(Instructed by Browne Jacobson LLP (Birmingham) and Bevan Brittan LLP (Bristol))
lord leggatt and lady rose (with whom Lord Briggs, Lord Sales and Lord Richards agree):
1. Introduction
We all die and, when we do, the fact or manner of our deaths may cause harm to other people. Often such harm is readily foreseeable. We all know that the death of someone's child, or of their partner, or of a young child's parent, will cause grief and suffering and can have prolonged and profound effects on physical and mental health. Death may also have damaging, even ruinous, financial consequences for family members or others who were dependent economically on the deceased.
Under the common law the rule was that "in a civil court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury" by another person: Baker v Bolton(1808) 1 Camp 493 (Lord Ellenborough); Admiralty Comrs v SS Amerika [1917] AC 38. This is still the general rule. The same rule applies where the victim does not die but is severely injured. Essentially, the common law does not recognise one person as having any legally compensable interest in the physical well-being of another. The law affords compensation to the victim but not to others who suffer harm in consequence of the victim's injuries or death, however severely affected they may be: see eg D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust [2005] UKHL 23, [2005] 2 AC 373, paras 102-105.
There is a statutory exception, introduced by the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 (9 & 19 Vict c 93) and now contained in the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, which gives certain dependants of a person whose death is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default the right to sue and recover damages from the person who (if death had not ensued) would have been liable to the deceased. Originally such damages were only recoverable to compensate dependants for financial loss resulting from the death. Since 1991, when a new provision was added to the 1976 Act, a spouse or partner or parents (if the child was an unmarried minor) of the deceased can recover damages for bereavement whether or not they were dependent on the deceased; but these damages are limited to a fixed sum (currently £15,120). No remedy under that Act is otherwise available for physical or psychological harm caused to relatives or others by the death.
There is a further limited category of cases, recognised by the common law, in which damages may be recovered for personal injury consequent on the death or injury of another person. In these cases, it is not the…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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