehicle, and without fault in the manner of his driving the vehicle was involved in an accident which caused injury to a person. The Court found that the absence of fault in the driving negated the causal connection between the driving and the accident. The Court did not consider it necessary to comment on the Crown's alternative argument regarding the appellant's blood alcohol level.

Orders