R v Docherty (Appellant)

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Michaelmas Term

[2016] UKSC 62

On appeal from: [2014] EWCA Crim 1197

JUDGMENT

R v Docherty (Appellant)

before

Lord Neuberger, President


Lord Mance
Lord Reed
Lord Carnwath
Lord Hughes

JUDGMENT GIVEN ON

14 December 2016

Heard on 3 and 4 May 2016

Appellant Respondent
Kirsty Brimelow QC John McGuinness QC
Philip Rule Simon Heptonstall
(Instructed by EBR (Instructed by Crown
Attridge, Solicitors) Prosecution Service

Appeals and Review Unit)

Intervener (Secretary of

State for Justice

David Perry QC

Melanie Cumberland

(Instructed by The Government Legal

Department)

LORD HUGHES: (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Reed and

Lord Carnwath agree)

Summary

1. The appellant Shaun Docherty fell to be sentenced in the Crown Court for offences of serious violence. He was on any view a high risk of further, and perhaps worse, serious violence. At the time when he was sentenced the statutory scheme for the sentencing of offenders who represent a future public danger was in the

course of change. The scheme provided for by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (“the CJA 2003”), as amended, was being replaced by a different one under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (“LASPO”). The transitional

provisions made by the Commencement Order for LASPO preserved the old scheme sentences if the conviction was before the prescribed commencement date. Docherty was convicted before that date and was accordingly sentenced, after it, to an

indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for public protection (“IPP”) under the

scheme of the CJA 2003, although that form of sentence was in the course of being abolished for the future. In his appeal against sentence he contended that the Commencement Order containing the transitional provisions was, to the extent that it preserved IPP for him, unlawful. He submitted that this was so for one or more of three reasons:

(a) because the new scheme was less severe than the earlier one, and therefore to apply the earlier was unlawful as contrary to an international

principle of “lex mitior”, which is binding on the English court via article 7

of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), as explained by

the Strasbourg court in Scoppola v Italy (No 2) (2010) 51 EHRR 12

(“Scoppola”); or

(b) because the purpose of LASPO was to remove IPP from the armoury

of sentencing, and therefore transitional provisions which preserved it to any
extent were outside the authority given by that statute; or

(c) because to impose an IPP on him, but not on a person convicted after

the LASPO commencement date, amounted to unlawful discrimination
against him, contrary to article 14 of the ECHR, read with article 5.

The facts

2. Docherty was born in April 1978. By the time he came to be sentenced in December 2012 on the occasion now under scrutiny he was 34 years of age. He had been convicted on 16 previous occasions of some 28 offences. There was a clear pattern of aggressive offending, usually fuelled by alcohol, supplemented in some cases by cannabis.…

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Details
Case
[2016] UKSC 62
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Shaun Docherty, was convicted in 2012 of multiple counts of wounding with intent. He was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for public protection (IPP) under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. However, the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) had already been passed, which abolished the IPP sentence. Docherty argued that the transitional provisions under LASPO that allowed for his sentencing under the old regime were unlawful. His arguments were threefold: first, that the new regime was less severe and therefore applying the old one was contrary to the principle of lex mitior; second, that the purpose of LASPO was to remove IPP entirely and transitional provisions preserving it were outside the statute's authority; and third, that the differential treatment amounted to unlawful discrimination. The court held that none of these arguments were valid. It found that the principle of lex mitior, as recognised in English law, did not require applying the new regime retroactively. The court also concluded that the phased introduction of LASPO was rational and lawful, and that any differential treatment arising from the timing of sentencing was justified as inherent to the change in the law. The appeal against the IPP sentence was dismissed.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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