Hilary Term
[2017] UKSC 23
On appeal from: [2013] EWCA Civ 1658
| JUDGMENT |
Plevin (Respondent) v Paragon Personal Finance Limited (Appellant)
before
Lady Hale, Deputy President
Lord Clarke
Lord Sumption
Lord Carnwath
Lord Hodge
JUDGMENT GIVEN ON
29 March 2017
Heard on 6 February 2017
Appellant Respondent
PJ Kirby QC Robert Marven Thomas Bell Andrew Clark (Instructed by Harrison (Instructed by Miller Clark Rickerbys Gardner Solicitors) Solicitors)
LORD SUMPTION: (with whom Lady Hale, Lord Clarke and Lord
Carnwath agree)1. On 12 November 2014, this court gave judgment dismissing Paragon’s
appeal and ordering them to pay Mrs Plevin’s costs in the Supreme Court [2014] UKSC 61. Those costs were subsequently assessed by Master O’Hare and Mrs
Registrar di Mambro in judgments given by them on 5 February 2015.
2. Costs in the Supreme Court were high, mainly because Mrs Plevin’s solicitors were acting under a conditional fee agreement (“CFA”), with after the
event insurance (“ATE”). They were assessed at £751,463.84, including £31,378.92
for the solicitors’ success fee and £531,235 for the ATE insurance premium. It need
hardly be said that these sums are wholly disproportionate to the relatively modest amount at stake, in the event just £4,500. This was a common feature of the costs regime introduced by the Access to Justice Act 1999, which ultimately led to its
abrogation on the recommendation of Sir Rupert Jackson’s Review of Litigation
Costs (2010). Subject to transitional provisions, the 1999 costs regime was brought to an end with effect on 1 April 2013 by Part 2 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.
3. Rule 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides for a party dissatisfied with an assessment of costs made at an oral hearing to apply for any question of principle arising from an assessment to be reviewed by a single Justice, who may refer the matter to a panel of Justices. Paragon applied for a review of the costs assessment on two grounds, both of which raise questions of principle. The first ground relates to the success fee. It is said that the CFA was made with the solicitors originally instructed by Mrs Plevin and was not validly assigned to the two firms who successively replaced them on the record. The second ground relates to both the success fee and the ATE premium. It is said that they were not recoverable, because they were payable under arrangements made by Mrs Plevin after the 2012 Act came into force. The application was referred to me as a single Justice. I referred it to the full panel which sat on the substantive appeal, because the second ground raised questions of some general importance. For the same reason, we are dealing with the matter by a formal judgment delivered in open court.
Assignments of the conditional fee agreement
4. Mrs Plevin entered into a CFA with her original solicitors, Miller Gardner, on 19 June 2008. Subsequently there were two technical changes of solicitor. They were…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Plevin (Respondent) v Paragon Personal Finance Limited (Appe... and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] UKSC 23
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi