Plevin (Respondent) v Paragon Personal Finance Limited (Appellant)

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Hilary Term

[2017] UKSC 23

On appeal from: [2013] EWCA Civ 1658

JUDGMENT

Plevin (Respondent) v Paragon Personal Finance Limited (Appellant)

before

Lady Hale, Deputy President


Lord Clarke
Lord Sumption
Lord Carnwath
Lord Hodge

JUDGMENT GIVEN ON

29 March 2017

Heard on 6 February 2017

Appellant Respondent
PJ Kirby QC Robert Marven
Thomas Bell Andrew Clark
(Instructed by Harrison (Instructed by Miller
Clark Rickerbys Gardner Solicitors)

Solicitors)

LORD SUMPTION: (with whom Lady Hale, Lord Clarke and Lord
Carnwath agree)

1.         On 12 November 2014, this court gave judgment dismissing Paragon’s

appeal and ordering them to pay Mrs Plevin’s costs in the Supreme Court [2014] UKSC 61. Those costs were subsequently assessed by Master O’Hare and Mrs

Registrar di Mambro in judgments given by them on 5 February 2015.

2. Costs in the Supreme Court were high, mainly because Mrs Plevin’s solicitors were acting under a conditional fee agreement (“CFA”), with after the

event insurance (“ATE”). They were assessed at £751,463.84, including £31,378.92

for the solicitors’ success fee and £531,235 for the ATE insurance premium. It need

hardly be said that these sums are wholly disproportionate to the relatively modest amount at stake, in the event just £4,500. This was a common feature of the costs regime introduced by the Access to Justice Act 1999, which ultimately led to its

abrogation on the recommendation of Sir Rupert Jackson’s Review of Litigation

Costs (2010). Subject to transitional provisions, the 1999 costs regime was brought to an end with effect on 1 April 2013 by Part 2 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.

3. Rule 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides for a party dissatisfied with an assessment of costs made at an oral hearing to apply for any question of principle arising from an assessment to be reviewed by a single Justice, who may refer the matter to a panel of Justices. Paragon applied for a review of the costs assessment on two grounds, both of which raise questions of principle. The first ground relates to the success fee. It is said that the CFA was made with the solicitors originally instructed by Mrs Plevin and was not validly assigned to the two firms who successively replaced them on the record. The second ground relates to both the success fee and the ATE premium. It is said that they were not recoverable, because they were payable under arrangements made by Mrs Plevin after the 2012 Act came into force. The application was referred to me as a single Justice. I referred it to the full panel which sat on the substantive appeal, because the second ground raised questions of some general importance. For the same reason, we are dealing with the matter by a formal judgment delivered in open court.

Assignments of the conditional fee agreement

4. Mrs Plevin entered into a CFA with her original solicitors, Miller Gardner, on 19 June 2008. Subsequently there were two technical changes of solicitor. They were…

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Details
Case
[2017] UKSC 23
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Plevin (Respondent) v Paragon Personal Finance Limited (Appellant), the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom considered an appeal against the costs awarded to the Respondent. The key issues were the validity of the assignment of a conditional fee agreement (CFA) and the recoverability of success fees and after-the-event (ATE) insurance premiums under the transitional provisions of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO). The Court held that the CFAs were validly assigned, and that the success fees and ATE premiums were recoverable under the transitional provisions. The Court found that the transitional provisions in LASPO were designed to protect the contractual rights and expectations of parties who had entered into funding arrangements before the commencement date of the Act. The majority of the Court held that the transitional provisions applied to the entire litigation, including appellate stages, whereas a dissenting opinion argued that the provisions only protected the pre-existing contractual rights and expectations. Ultimately, the Court confirmed the assessment of the costs judges, ordering the Appellant to pay the Respondent's costs in the Supreme Court.

Orders

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Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Legal Principle Established